tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-236421142024-03-08T08:03:46.127+05:30New IndiaThese are exciting times to be in India, an India that is on the move and above all to be an Indian.Unknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger238125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-41159144976429772412007-09-08T17:24:00.000+05:302007-09-08T17:34:44.570+05:30The Israel Lobby in the U.S.<p align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Here is an interesting and insightful article from Stratfor on the the Israel Lobby in U.S. This one, if true, will put to rest some popular myths about the "most powerful" lobby in U.S. </span></p><p align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></p><p align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>By George Friedman</b><br /><br /><br />U.S. President George W. Bush made an appearance in Iraq's restive Anbar province on Sept. 3 -- in part to tout the success of the military surge there ahead of the presentation in Washington of the Petraeus report. For the next month or two, the battle over Iraq will be waged in Washington -- and one country will come up over and over again, from any number of directions: Israel. Israel will be invoked as an ally in the war on terrorism -- the reason the United States is in the war in the first place. Some will say that Israel maneuvered the United States into Iraq to serve its own purposes. Some will say it orchestrated 9/11 for its own ends. Others will say that, had the United States supported Israel more resolutely, there would not have been a 9/11.<br /><br /><br />There is probably no relationship on which people have more diverging views than on that between the United States and Israel. Therefore, since it is going to be invoked in the coming weeks -- and Bush is taking a fairly irrelevant pause at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Australia -- this is an opportune time to consider the geopolitics of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.<br /><br /><br />Let's begin with some obvious political points. There is a relatively small Jewish community in the United States, though its political influence is magnified by its strategic location in critical states such as New York and the fact that it is more actively involved in politics than some other ethnic groups.<br /><br /><br />The Jewish community, as tends to be the case with groups, is deeply divided on many issues. It tends to be united on one issue -- Israel -- but not with the same intensity as in the past, nor with even a semblance of agreement on the specifics. The American Jewish community is as divided as the Israeli Jewish community, with a large segment of people who don't much care thrown in. At the same time, this community donates large sums of money to American and Israeli organizations, including groups that lobby on behalf of Israeli issues in Washington. These lobbying entities lean toward the right wing of Israel's political spectrum, in large part because the Israeli right has tended to govern in the past generation and these groups tend to follow the dominant Israeli strand. It also is because American Jews who contribute to Israel lobby organizations lean right in both Israeli and American politics.<br /><br /><br />The Israel lobby, which has a great deal of money and experience, is extremely influential in Washington. For decades now, it has done a good job of ensuring that Israeli interests are attended to in Washington, and certainly on some issues it has skewed U.S. policy on the Middle East. There are Jews who practice being shocked at this assertion, but they must not be taken seriously. They know better, which is why they donate money. Others pretend to be shocked at the idea of a lobbyist influencing U.S. policy on the Middle East, but they also need not be taken seriously, because they are trying to influence Washington as well, though they are not as successful. Obviously there is an influential Israel lobby in Washington.<br /><br /><br />There are, however, two important questions. The first is whether this is in any way unique. Is a strong Israel lobby an unprecedented intrusion into foreign policy? The key question, though, is whether Israeli interests diverge from U.S. interests to the extent that the Israel lobby is taking U.S. foreign policy in directions it wouldn't go otherwise, in directions that counter the U.S. national interest.<br /><br /><br />Begin with the first question. Prior to both world wars there was extensive debate on whether the United States should intervene in the war. In both cases, the British government lobbied extensively for U.S. intervention on behalf of the United Kingdom. The British made two arguments. The first was that the United States shared a heritage with England -- code for the idea that white Anglo-Saxon Protestants should stand with white Anglo-Saxon Protestants. The second was that there was a fundamental political affinity between British and U.S. democracy and that it was in the U.S. interest to protect British democracy from German authoritarianism.<br /><br /><br />Many Americans, including President Franklin Roosevelt, believed both arguments. The British lobby was quite powerful. There was a German lobby as well, but it lacked the numbers, the money and the traditions to draw on.<br /><br /><br />From a geopolitical point of view, both arguments were weak. The United States and the United Kingdom not only were separate countries, they had fought some bitter wars over the question. As for political institutions, geopolitics, as a method, is fairly insensitive to the moral claims of regimes. It works on the basis of interest. On that basis, an intervention on behalf of the United Kingdom in both wars made sense because it provided a relatively low-cost way of preventing Germany from dominating Europe and challenging American sea power. In the end, it wasn't the lobbying interest, massive though it was, but geopolitical necessity that drove U.S. intervention.<br /><br /><br />The second question, then, is: Has the Israel lobby caused the United States to act in ways that contravene U.S. interests? For example, by getting the United States to support Israel, did it turn the Arab world against the Americans? Did it support Israeli repression of Palestinians, and thereby generate an Islamist radicalism that led to 9/11? Did it manipulate U.S. policy on Iraq so that the United States invaded Iraq on behalf of Israel? These allegations have all been made. If true, they are very serious charges.<br /><br /><br />It is important to remember that U.S.-Israeli ties were not extraordinarily close prior to 1967. President Harry Truman recognized Israel, but the United States had not provided major military aid and support. Israel, always in need of an outside supply of weapons, first depended on the Soviet Union, which shipped weapons to Israel via Czechoslovakia. When the Soviets realized that Israeli socialists were anti-Soviet as well, they dropped Israel. Israel's next patron was France. France was fighting to hold on to Algeria and maintain its influence in Lebanon and Syria, both former French protectorates. The French saw Israel as a natural ally. It was France that really created the Israeli air force and provided the first technology for Israeli nuclear weapons.<br /><br /><br />The United States was actively hostile to Israel during this period. In 1956, following Gamal Abdul Nasser's seizure of power in Egypt, Cairo nationalized the Suez Canal. Without the canal, the British Empire was finished, and ultimately the French were as well. The United Kingdom and France worked secretly with Israel, and Israel invaded the Sinai. Then, in order to protect the Suez Canal from an Israeli-Egyptian war, a Franco-British force parachuted in to seize the canal. President Dwight Eisenhower forced the British and French to withdraw -- as well as the Israelis. U.S.-Israeli relations remained chilly for quite a while.<br /><br /><br />The break point with France came in 1967. The Israelis, under pressure from Egypt, decided to invade Egypt, Jordan and Syria -- ignoring French President Charles de Gaulle's demand that they not do so. As a result, France broke its alignment with Israel. This was the critical moment in U.S.-Israeli relations. Israel needed a source of weaponry as its national security needs vastly outstripped its industrial base. It was at this point that the Israel lobby in the United States became critical. Israel wanted a relationship with the United States and the Israel lobby brought tremendous pressure to bear, picturing Israel as a heroic, embattled democracy, surrounded by bloodthirsty neighbors, badly needing U.S. help. President Lyndon B. Johnson, bogged down in Vietnam and wanting to shore up his base, saw a popular cause in Israel and tilted toward it.<br /><br /><br />But there were critical strategic issues as well. Syria and Iraq had both shifted into the pro-Soviet camp, as had Egypt. Some have argued that, had the United States not supported Israel, this would not have happened. This, however, runs in the face of history. It was the United States that forced the Israelis out of the Sinai in 1956, but the Egyptians moved into the Soviet camp anyway. The argument that it was uncritical support for Israel that caused anti-Americanism in the Arab world doesn't hold water. The Egyptians became anti-American in spite of an essentially anti-Israeli position in 1956. By 1957 Egypt was a Soviet ally.<br /><br /><br />The Americans ultimately tilted toward Israel because of this, not the other way around. Egypt was not only providing the Soviets with naval and air bases, but also was running covert operations in the Arabian Peninsula to bring down the conservative sheikhdoms there, including Saudi Arabia's. The Soviets were seen as using Egypt as a base of operations against the United States. Syria was seen as another dangerous radical power, along with Iraq. The defense of the Arabian Peninsula from radical, pro-Soviet Arab movements, as well as the defense of Jordan, became a central interest of the United States.<br /><br /><br />Israel was seen as contributing by threatening the security of both Egypt and Syria. The Saudi fear of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was palpable. Riyadh saw the Soviet-inspired liberation movements as threatening Saudi Arabia's survival. Israel was engaged in a covert war against the PLO and related groups, and that was exactly what the Saudis wanted from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. Israel's covert capability against the PLO, coupled with its overt military power against Egypt and Syria, was very much in the American interest and that of its Arab allies. It was a low-cost solution to some very difficult strategic problems at a time when the United States was either in Vietnam or recovering from the war.<br /><br /><br />The occupation of the Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights in 1967 was not in the U.S. interest. The United States wanted Israel to carry out its mission against Soviet-backed paramilitaries and tie down Egypt and Syria, but the occupation was not seen as part of that mission. The Israelis initially expected to convert their occupation of the territories into a peace treaty, but that only happened, much later, with Egypt. At the Khartoum summit in 1967, the Arabs delivered the famous three noes: No negotiation. No recognition. No peace. Israel became an occupying power. It has never found its balance.<br /><br /><br />The claim has been made that if the United States forced the Israelis out of the West Bank and Gaza, then it would receive credit and peace would follow. There are three problems with that theory. First, the Israelis did not occupy these areas prior to 1967 and there was no peace. Second, groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have said that a withdrawal would not end the state of war with Israel. And therefore, third, the withdrawal would create friction with Israel without any clear payoff from the Arabs.<br /><br /><br />It must be remembered that Egypt and Jordan have both signed peace treaties with Israel and seem not to care one whit about the Palestinians. The Saudis have never risked a thing for the Palestinians, nor have the Iranians. The Syrians have, but they are far more interested in investing in Beirut hotels than in invading Israel. No Arab state is interested in the Palestinians, except for those that are actively hostile. There is Arab and Islamic public opinion and nonstate organizations, but none would be satisfied with Israeli withdrawal. They want Israel destroyed. Even if the United States withdrew all support for Israel, however, Israel would not be destroyed. The radical Arabs do not want withdrawal; they want destruction. And the moderate Arabs don't care about the Palestinians beyond rhetoric.<br /><br /><br />Now we get to the heart of the matter. If the United States broke ties with Israel, would the U.S. geopolitical position be improved? In other words, if it broke with Israel, would Iran or al Qaeda come to view the United States in a different way? Critics of the Israel lobby argue that, except for U.S. support for Israel, the United States would have better relations in the Muslim world, and would not be targeted by al Qaeda or threatened by Iran. In other words, except for the Israel lobby's influence, the United States would be much more secure.<br /><br /><br />Al Qaeda does not see Israel by itself as its central problem. Its goal is the resurrection of the caliphate -- and it sees U.S. support for Muslim regimes as the central problem. If the United States abandoned Israel, al Qaeda would still confront U.S. support for countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. For al Qaeda, Israel is an important issue, but for the United States to soothe al Qaeda, it would have to abandon not only Israel, but its non-Islamist allies in the Middle East.<br /><br /><br />As for Iran, the Iranian rhetoric, as we have said, has never been matched by action. During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iranian military purchased weapons and parts from the Israelis. It was more delighted than anyone when Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. Iran's problem with the United States is its presence in Iraq, its naval presence in the Persian Gulf and its support for the Kurds. If Israel disappeared from the face of the Earth, Iran's problems would remain the same.<br /><br /><br />It has been said that the Israelis inspired the U.S. invasion of Iraq. There is no doubt that Israel was pleased when, after 9/11, the United States saw itself as an anti-Islamist power. Let us remind our more creative readers, however, that benefiting from something does not mean you caused it. However, it has never been clear that the Israelis were all that enthusiastic about invading Iraq. Neoconservative Jews like Paul Wolfowitz were enthusiastic, as were non-Jews like Dick Cheney. But the Israeli view of a U.S. invasion of Iraq was at most mixed, and to some extent dubious. The Israelis liked the Iran-Iraq balance of power and were close allies of Turkey, which certainly opposed the invasion. The claim that Israel supported the invasion comes from those who mistake neoconservatives, many of whom are Jews who support Israel, with Israeli foreign policy, which was much more nuanced than the neoconservatives. The Israelis were not at all clear about what the Americans were doing in Iraq, but they were in no position to complain.<br /><br /><br />Israeli-U.S. relations have gone through three phases. From 1948 to 1967, the United States supported Israel's right to exist but was not its patron. In the 1967-1991 period, the Israelis were a key American asset in the Cold War. From 1991 to the present, the relationship has remained close but it is not pivotal to either country. Washington cannot help Israel with Hezbollah or Hamas. The Israelis cannot help the United States in Iraq or Afghanistan. If the relationship were severed, it would have remarkably little impact on either country -- though keeping the relationship is more valuable than severing it.<br /><br /><br />To sum up: There is a powerful Jewish, pro-Israel lobby in Washington, though it was not very successful in the first 20 years or so of Israel's history. When U.S. policy toward Israel swung in 1967 it had far more to do with geopolitical interests than with lobbying. The United States needed help with Egypt and Syria and Israel could provide it. Lobbying appeared to be the key, but it wasn't; geopolitical necessity was. Egypt was anti-American even when the United States was anti-Israeli. Al Qaeda would be anti-American even if the United States were anti-Israel. Rhetoric aside, Iran has never taken direct action against Israel and has much more important things on its plate.<br /><br /><br />Portraying the Israel lobby as super-powerful behooves two groups: Critics of U.S. Middle Eastern policy and the Israel lobby itself. Critics get to say the U.S. relationship with Israel is the result of manipulation and corruption. Thus, they get to avoid discussing the actual history of Israel, the United States and the Middle East. The lobby benefits from having robust power because one of its jobs is to raise funds -- and the image of a killer lobby opens a lot more pocketbooks than does the idea that both Israel and the United States are simply pursuing their geopolitical interests and that things would go on pretty much the same even without slick lobbying.<br /><br /><br />The great irony is that the critics of U.S. policy and the Israel lobby both want to believe in the same myth -- that great powers can be manipulated to harm themselves by crafty politicians. The British didn't get the United States into the world wars, and the Israelis aren't maneuvering the Americans into being pro-Israel. Beyond its ability to exert itself on small things, the Israel lobby is powerful in influencing Washington to do what it is going to do anyway. What happens next in Iraq is not up to the Israel lobby -- though it and the Saudi Embassy have a different story.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=294861"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></p><p align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center><br /> </span></p>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-54802717646584137242007-09-08T16:17:00.000+05:302007-09-08T16:22:30.610+05:30Stratfor on Osama bin Laden's Latest Video<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor on Osama bin Laden's latest video.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td><br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">NBC News released the text of an alleged new video of Osama bin Laden on Sept. 7. Though the video is addressed to the United States, the message is clearly meant for al Qaeda's constituency as the jihadist leader provides justification for young mujahideen to continue their war against the West.<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In the 25-minute video, bin Laden addresses the American people and lays out his argument for why U.S. Democrats are unable to stop the Iraq war. He spends a great deal of time echoing the works of Noam Chomsky in condemning capitalism and globalization, arguing that the "money talks" notion is hardwired into the U.S. political system and is what drives the war industry. Toward the end of the speech, he calls for Americans to convert to Islam and makes an awkward outreach to Christians by noting how the Koran mentions Jesus and Mary dozens of times and even affirms the concept of the virgin birth. It is quite possible that the speech was written or influenced by Adam Gadahn, also known as Azzam the American, who is also referred to in the video. Bin Laden has not exhibited detailed knowledge of American political discourse in any of his previous communiques.<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The fact that he referenced the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as being observed "a few days ago" (the anniversaries are Aug. 6 and Aug. 9) means the tape was probably recorded in mid-August. This would be in line with the pattern of bin Laden's statements taking at least three weeks to be released after being recorded.<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">If the video is authentic, the main takeaway from the message is that bin Laden is, in fact, alive. He has not appeared in a video since November 2004, and for operational security reasons has avoided making any media appearances. The last video was made at what was perceived as a major turning point for the United States ahead of the congressional elections. Bin Laden likely chose to risk making his reappearance at this time to take advantage of a critical juncture in U.S. politics over how to proceed in Iraq. His speech will strike a chord among al Qaeda's sympathizers and franchise jihadist groups, but it does not necessarily raise the threat level for attacks against the West. The gradual degradation of al Qaeda's apex leadership has significantly hampered the group's ability to carry out meaningful attacks against Western targets. Moreover, bin Laden's vision of creating an Islamic Caliphate by toppling corrupt Muslim regimes has proven unattainable. Even in this new video, bin Laden has no accomplishment to tout other than 9/11, nor does he make any specific threats.<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Nonetheless, bin Laden remains the central inspirational figure to the modern jihadist movement, and the perceived proof of his continued survival from this video could aid regional jihadist nodes in recruitment and maintenance of their support networks.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=295042&selected=Analyses"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-69605443843592383332007-09-06T19:45:00.000+05:302007-09-06T19:57:07.329+05:30Stratfor's Forecast for US Military<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Here is Stratfor's 2005-15 decade forecast for US Military.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The peaks and troughs and localized strains the U.S. military has felt during the war on terrorism in general and the Iraq war in particular will prove to be immaterial in the coming decade. Regardless of the outcome of the war -- though Stratfor suspects it will end in Washington's favor -- U.S. military dominance will remain absolute during the next decade.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The U.S. military is the unquestioned and sole global military power; this is based primarily on the ability of the U.S. Navy to dominate the world's oceans. This condition of hegemony is only partially based on the superior numbers and technology of U.S. naval vessels and augmented significantly by U.S. dominance in space-based reconnaissance technology. On a broad scale, this situation will not change in the next 10 years -- especially regarding U.S. naval dominance -- but the next decade probably will see the emergence of cautious challengers to U.S. dominance over space.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Fundamental technological breakthroughs have often driven fundamental changes in warfare, and Stratfor expects the next decade to be no different. The next step in revolutionary warfare likely to become operational by 2015 is hypersonic scramjet technology. Having been developed by the United States for going on two decades now, this technology -- capable of traveling at 15 times the speed of sound, meaning an aircraft with a weapons payload could fly from Seattle to Beijing in less than half an hour -- will have a coming-out party of sorts over the next 10 years.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The availability of such a unique standoff weapon will allow for rapid response and battlefield dominance in every corner of the world. This already is provided in part by the U.S. Navy, but now weapons can be delivered to a target far from any substantive naval presence and rapidly enough to negate any conventional countermeasures an enemy might have on hand. Technology like this solves many logistics-associated force projection problems simply because assets do not have to be in theater in order to launch a strike. Naturally, this will be another warfare tool for the United States and will not supplant traditional tactics and techniques. As situations require, ground forces will still have to be sent in to hold ground and force a political outcome favorable to the United States. This weapon would, however, give the United States rapid first strike or retaliatory capability in corners of the world where U.S. forces cannot instantaneously interdict or where the overriding geopolitical concerns do not require the physical presence of traditional U.S. military assets.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This will force those seeking to counter the United States to look to asymmetric methods and toward the one area the U.S. military is still subject to competition -- space. After all, the quickest, stealthiest, most expensive aircraft in the world is still rendered useless if it cannot navigate or if intelligence on the target cannot be gathered quickly.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Given the virtual inevitability of U.S. naval dominance, state and non-state actors' only viable recourse will be the pursuit of asymmetric naval forces to limit Western mercantile and U.S. military access. Guerrilla navies are limited to regionally focused militant organizations (Tamil Tigers) and oceangoing pirates; in 10 years, however, the use of these navies might rise. Considering the ability of a single small craft to disable a U.S. naval vessel -- as evidenced by the attack against the USS Cole -- it is a logical step for anyone seeking to disrupt U.S. naval operations but without the conventional military strength to do so. Southeast Asia is the most likely area for this development, since the region already plays host to a number of maritime pirates and criminal organizations that can find safe sanctuary in areas of limited security and governance -- the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, for example. Elsewhere, increased naval activity in and around the Gulf of Guinea might inspire guerrilla navies to use the existing pirate havens of Nigeria and the surrounding area to launch attacks against mercantile and U.S. naval vessels and ships of allied navies.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Though a strategic competitor is not likely to emerge by 2015, missile technology will continue to develop. States such as Iran and North Korea could be able to deliver first-strike nuclear weapons to targets within their regions, including U.S. military bases and staging points. This is part and parcel of the unconventional threat that could trump the U.S. military's ability to project power wherever and whenever Washington sees fit.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Of course, hypersonic payload delivery technology partially mitigates this threat, since it is best used against fixed infrastructure targets. The broadening of the U.S. missile defense umbrella is another line of defense for countries within range of regional nuclear powers, but missile defense technology is still spotty, will likely lag behind offensive technology and will never be 100 percent reliable.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The possibility of non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons either through collusion with or because of the incompetence of a state government cannot be ruled out. A non-state actor in possession of nuclear weaponry allows for the weapons' use without political encumbrances and throws a volatile variable into military planning and operations in the next decade.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">There will be at least six potential rivals emerging to challenge the United States' sole ownership of global, real-time, space-based reconnaissance and navigation: Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran and Europe. All six have their own internal limits on what they can and will do as far as space-based technology goes, but each will attempt to deploy such assets one way or another.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Russia is the only competitor with an outside shot of actually reforming its existing space program to the point of creating a near-global, near-real-time reconnaissance system. Add this to existing ballistic missile technology, and a space-capable Moscow would pose a genuine threat to U.S. hegemony. The variable here is the economic and political status of Russia throughout the decade; the country is in a cycle of decline, but Stratfor expects that to reverse sometime in the next decade. Once that reversal kicks in, Moscow will pay far more attention to improving its space-based capabilities as the only viable hedge to U.S. global naval dominance.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">India and China are hamstrung by their indigenous space programs' limitations and the limitations created by economic difficulties, such as those forecast for China. Nevertheless, both countries maintain fairly substantial missile programs they will seek to augment with space-based assets to multiply their missiles' capabilities and deny the perception of free passage through their territorial waters. A rise in Chinese nationalism/militarism could serve as an impetus for this despite economic and social limitations. India's economy will continue to grow, and a severe economic crunch will not negatively impact its fledgling space program. It is possible -- and probable, in India's case -- that a limited space program, coupled with indigenous and exogenous missile development, could provide checks to U.S. naval dominance on a regional scale.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Japan's national security interests currently are in line with U.S. global and regional interests. In the long term, however, Japan likely anticipates its interests diverging from Washington's and could seek to use good relations now to incrementally launch a space-based reconnaissance and navigation program further down the road. This will be done slowly and innocently -- dual-use satellites, for example -- so as not to raise the United States' hackles and likely will not be completed by 2015, given Japan's economic and political limitations.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Iran and Europe are even further behind the power curve than other potential rivals. Europe has demonstrable space-based and satellite capabilities but does not, and likely will not, have the internal structure or political willingness to pursue a militaristic space program -- though Europe might be interested in a purely defensive domestic intelligence/surveillance space program. Iran has the motivation and the initiative, demonstrated by its planned March 2005 launch of its very first satellite. Additionally, Iran has a relatively capable missile program that will continue to improve, unless indigenous and exogenous factors interfere with Iranian military development. Their space program is still in its embryonic stages and not likely to be robust enough to challenge U.S. naval power even regionally.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The limiting factor for all these programs is not so much time as it is indigenous political willpower and economic capability. With the exception of Russia -- should its reversal come sooner rather than later -- none of the potential rivals has the necessary political willpower and economic leeway to complete a space-based defense program by 2015 that would be robust enough to challenge U.S. space hegemony.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Of course, geopolitical and military alliances between any of these rivals could accelerate indigenous programs and capabilities. It is worth noting that Russia has made a virtual cottage industry out of exporting its own space expertise and technology to countries such as India, China and Iran. Whenever Russia reverses course and begins to rebuild its military and space programs, this cooperation is likely to be somewhat curtailed, mitigating the benefits of these relationships.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Since U.S. naval dominance will not be challenged and power projection capabilities will remain near absolute, the United States will naturally respond in kind to a growing threat to its space hegemony. Stratfor expects a substantial increase in research and development into yet-to-be-realized anti-satellite technology to counter the potential rise of competing space powers. Whatever system is decided upon -- kinetic energy, high energy lasers, satellite parasites, jamming or chemical lasers -- it is not likely to be operational by 2015. Working prototypes, however, could be seen in limited operation by 2015. These will become even more indispensable when satellite-dependent hypersonic scramjet aircraft are put to use.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-5256188464036430332007-09-06T19:04:00.000+05:302007-09-06T19:43:45.882+05:30Stratfor India Forecast for 2005-2015<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">I was going through Stratfor's archives and read some of their old forecasts regarding India and her neighbours. It was quite interesting. So I thought flagging some of them.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Here is one of their forecasts for India made in July of 2001. Looking back, I am impressed with their accuracy.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">India is a major country to watch during the third quarter and the next few years. India is effectively an island, with swamp and jungle to the east, the Himalayas to the north and the economic and political wastes of Pakistan and Afghanistan to the west. India's economy is strong, with a growing base in technology, and its domestic politics are at least resilient, if not stable. With a navy that is growing and challenged by no one except the U.S. Fifth Fleet, India is fast becoming the predominate power in the Indian Ocean basin.<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">India is already being wooed by Russia, which offers arms, and the United States, which offers technology and investment. As it has the potential to control the gates to the Red Sea, as well as the straits of Hormuz and Malacca, India will spend the next few quarters choosing between suitors, rather than seeking them out. The United States, with more to offer, may emerge as New Delhi's partner of choice.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor also publishes "Decade Forecasts". In 2005 they published forecasts for the decade 2005-2015. Here is their forecast for South Asia. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">As this forecast was done before India's manufacturing boom became visible, Stratfor missed taking into account the benefits accruing out of this sector.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In our 1995-2005 decade forecast, Stratfor correctly said that India, as South Asia's leading player, would be contained by regional forces. India might continue to claim the title of regional hegemon, but the last 10 years have demonstrated New Delhi's inability to overcome social and political impediments to achieving superpower status. Furthermore, as the global hegemonic power of the early 21st century, the United States will undoubtedly extend its influence -- already felt in Pakistan -- into the Indian subcontinent.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">As India enters the next decade, its center of gravity will be the economy. Economic growth is the key to a country's success or failure, and India is fully aware that it has the potential to create a position for itself among the world's leading nations. Though the popular message in international media is that India is on the brink of explosive growth and is following the path of its eastern neighbor, China, Stratfor holds a slightly more pessimistic view of India's future.<br />India has grown at an average annual rate of 6 percent during the past decade and will be able to sustain a strong level of GDP growth at rates reaching as high as 6 percent to 8 percent in the coming decade. However, India will not be able to reach China's current level of economic growth in the next 10 years.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">On the surface, India has several factors favorable to rapid economic growth. With a population of more than 1 billion, it has a massive and highly-educated labor pool from which to draw its resources. In addition, India does not face the language barrier China has, since English is prevalent throughout the country. This significantly contributes to its fast-growing software development sector by facilitating communication with India's Western trading partners.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">India will continue to occupy the profitable niche of value-added services driven by the information technology (IT) and telecom sectors. The states that have most benefited from these industries include the "Silicon Valley" cities of Bangalore and Hyderabad. However, the economic successes of these pockets of "Shining India" are not easily replicable and have not been adopted by India's other state governments. Even if these successes were to be replicated at the state level across the country, it would take at least another 20 years and a more diversified economy for India to reach economic growth levels comparable to China.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">To a large extent, India faces the same immense developmental obstacles it did at the beginning of its cycle of economic liberalization in 1991. On a basic level, the poor conditions of roads, railways, ports, airports and power supplies illustrate the enormity of India's task of modernizing its infrastructure to attract more FDI and allow businesses to operate more efficiently. While India's IT-driven states require only minimal levels of infrastructure, particularly in fiber-optic networks and electricity, the rest of India is largely underdeveloped. Thus, India is not in the position to become a highly industrialized country.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The India-China comparison has become common discourse, but is not an easy comparison to make. China began its economic reforms in 1979 under an extremely focused and strategic "period of readjustment" that has been successfully implemented through the effective central control of China's authoritarian regime. In contrast, India is arguably a highly diverse, massive and fractionalized democracy lacking the central control necessary to put policy reforms into action. No democratic country comparable to India in terms of size and diversity has succeeded in implementing wide-scale democratic reforms to achieve rapid economic growth.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Though India's current government is economically focused, actually getting state governments to implement reforms is a chore. In addition to rampant corruption and bloated bureaucracies in the Indian public sector, the Indian government's democratic structure and competing views of India's openness to trade and investment allow the states' chief ministers to ignore government policy reforms and pursue each political party's agenda, which is usually designed to garner votes through populist appeals. An important distinction to make is that while FDI is strongly sought after and encouraged in China, it is merely approved of and often resented by state governments in India. These differing attitudes toward reform define the contrast between the Chinese and Indian approach to economic development.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">With about one-fourth of the population living in absolute poverty, India has a significant number of voters who are not interested in FDI or global competition; the average voter is more concerned with where his next meal is coming from. This poverty is a developmental issue that must reach a manageable level before ruling governments can think past elections and toward long-term economic reforms. However, as local governments are forced to leverage poverty reduction and economic liberalization, the downward trend of poverty levels and upward rate of liberalizing India's markets will counter each other, thus preventing a rapid pace of economic development or poverty reduction.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Given the number of developmental constraints on its economic potential, India still has a long way to go before it can catch up to China's current economic growth rate. The good news for India is that its economy is in a stronger position than the Chinese economy as we look into the coming decade. Stratfor has forecast the burst of the Chinese economic bubble, signaling the inevitable halt to China's unprecedented growth trajectory. Combined with a massive and highly-skilled labor force, India's vital sectors provide a solid foundation for the country to pursue policy reforms at a strong yet gradual rate.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">On the geopolitical front, India will view Russia's disintegration as an opportunity to build its strategic alliance with the U.S. superpower. Although China will slow down economically, the East Asian giant will continue its attempts to tilt the balance of power on the Asian continent in its own direction, providing more reason for India to align with the United States and become part of the "winning" team in the global arena. India also will use this alliance to counter its historical opponent to the west -- Pakistan. India realizes the United States values the Indo-U.S. alliance in the long-term over its short-term alliance with Pakistan, which was primarily built in the last half of the previous decade because of the U.S.-led war on terrorism.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The dispute over Kashmir is the driving factor of Indo-Pakistani relations. Domestic constraints in India and Pakistan lead Stratfor to believe the issue of Kashmir will not be resolved in the coming decade. However, New Delhi and Islamabad will continue the process of normalization and will likely reach a point by 2015 at which the two states will begin implementing a "road map" solution.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The United States' final battle against al Qaeda will be fought within Pakistani territory early in the coming decade. Stratfor has been forecasting a U.S. incursion onto Pakistani soil targeting al Qaeda militants with or without Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf's cooperation. We expect the operation to be successful for the United States but costly for Musharraf, as domestic instability will rise in opposition to U.S. forces in the region. With the Pakistani government centered around Musharraf's leadership, political instability in Pakistan will continue to loom over the horizon.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Regardless of the domestic upset Musharraf is bound to face when U.S. troops enter the region, Stratfor expects the current military regime in Pakistan to stay in power until 2007, given that there are no viable opposition forces strong enough to unseat Musharraf. The balance of forces among the military, bureaucracy and centrist political groups ensures the survival of the state, despite any instability that occurs at the regime level.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">After 2007, Musharraf probably will reach a deal with his regime to step down as military commander of Pakistan, enter a civilian role as the elected president of Pakistan and assume leadership of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The centralization of power around Musharraf does not suggest that the Pakistani government would collapse in his absence. In accordance with historical precedent, the military and bureaucratic establishments would reach a consensus and Pakistani politics would shift back to increased civilian control until the domestic situation settled.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Pakistan will undoubtedly be influential in the nation-building effort in Afghanistan, given the large presence of ethnic Pashtuns in the two Pakistani provinces -- Northwest Frontier and Balochistan -- located along the Afghan-Pakistani border and the fact that Pashtuns account for at least 40 percent of Afghanistan's population.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The United States also will maintain its military presence in Afghanistan as part of its operation against al Qaeda. Opposition to U.S. forces in Afghanistan is significantly less than in Iraq, and the U.S. presence in the region will allow for much-needed stability to aid Afghan President Hamid Karzai's emerging state. The Taliban movement has collapsed and evidently splintered into at least three different factions, one of which wishes to lay down its arms and become part of the developing political system. As a result, the Taliban will be unable to make a comeback in the next decade.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">However, Karzai's government does face effective opposition from Afghan warlords, Uzbeks and Tajiks, all of whom have a vested interest in representing their respective communities in the government. Stratfor expects a consensus to be reached among the key players of each major ethnic community to work toward extending Kabul's influence to the 29 Afghan provinces. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center> </span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-57055240797524314042007-09-04T20:43:00.000+05:302007-09-04T20:54:26.675+05:30A Slap on the Face of Terrorists<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The world's tourists have just certified India as the best travel destination. This is certainly a tight slap on the nameless, ruthless, and pointed terrorist.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">.....India has now emerged as the numero uno travel destination trailing beauties of Italy, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand, according to survey by a tourism magazine. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">India's rise from the fourth spot last year was contained in a survey conducted by a widely-read British magazine Conde Nest Traveller, which gives away Readers Travel Awards, considered to be the Oscar awards of the tourism industry.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">"India was the 10th most preferred destination in 2004, 4th in 2006 and is now at the top in 2007 and that is where we want to be," Union Tourism Minister Ambika Soni said while receiving the award at a ceremony in London on Monday night.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Conducted among the readers of the magazine that includes some of the most sophisticated and avid travellers across the world, the survey included a range of criteria for each category from 'range of accommodation' to 'environmental friendliness', the magazine said in a release. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In the April issue of the magazine, readers were asked for nominations for the world's best hotels, spas, cities, airports, cruise lines and tour operators and to rate them. To discern their list of 'best of the best', each nomination was ranked to produce the world's Top 100 in each field.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The replies were then collated and analysed by an independent market research company before giving away with the awards.[</span><a href="http://www.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=91746"><span style="font-family:verdana;">IE</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center> </span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-12474289783360831602007-09-04T20:27:00.000+05:302007-09-04T20:42:56.388+05:30The Bumbling Indian Police<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Here is another example of bumbling by Indian Police which allows a terror suspect to escape. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td> </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Taking forward the probe into the August 25 twin blasts in Hyderabad, the police have arrested one more Bangladeshi woman in Bangalore. But another suspect Rizvan Ghazi once again managed to give a slip to the cops.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /><br />Afsana, 28, was arrested late on Monday from a house in Bannerghatta in Bangalore but her accomplice Rizvan once again escaped the police dragnet. She is the second Bangladeshi woman to be arrested in the case.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Police sources in Hyderabad said Afsana is a relative of Shafeera Rustomjah, a Bangladeshi arrested in Hyderabad four days ago for overstaying.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><u>Shafeera's brother Rizvan, who resembled the sketch of the bomb planter at Lumbini Park, escaped on Sunday when a police team from Hyderabad was reportedly arguing with an autorickshaw driver over the fare after reaching a house in Bangalore.</u><br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Shafeera, Rizvan and their parents were allegedly staying in Bangalore even six years after their visas expired.[</span><a href="http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.aspx?id=ab3ad8d3-79ea-4598-bcd9-e6c9aeab0915TerrorinHyderabad_Special&&Headline=Another+Bangladeshi+woman+detained"><span style="font-family:verdana;">HT</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-12436427435484550042007-09-04T14:56:00.000+05:302007-09-04T15:44:06.886+05:30The Coming Changes in Pakistan<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor takes a look at what’s in store for Pakistan and its Military after President Gen. Pervez Musharraf's fall. According to them it no longer is a matter of if, but of when Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf will leave the helm in Islamabad. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced Aug. 30 that he will return to Pakistan from forced exile Sept. 10. The same day, another exiled former leader, Benazir Bhutto, announced breakthroughs in negotiations with President Gen. Pervez Musharraf that would ease the general out of power. Meanwhile, the country's Supreme Court began proceedings on petitions challenging on constitutional grounds Musharraf's bid to seek re-election. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor forecast months ago that Musharraf would have to </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=285920"><span style="font-family:verdana;">concede</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> his position as military chief if he intended to stay on as a civilian president, and that he would have no choice but to work out a political agreement with Pakistan's opposition parties, specifically Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party. Prompted by advice from his closest aides, Musharraf is now quietly working toward securing an honorable exit from the scene. He could be forced to throw in the towel sometime after the appointment of a </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=289996"><span style="font-family:verdana;">successor military chief</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> on or around Oct. 8. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Once Musharraf vacates the presidency, events will pretty much unfold as per the constitution -- the way they did when the death in 1988 of Pakistan's last military dictator, Gen. Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq, created a power vacuum. A caretaker government headed by an acting president and an interim premier will be charged with holding fresh legislative elections, which will likely produce a highly divided parliament resulting in a coalition government.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Beyond the change in political personalities and groups, a far more important shift will take place in Pakistan in the coming months. For the first time since the army took control of the state in 1958 under Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the military's grip on the reins of the state is in the process of weakening. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This did not happen even when Pakistan's second military dictator, Gen. Yahya Khan, stepped down in 1971 after civil war led to the secession of a major chunk of the country and the surrender of some 100,000 troops to Indian forces. Neither did it happen when Zia-ul-Haq and his top generals died in a mysterious plane crash, ending his 11-year stint. In both cases, the military merely went into the background for some years -- only to return when the politicians could not agree to disagree. Even when the army was not directly ruling, the civilian leaders had to look over their shoulders continuously to see whether the generals were still with them nearly each step of the way. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">That was in the past, however, when there were essentially two players in Pakistan -- the army and the political parties. Today, a vibrant civil society and increasingly independent and assertive judiciary have emerged within the country.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The empowerment of Pakistan's civil society was catalyzed by Musharraf's ill-fated decision to sack Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry in March. Chaudhry, breaking with tradition, would not fold, which set in motion a series of events that, within a matter of days, energized bar associations across the country. In turn, this emboldened the judiciary to assert its independence and </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292616"><span style="font-family:verdana;">challenge</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> the military's hold on power. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The Supreme Court already has asserted its power, reversing a number of the Musharraf regime's decisions. The court reinstated the chief justice, released a top Musharraf opponent who was jailed on charges of treason and ensured Sharif's right of return. The judiciary also has taken steps to limit interference by the military and the intelligence agencies in matters of governance.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Meanwhile, the country's media, particularly the private television news channels, also have emerged as a powerful driver of events. In the wake of the judicial crisis, Musharraf tried June 4 to place restrictions on the electronic media through new ordinances empowering the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to block transmissions, suspend licenses and confiscate equipment of electronic media organizations deemed in violation of the new laws. But five days later, under intense domestic and international pressure, he was forced to withdraw the controversial restrictions.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Pakistan also has witnessed an unprecedented surge in civil society activism. Instead of the political parties that historically have led protests, civil society groups -- especially the legal syndicates -- drove the protests during the legal crisis. There also has been an unprecedented outbreak of social debate on national issues, not only regarding the military's role in politics but also on the issue of rule of law. This debate has included criticism of men in uniform, as well as politicians. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">All of this has been made possible by several structural changes that took shape mostly during the first seven years of Musharraf's rule. In order to counter the perception that he was a military dictator, Musharraf created a hybrid political system with a significant civilian component. Despite having manipulated the constitution on a number of occasions, he relied heavily on it to strengthen his grip on authority. In the process, he inadvertently strengthened the country's constitutional roots, which is now weakening the very power he consolidated.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Even within the military, Musharraf's repeated reshuffling of positions has contributed to his own undoing. It has brought to the fore a junior crop of generals that is inexperienced in politics and government. For a long time, this worked to his advantage by preventing any of his subordinates from rising up to challenge him. Now, however, as he faces challenges from Pakistan's civilian sectors, his top generals are unable and/or unwilling to support him. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In essence, the law of unintended consequences has worked against Musharraf. Moreover, it has weakened the military's ability to dominate the state. For now, this is limited to the political sphere. Eventually, the judicial branch can be expected to empower the legislative branch by forcing the military and the intelligence community to open up their books to parliamentary scrutiny. The weakening of the military's hold over the country's economic sector will be the next stage in the ongoing systemic change.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The question moving forward is: How far will the military's grip slacken before arrestors force the generals to take a firmer role? For now, the trend is running against the military -- and historical positions are being reversed. As the civilians entrench their power, it is the military -- not the civilian politicians -- that will mostly have to contend with limitations imposed by the judiciary. And civil society will serve as the watchdog.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">And yet, there are plenty of issues that have the potential to topple this emerging civilian structure, such as the ability of Sharif and Bhutto to get along with one another and cooperate in order to check the military's power; the Islamists' level of power in the political system; the level of security in the country's Northwest; the status of the war on terrorism; the amount of pressure from the United States; and, of course, how India reacts to the changing political dynamic in Islamabad.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Any of these issues could lead to the military's return. Pakistan might be moving into the hands of civilians, but half a century of political culture does not die easily.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=294771"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-85104701865794305622007-09-03T19:41:00.000+05:302007-09-03T20:38:36.130+05:30Is NDTV Committed to the Nation?<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It is a well known fact that NDTV is a leftist media organisation. Prannoy Roy's relation with the Commie couple the Karats is also well known. Because of these facts, NDTV's commitment to the nation is always questioned just like the Indian Commie's commitment is questioned. NDTV also came out editorially in strong defence of the Commies when they were <a href="http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20070023397&ch=8/21/2007%2010:01:00%20PM">accused</a> by the center-right media of being agents of Communist China. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Here is an example of NDTV's nationalism. A commander-in-chief of a north-east militant organisation drops in at NDTV's Guwahati office and NDTV instead of calling the authorities and getting these militants arrested treats them like kings and makes a news story out of their visit. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea" border="0"><tbody><tr><td></span><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Unexpected visitors dropped by at NDTV's Guwahati office on Monday morning.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It's not everyday that the commander in chief of a militant outfit walks in, and this one had an unusual request.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">He wanted to tell his side of a story NDTV had run last week.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The Dimasa group commander asked to see a CD NDTV had aired which had visuals of two boys being tortured by kidnappers.[</span><a href="http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20070024867"><span style="font-family:verdana;">NDTV</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div></td></tr></tbody></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-29269220367185584602007-08-31T17:41:00.000+05:302008-12-12T01:24:13.556+05:30Cartoon Speak: The Hindu on the Indo-US Nuclear Deal<div><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiWIzDztvzoYcX4srD0Nyopm4i7TCTjxc5_16FLfZDcAprfc8rphOqn2x8YZBxwNqfVY3npkCY7XUd_VPhiZGhVW0RFEN5gQYH_C-VNkwpNjdCLvz2Zks5rBtFWw2ifakMBDT7Rrg/s1600-h/manmohan+houdini.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5104836948537583314" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiWIzDztvzoYcX4srD0Nyopm4i7TCTjxc5_16FLfZDcAprfc8rphOqn2x8YZBxwNqfVY3npkCY7XUd_VPhiZGhVW0RFEN5gQYH_C-VNkwpNjdCLvz2Zks5rBtFWw2ifakMBDT7Rrg/s400/manmohan+houdini.jpg" border="0" /></a><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiljYLevBnISQXdK6DvfonAZHMWbKU-p5rxK20fwgxsTX7FjO9XtCnsMB5uiJ_XH8ipRz8UwyKxkPy9qO9hqOfzB_Ppynigp62zaQd9AxW_sp_1B2QM6gmmh2DDVqkgqakL9phJFw/s1600-h/nuk+rope+trick.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5104836952832550626" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiljYLevBnISQXdK6DvfonAZHMWbKU-p5rxK20fwgxsTX7FjO9XtCnsMB5uiJ_XH8ipRz8UwyKxkPy9qO9hqOfzB_Ppynigp62zaQd9AxW_sp_1B2QM6gmmh2DDVqkgqakL9phJFw/s400/nuk+rope+trick.jpg" border="0" /></a><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjF_ipGWEIPfWVDQvkXH2Wj472H-b6PS7yZ0o8eZ5oeDuZzdHTCQN86oR-Mht9JiNU4NrVjjriWebxS8v8dgj-wCaz8-4LNQ6YwOmWksO-YWnJknh2b4fTophVVpQvPkV00bZv2Jw/s1600-h/123+jump.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5104836957127517938" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjF_ipGWEIPfWVDQvkXH2Wj472H-b6PS7yZ0o8eZ5oeDuZzdHTCQN86oR-Mht9JiNU4NrVjjriWebxS8v8dgj-wCaz8-4LNQ6YwOmWksO-YWnJknh2b4fTophVVpQvPkV00bZv2Jw/s400/123+jump.jpg" border="0" /></a><br /><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQFh1pyxLVNhAfMA-g9xYxU7w-iEUhSHe89QXB0kA0YOJDFo1beLc7WKqpBOKwd7fh60C9WLgNoeZxxGLUTae0DrHhieQZIeBMhjzIfV5lxPRwuvBoMwgcealOBzQIi9ur_mIKrg/s1600-h/nuclear+modification.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5104837313609803522" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQFh1pyxLVNhAfMA-g9xYxU7w-iEUhSHe89QXB0kA0YOJDFo1beLc7WKqpBOKwd7fh60C9WLgNoeZxxGLUTae0DrHhieQZIeBMhjzIfV5lxPRwuvBoMwgcealOBzQIi9ur_mIKrg/s400/nuclear+modification.jpg" border="0" /></a><br /><br /><div></div></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-17451073892967402212007-08-31T17:16:00.000+05:302007-08-31T20:51:47.042+05:30The Decision Time is Now<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Around last year this time the Janata Party’s president Subramanian Swamy came up with an </span><a href="http://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=142&page=33"><span style="font-family:verdana;">incredulous plan</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> to make India a mighty economic power by 2020 and overtake China by then. According to him as the UPA had dumped economic reforms that are required to put India on the fast track of growth and development, it is imperative to get back the BJP led NDA back to power at the center with a mighty majority. And how does he envisage this to happen? According to Mr. Swamy “the BJP will return to power riding on a wave of support arising from the backlash of continuous hemorrhaging from terrorist attacks.”<br /><br /><br />Narendra Modi whom the courts called a modern-day Nero because he allowed the Sanghis to unleash unimaginable terror on Gujarati Muslims to avenge the Godhra carnage is known among Sanghis as “Hindu Hriday Samrat” (emperor of Hindu hearts). Why? Because they say he taught Gujarati Muslims a lesson that they will never forget. In today’s booming economy of Gujarat, its Muslims have no place. They have become second-class citizens in their own land.<br /><br /><br />The Gujarat riots which was the first one to be televised live was the last straw and it gifted South Indian Muslims into the hands of Pakistan’s ISI. Muslims </span><a href="http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Lifer_for_nine_in_Haren_Pandya_murder_case/articleshow/2146831.cms"><span style="font-family:verdana;">recruited</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> from Andhra Pradesh who were then trained in Pakistan by ISI assassinated ex- minister Haren Pandya. Now Hyderabad has become a safe haven for ISI’s Islamic terrorists. So much so that they are able to perpetuate their insidious wickedness with impunity in their haven and still hang around till further orders from ISI. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">After every terror outrage since 2002, India’s Center-Left Media almost justifies them as Muslim revenge for the 2002 Gujarat riots. Sadly India’s Muslims too have fallen for this lie completely.The Center-Left media has <a href="http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20070024346&ch=8/30/2007%201:08:00%20PM">hijacked</a> the recent terror bombings where Indian Muslims too have lost many lives, to promote their pathetic agenda of painting Pakistan as an equal victim of terror and thus implying that these trerror outgrages could be the handiwork of Hindu "terror groups". </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Today in Andhra Pradesh except BJP all other parties are wooing the Muslims as a strategic vote bank to supplement their various dedicated caste vote banks. For BJP, the Muslims are just cannon fodder. In Andhra Pradesh and particularly in Hyderabad, BJP and Muslim parties like MIM would love to polarize the society on communal lines to serve their narrow agendas.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">When the Islamists brief is to destroy India, it doesn’t mean co-religionists are exempted from being body bags in this war. This is yet to be comprehended by Indian Muslims. The earlier the Indian Muslims realize this fact, the sooner we can wipe this menace out. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It is up to India’s Muslims to decide their future (and probably India’s too). There are three points they have to decide on. One, whether they want BJP back in power at the center as a result of Hindu backlash as envisioned by Mr. Swamy. Two, whether they want a "Hindu Hriday Samrat" in each and every state of India and become pariahs like today’s Gujarati Muslim. Three, whether they want to live and enjoy life in tomorrow’s third biggest economy. The decision time is now. </span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-4097415927220978062007-08-31T12:48:00.001+05:302007-08-31T13:11:28.333+05:30The Desired Effects<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The repeated targetting of Hyderabad by Pakistan's ISI trained Islamist terrorists is having its desired effects. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In what could be the first aftershock of the recent macabre bomb blasts, the city has just lost a unit of a multinational corporation and along with it 5,000 jobs.<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This was disclosed by Sanjaya Baru, media advisor to the Prime Minister, while delivering Dr. Waheeduddin Khan memorial lecture on “The local and global in Hyderabad’s development”, at the Centre for Economic and Social Studies here on Thursday.Responding to questions from the audience, Dr. Baru narrated how a passenger, a top executive of the MNC, broke this news to him on board the New Delhi-Hyderabad flight. The board of the MNC was to decide whether it should set its shop in Hyderabad or Kuala Lumpur.<br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The bomb blasts led the board to plump for Kuala Lumpur.[</span><a href="http://www.hindu.com/2007/08/31/stories/2007083161550400.htm"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The Hindu</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">These lost 5000 jobs could have created an additional almost equal number of support and auxiliary services which could have benefitted the people of Hyderabad including a large number of Muslims.</span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-53462376003258961742007-08-31T12:29:00.000+05:302008-12-12T01:24:13.769+05:30INS Viraat off the Visakhapatnam Coast<div align="justify"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDXS0tZqCqCXKeHvLlwCx4deshOLl2s1bnv_9GScpQNlsnbio1Yx6imVCIfGSZSRNk5VHWtZ-TRG2S5jjA0gTDV0h-fhwiAZthObuMe_XVkSHJt4kx1hjUXkpWa2_lnYiewUA2NA/s1600-h/virat+off+vizag+coast.jpg"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5104756160202745538" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDXS0tZqCqCXKeHvLlwCx4deshOLl2s1bnv_9GScpQNlsnbio1Yx6imVCIfGSZSRNk5VHWtZ-TRG2S5jjA0gTDV0h-fhwiAZthObuMe_XVkSHJt4kx1hjUXkpWa2_lnYiewUA2NA/s400/virat+off+vizag+coast.jpg" border="0" /></span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center>Courtesy: The Hindu</center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This was published in today's "Young World", children's supplement of "The Hindu". Quite a beautiful setting. INS Viraat is docked off the Vizag coast because it is here to participate in the Naval exercise with US, Australia and Japan. <br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-16468571375272265212007-08-29T17:36:00.000+05:302007-08-29T19:14:57.576+05:30Stratfor on the Latest Hyderabad Terror Outrage<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor's Fred Burton and Scott Stewart analysing the latest Hyderabad terror bombings opines that the terrorists are learning fast but still have a lot to learn to be really deadly. As for me, after reading their analysis, I am of the opinion that Stratfor has some more to learn about India, her Society and her Muslims. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td> </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">An explosion ripped through a crowd watching a laser show at an outdoor amphitheater in the Indian city of Hyderabad on the evening of Aug. 25. At about the same time, a second device detonated in a popular outdoor restaurant in the city. The twin blasts killed at least 42 people and injured about 80.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Following the bombings in Lumbini Park and the Gokul Chat Bhandar restaurant in the Koti market, Indian police reportedly recovered as many as 19 unexploded devices in the city, though Stratfor has confirmed the recovery of only two devices, one under a footbridge in the Dilsukhnagar commercial area and a second in a movie theater in the Narayanaguda district. Regardless of the number of bombs planted, it appears the attack was intended to be more wide-ranging -- and deadlier -- than it was. The targets selected and the unexploded devices not only provide insight into the attackers' intent but also serve as a gauge of their level of competence. The unexploded devices will also provide investigators with a treasure trove of forensic evidence.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">While the number of malfunctioning devices points to an inexperienced bombmaker, the fact that the devices were planted without detection indicates the organization responsible for the attack is practicing fairly good operational security. No arrests have been made in connection with the case, meaning the cell members involved -- including the all-important bombmaker -- remain at large. Indian investigators, therefore, are racing against the clock to locate and apprehend the attackers before they can learn from their mistakes and launch another, more devastating attack.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>Dissecting the Attack</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The choice of targets in this attack says a great deal about the cell that staged it. Because the cell attacked soft Indian targets, rather than some of the many soft Western targets in and around the city -- Hyderabad is a high-tech hub for Indian and Western corporations -- it clearly is focused on striking what jihadists term the "near enemy" (India) and not the "far enemy" of the United States and other Western powers. Additionally, the targets were clearly civilian, rather than the type of targets normally selected by the </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=285871"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Maoist Naxalites</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, such as infrastructure or government sites. The Naxalites normally seek to avoid indiscriminate civilian causalities, since they believe such attacks will undercut their popular support. This, then, does not appear to be the work of either Naxalites or those jihadists who adhere to al Qaeda's targeting philosophy. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Therefore, based on the target selection, this attack appears to have been conducted by Kashmiri-type Islamist militants seeking specifically to kill Hindus in order to stoke intercommunal Hindu/Muslim violence. Furthermore, the intent of this attack appears similar to that of an Islamist militant attack in May against the </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=288832"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Mecca Mosque</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> in Hyderabad. That attack, though, revealed a strategy to strike at Muslim targets in order to incite communal riots between Hindus and Muslims. However, Hyderabad's Muslim community failed to take the bait and instead turned increasingly hostile toward these militant groups, further threatening their support.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The backlash experienced following the Mecca Mosque bombing likely encouraged the Islamist militants to </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=294511"><span style="font-family:verdana;">shift their focus</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> toward Hindu targets in their effort to stir up communal animosity. Furthermore, the choice of soft targets suggests the attackers did not consider themselves capable of hitting any of the city's many symbolic -- and therefore more highly protected -- Indian/Hindu sites. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Following the June 29-30 attempted bombings in London and Glasgow, Scotland, -- plots that involved militants </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=293266"><span style="font-family:verdana;">born in India</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> -- Indian authorities asked information technology companies in Hyderabad and other places to step up security. In addition, although the threats that surfaced Aug. 21 involved </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=294487"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Chandigarh</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, the warning served to keep security high at India's high-tech companies in places such as Bangalore and Hyderabad. Following the May 18 bombings at the Mecca Mosque, security at religious sites in the city also was increased. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In addition to the type of target selected, the type of attack conducted can provide insight into those behind it. In this latest attack, the perpetrators left improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in unsecured public places -- the modus operandi (MO) also employed in the Mecca Mosque attack. While using this common MO does not necessarily mean the same group is behind both attacks, it does signify that the groups that conducted the two attacks are operating at roughly the same level of operational sophistication. This type of attack against a soft target does not incur much risk and requires few resources. Additionally, it does not require the intense dedication/indoctrination required for successful suicide bombings, and it does not consume human resources as quickly; the operatives who planned and conducted this attack are still at large.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The selection of soft, vulnerable targets and the fact that at least half the IEDs deployed did not function as designed points to a low level of professionalism. However, it is significant that the cell obtained the explosives and components necessary for the devices, constructed them and deployed them without detection. This is not a small feat, which indicates the organization practices an acceptable level of operational security. It also seems to highlight the </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=293266"><span style="font-family:verdana;">shortcomings</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> of street-level Indian intelligence officers. The weaknesses of this militant cell appear to be in bombmaking and lack of imaginative operational planning -- the kind of planning that could allow the attackers to use their devices to target more high-profile figures or sites. However, these are areas in which militants traditionally improve with experience.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>The Importance of Bombmakers</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">One of the key positions in any militant organization is that of the bombmaker, since his work can literally make or break an operation. This was dramatically reflected in the difference between the impacts of the July 7 and July 21, 2005, London attacks. Because of the mistakes made by the July 21 bombmaker, that attack is now only a footnote to the successful July 7 attack. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In spite of popular wisdom, a person does not become a proficient bombmaker by reading a few Internet sites that offer instructions on bomb construction. Indeed, as demonstrated by the would-be London and Glasgow bomber, Bangalore-born Kafeel Ahmed, even an advanced engineering degree does not provide the practical skills required for a person to become an effective bombmaker. This skill is even more critical when the bombmaker is working in an environment such as the United States or United Kingdom, where strict controls on explosives require that a bombmaker construct his own improvised detonators and explosive mixtures, a dangerous process in which one mistake can result in a serious injury or death. When making improvised explosive mixtures, even experienced bombmakers, including militant mastermind </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=266287"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Abdel Basit</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, occasionally catch themselves on fire. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">However, even when commercial or military explosives are available, designing an effective and reliable </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=258551"><span style="font-family:verdana;">firing chain</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> can be difficult. Inexperienced bombmakers often will take shortcuts when constructing their devices (especially when they have been ordered to construct multiple devices) and, in addition to making other mistakes, will not take the care to thoroughly test each of their firing chains for functionality. However, through trial and error, bombmakers tend to learn from past mistakes and improve their devices to make them increasingly reliable and deadly. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>CSI: Hyderabad</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Although a remarkable amount of forensic evidence can be recovered from any blast site, the unexploded devices picked up in Hyderabad will provide invaluable forensic evidence for Indian investigators. It obviously is far quicker and easier to work with intact devices than to try to recover and piece together a device after it detonates. One of the first items examined will be the IEDs' main explosive charge, which in this case appears to have consisted of cartridges of commercial explosives. These cartridges should have lot numbers on them that will allow authorities to trace them from the manufacturer to the last legitimate purchaser. Although explosives are frequently stolen from quarries and construction company warehouses (even by unscrupulous employees), tracking the explosives used in an attack to a specific robbery or theft could help authorities locate the cell.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In addition to the main charge, the devices could contain detonators (blasting caps) or booster charges that also might be marked with lot numbers or other traceable manufacturer markings. Other components used to construct the devices, such as the clocks used for the timers, the wires, the batteries and the containers, will be carefully studied and efforts will be made to trace them. The components also will be checked for fingerprint and DNA evidence, while evidence such as the marks made by the pliers or wire cutters likely will be studied and databased. It must be remembered, however, that CSI: Hyderabad is not the same as CSI: Miami -- and even Miami's real crime scene investigators are nowhere near as advanced as their fictional counterparts.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In addition, investigators will study myriad small details pertaining to the way the device was designed and constructed -- little touches referred to as the bombmaker's "signature" -- in an attempt to tie this specific bombmaker to previous plots. The signature can include unique items used in fashioning the firing chain; the way wire was stripped, cut, twisted and soldered; and the use of electrical tape and shrink tubing. In this case, it will be interesting to compare the signature of the person who made the two unexploded devices with that of the person who made the two unexploded devices recovered from the Mecca Mosque attack.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">As we said after the </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=288840"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Mecca Mosque</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> bombing, the attackers' MO, the placement of the devices and the number of unexploded devices indicate the organization behind that attack was not very sophisticated. The group behind this latest attack has exhibited many of the same characteristics. It does not appear to be overly advanced at this time -- though its ability to obtain explosives and deploy devices without detection is troubling for Indian authorities. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">While some sources in India say they believe Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency was involved in this latest attack, the simplicity of the attack and the lack of skill on the part of the bombmaker suggest there was no ISI connection. The operatives trained and directed by the ISI tend to be more professional than those behind this latest attack. Also, commercial explosives were used in this latest attack, which is </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=269956"><span style="font-family:verdana;">not without precedent</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, but an ISI-connected operation likely would have involved military explosives, such as RDX, which seem ubiquitous among militant groups on the subcontinent. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Although the Mecca Mosque bombing involved military explosives and targeted a different side of the communal line, there are many similarities between these attacks -- including intent, MO and level of professionalism. The Mecca Mosque bombing killed five people, while this latest twin bombing killed more than 40. If the same group is behind both attacks, it appears to be improving -- and getting deadlier. This learning curve will place additional pressure on Indian authorities to identify and capture the perpetrators before they can improve their tradecraft enough to stage larger, mass-casualty attacks or begin to attack harder, more secure targets, such government buildings, Indian high-tech companies or Western companies doing business in the country.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=294606"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-24478808159211116902007-07-17T11:34:00.000+05:302007-07-17T12:12:51.182+05:30R.I.P. Osama bin Laden?<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor after examining the latest Osama video is of the opinion that Osama might just be dead. I am not buying it yet especially when it is strongly 'rumoured' that Osama is in a safe house in Pakistan after he was airlifted along with those Pakistani military personnel who were helping the Taliban in Afghansitan.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Al Qaeda's media branch, As-Sahab, released a 40-minute video July 14 featuring several jihadist figures paying tribute to "martyred" militants. Attention to the video, however, is centering on a previously unseen 50-second clip of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who extols the virtues of martyrdom. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Although the bin Laden video is new in that it has not been seen before, it is not new chronologically. In fact, the "new" footage appears to have been taped at the same time as a bin Laden video released by the United Kingdom-based Islamic news agency Al-Ansaar in May 2002. Bin Laden's dress, the camera angle and the setting for both videos are identical. In both tapes, a mountain rises up next to bin Laden's right shoulder, there is a tree to his left and the same bodyguard stands behind him, occasionally visible over his left shoulder. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">One other similarity about these two videos is that they both were released under similar circumstances: during a time when there was doubt about bin Laden's well-being. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">At the time of the May 2002 video release, there was some doubt that bin Laden had survived the December 2001 U.S. assault on Tora Bora. Al-Ansaar reported that it believed the video had been recorded in March 2002, and that this proved bin Laden had survived the attack. Al Jazeera, however, reported that it had seen the video in early 2002 but did not air it. Al Jazeera further said it believed the video was recorded in October 2001 and that it therefore did not prove bin Laden survived Tora Bora. Later tapes that were deemed authentic new releases, however, did prove bin Laden survived the attack.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Today, the question of whether bin Laden </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=276581"><span style="font-family:verdana;">remains alive</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> is being debated again. He has not been seen on video since </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=238575"><span style="font-family:verdana;">October 2004</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> and he has not issued a new audio statement since July 2006. This silence stands in stark contrast to the </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=268665"><span style="font-family:verdana;">flurry</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> of audio statements he released in 2006. That series began with a </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=261123"><span style="font-family:verdana;">January audiotape</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, in which he warned Americans that an attack against the U.S. homeland was imminent, and ended with a July 1 message discussing Somalia. Bin Laden's silence also is remarkable when compared to the media activity of his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who has issued a number of statements this year, including three audios and a </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291201"><span style="font-family:verdana;">video</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> within the past month.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Al Qaeda has little to gain by keeping bin Laden out of the spotlight. Indeed, it could gain far more by trumpeting his ability to evade the massive U.S.-led manhunt for him. Al Qaeda also is under a great deal of pressure to demonstrate that bin Laden is alive and well, and in command of his organization. These factors suggest there is another reason for bin Laden to maintain a low profile. Perhaps he is dead, although based on al Qaeda's acknowledgement of the death of other senior figures, we would expect the organization to acknowledge such a loss, eulogize its "great martyr" and attempt to gain a public relations advantage out of the situation.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">There also have been continuous reports that bin Laden is seriously ill, so al Qaeda might not want to show him in poor health. Indeed, there was much speculation about his health after his last video, when he stood behind a lectern and did not move much. This was in contrast to a 2003 video (aired around the second anniversary of 9/11), in which bin Laden was shown walking with the aid of a cane on a hillside in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. If, indeed, bin Laden is in poor health, his voice might be too weak to come across forcefully on audio. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Although al Qaeda faces an operational security risk related to video messages -- al-Zawahiri has curtailed his video appearances markedly since the October 2006 missile attack in Chingai, Pakistan -- it should not be as concerned with an audio message. Audio equipment is compact, easy to conceal and easy to use without the need for a crew or lighting equipment. Bin Laden, therefore, could easily record his own voice. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">There must be another reason for his silence.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292356"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">A new al Qaeda tape is circulating; a sort of montage honoring the "fallen martyrs" of the Afghan war. Within the tape is a 50-second clip of al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden discussing his thoughts on the subject. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The tape was first released July 14, but now news commentators aplenty are citing the video as proof of al Qaeda's strength in general, and of bin Laden's vitality in particular. However, judging from the camera angle, the clothing and what appears in the video's background, the </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292356"><span style="font-family:verdana;">tape is more than five years old</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> and was filmed on the same reel used to assemble a video released in May 2002. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">That means it has been more than a year since al Qaeda released any evidence indicating bin Laden is still alive, and roughly five years since the apex leadership of al Qaeda has been conclusively linked to any attack outside the Middle East or South Asia. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">We certainly understand al Qaeda's effort to make its leader loom large; there are few organizations whose need to do something spectacular outweighs that of al Qaeda, and there is arguably no one who needs to prove he is a player more than bin Laden does. But barring a secret plan that, for some as-yet-undisclosed reason, necessitates hiding in Pakistani caves for years, bin Laden is either dead or incapacitated to the point that he cannot speak -- or his condition is such that his handlers prefer he does not. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">So, whatever other axes one might have to grind with the U.S. administration -- and these days there seem to be enough to outfit an army of Vikings -- take this for what it is: Bin Laden is probably gone for good, and al Qaeda likely lacks the ability to strike in any strategically meaningful way. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">But with the war against al Qaeda now disposed of, what of the other?[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292374"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Rest of that article is on the mess in Iraq.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-34346820067643314112007-07-13T11:34:00.000+05:302007-07-13T11:58:59.660+05:30More Stratfor Reports on Al Qaeda<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Here are three Stratfor reports issued after their last report titled "Many faces of Al Qaeda"</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>The Reality of Al Qaeda's Resurgence</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">A leak from the U.S. defense community revealed a document titled "Al Qaeda better positioned to strike the West" on Thursday, touching off a firestorm of debate within the United States over the status of the war on terror. According to the leak, al Qaeda is "considerably operationally stronger than a year ago," has "regrouped to an extent not seen since 2001," and is "showing greater and greater ability to plan attacks in Europe and the United States." </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor cannot analyze the contents of the report because we have not read it; so far, no one has felt it necessary to commit a felony by leaking this specific document to us. But the general thrust of the document, that al Qaeda has regenerated, is clear. Many of Stratfor's readers have noted that this position clashes with our </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292004"><span style="font-family:verdana;">recently clarified assessment</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> that, while al Qaeda remains dangerous, the group's day in the sun is over. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The first and most important question to ask when looking at this leaked report, then, is which al Qaeda is being discussed. Evolution and misuse of terminology means there are now two. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The first is the al Qaeda that carried out the 9/11 attacks. This group deeply understands how intelligence agencies work, and therefore how to avoid them. After the 9/11 attacks, however, this group's security protocols forced it to go underground, pushing itself deeper into the cave each time it thought one of its assets or plans had been compromised. The result was a steady degradation of capabilities, with its attacks proving less and less significant. Stratfor now estimates that, while this al Qaeda -- which we often refer to as the apex leadership, or al Qaeda prime -- still exists and is still dangerous, it is no longer a strategic threat to the United States. Its members can carry out attacks, but not ones of the grandeur and horror of 9/11, or even of the Madrid bombings, that achieve the group's goals of forcing policy changes on Western governments. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The second al Qaeda is a result of the apex leadership's isolation. It represents a range of largely disconnected Islamist militants who either have been inspired by the real al Qaeda or who seek to use the name to bolster their credibility. While many of these groups are rather amateurish, others are deadly efficient. It is best to think of them as al Qaeda franchises. However, these franchises lack the security policy or vision of their predecessor, and they do not constitute a strategic threat. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The difference between a strategic and a tactical threat is the core distinction, and one that should not be trivialized. There are hundreds of militant groups in the world that pose tactical threats, and many of them are indeed affiliated with al Qaeda in some way. As a bombmaker or expert marksman, a single person possesses the skills to kill many people, but that does not make that individual a strategic threat to the United States. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Posing a strategic threat requires the ability to carry out operations in a foreign land, raise and transfer funds, recruit and relocate people, train and hide promising agents, a multitude of reconnaissance and technical skills, and -- most important -- the ability to do all this while avoiding detection before striking at a target of national importance. Yes, an attack against a local mall or a regional airport would be a calamity, but it would not be the sort of strategic attack against national targets that reshapes Western geopolitics as 9/11 did. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Charging that al Qaeda is as strong now as it was in 2001 simply seems a bridge too far. Prior to 9/11, al Qaeda was running multiple operations across multiple regions simultaneously. Its agents were traveling the globe regularly and operating very much in the open financially. Their vision of resurrecting the caliphate was a large and difficult one. Achieving that vision required mobilizing the Muslim masses, and this required spectacular attacks. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">A spectacular attack is what they carried out -- once. Since then, all the apex leadership has done is issue a seemingly endless string of </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=285626"><span style="font-family:verdana;">empty threats</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, and consequently its credibility is in tatters. No one doubts al Qaeda's desire to strike at the United States as hard and as often as possible, but the lack of activity indicates its capabilities simply do not measure up. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">And even if al Qaeda did not have a goal that required regular attacks, we would still doubt the veracity of this report. If an intelligence agency has penetrated an organization sufficiently to be aware of its full capabilities, the last thing the agency would want to disclose is this success. The agency would keep its intelligence secret until it had neutralized the militants. Shouting to the world that it knows what the militants are up to tells the militants they have been penetrated and starts them on the process of going underground and sealing the leak. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><ul><li><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Which, of course, raises the question: What is this report actually seeking to accomplish? That depends on who commissioned the report in the first place, and -- considering the size of the U.S. intelligence community -- it could well mean just about anything. A partial list of justifications could include:<br /></div></span></li><li><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">an effort to pressure Pakistan into cracking down on al Qaeda for fear that the group is just about ready to launch another attack,<br /></div></span></li><li><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">an effort by the U.S. administration to regenerate its political fortunes by reconsolidating national security conservatives under its wing,<br /></div></span></li><li><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">a plea for more funding for this or that branch of U.S. security forces,<br /></div></span></li><li><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">a general warning to force any militants currently planning attacks to pull back and reassess -- in essence, an effort by intelligence services to disrupt any cells they have been unable to penetrate,<br /></div></span></li><li><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">or even an effort by one branch of the government to discredit the efforts of another.</span></div></li></ul><p align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </p><p align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">But regardless of which memos are floating about Washington these days, al Qaeda prime itself is not feeling all that confident of late. In his most recent taped release (al Qaeda's attacks have sputtered recently but its multimedia arm is booming), deputy al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri calls on Muslims everywhere to focus their efforts on the jihad in Afghanistan. He does not focus on Iraq, where the fires burn bright, or on Pakistan, where the apex leadership resides. </span></p><p align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </p><p align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It appears the Pakistani government is on the verge of finally moving in force against al Qaeda in the country, and a looming U.S.-Iranian rapprochement is making the position of foreign jihadists in Iraq increasingly tenuous. That leaves the movement with only the mountains of Afghanistan for shelter. After all, there is no spot on the globe farther away from what the West might consider friendly shores.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292192"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></p><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>Al Qaeda After the Red Mosque</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Deputy al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri's most recent taped message, which addresses the Red Mosque standoff in </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291930"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Pakistan's capital</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, contains very telling insights about the situation facing the apex leadership of the transnational jihadist organization, despite being issued before Pakistani security forces overran the mosque/madrassa complex. Now that the mosque operation has ended, having whipped up a great degree of anti-government sentiment, al-Zawahiri can be expected to release a follow-up tape to try to exploit the situation. But even in this initial tape, which was made some time after Red Mosque cult leader Maulana Abdul Aziz was arrested while trying to escape from the facility wearing female robes, al-Zawahiri demonstrates an awareness of the threat to al Qaeda that lies ahead. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">As far back as </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=250336"><span style="font-family:verdana;">June 2005</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, we identified that al Qaeda's clandestine global headquarters had relocated to the area comprising the districts of Dir, Malakand and Swat in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) following the ouster of the Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan. Being based in Pakistan meant al Qaeda could not go too far in staging attacks in country for fear of attracting unwanted attention. It therefore tried to ensure that jihadist activity in the country did not become a security liability for the apex leadership. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Clearly, a great deal of militant activity within Pakistan is not commissioned by al-Zawahiri, but rather is the handiwork of domestic jihadist actors. Despite several attacks against Western and Pakistani government targets since Islamabad joined the U.S. war against jihadism, the government of Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf refrained from engaging in major action against the Islamist militancy. The Red Mosque crisis, however, forced the Pakistanis to change their attitude. Not only did the government decided to engage in an unprecedented assault against a mosque, but in a July 12 address to the nation Musharraf also announced plans to go after militant groups all over the NWFP and the adjacent tribal badlands.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">We forecasted this move, predicting it could prove devastating for </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291532"><span style="font-family:verdana;">al Qaeda prime</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">. Al-Zawahiri is well aware of the potential for such an outcome, which explains his remarks urging Pakistanis to focus on jihadist activity in Afghanistan as opposed to the situation in Pakistan -- which, from al Qaeda's point of view, is hopeless. Al-Zawahiri said, "Muslims of Pakistan ... you must now back the mujahideen in Afghanistan with your persons, wealth, opinion and expertise, because the jihad in Afghanistan is the door to salvation for Afghanistan, Pakistan and the rest of the region. Die honorably in the fields of jihad."</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The call to focus on Afghanistan makes sense given the strategic and tactical situation al Qaeda faces. Pakistan has thus far provided the leadership sanctuary, but at the cost of significantly diminishing al Qaeda's operational capability. Furthermore, despite the significant radical Islamist presence within Pakistan, the country poses significant structural impediments to al Qaeda's objectives. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">What al Qaeda really needs is the anarchy Afghanistan offers, presenting conditions conducive not only to the group's survival but also to a revival of its operational capabilities. Al Qaeda calculates that, given U.S. problems in Iraq and the disarray among NATO member states, the United States eventually will force the West yet again to abandon Afghanistan. The jihadists would then be able to use Afghanistan again for their purposes. The West is not going to leave Afghanistan anytime soon, but al Qaeda prime, which faces only bad options, will pursue the best one.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Although al Qaeda would love to exploit the anti-government sentiments that have arisen among Pakistanis in the wake of the storming of the Red Mosque, the group probably is bracing for what Stratfor has identified as the beginning of a long-term struggle between the Pakistani state and the jihadist Frankenstein it created over an </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291825"><span style="font-family:verdana;">extended period</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">. While the struggle against the jihadists will be a long engagement, the founders of al Qaeda could get caught in the cross-fire between Islamabad and its former proxies in the not-too-distant future.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292189"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>Intelligence Guidance on Al Qaeda</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">There have been many warnings by the government of potential and impending attacks in the past six years in the United States. None have come to pass. The credibility of these warnings has to be judged on this basis. When you have a source that has consistently claimed knowledge of an impending event of the same class and the event has consistently not occurred -- and this has happened over the course of years -- you have difficulty taking any claim seriously. In fact, according to the craft, given this track record, the best thing to do is rigorously avoid listening to the claim and, well before this point, start looking at the motive for a trail of erroneous calls.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It is always possible that this time the government has better intelligence than before, but that is not the most likely explanation. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Warnings from the government of potential attacks are always suspect for the following reason: If you have penetrated an organization sufficiently that you are aware of its intentions, the last thing you want to give away is that you have penetrated. You keep it secret for exploitation. Your mission is to find and kill the enemy, and telling the world that you know what they are up to tells the enemy that they are penetrated -- it tells them to shut the leak. You do not want that. So in one sense, the administration's latest announcement rests on a dubious pedigree, and in addition, the question has to be asked: Why would an intelligence organization tip off an enemy that it has been penetrated by humint or electronic means? Why warn them that you are on to them? The warning gives away a huge advantage.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">From these two facts, it is very difficult to take this seriously. So, since U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff is no fool, we have to look for other reasons:</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">1. We are attempting to abort a potential and poorly understood operation. We do not really know very much, but there has been chatter about an attack. Since the attackers will not chatter, this is a dubious pedigree, but again, it is one that has to be reacted to. By issuing a nonspecific warning, all potential groups, if they are out there, will hopefully reassess and abort. This is not bad strategy, but it is used only when your intelligence is of a relatively poor quality and not actionable, and you want to put the other side off balance. You do not do this when you have really good penetration.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">2. There is currently a collapse in the Bush administration's political position in the Republican Party. A warning like this coincides precisely with such a situation. A warning at this time reminds everyone that the main enemy is out there, and puts those who oppose the Iraq war on the defensive. The administration has used warnings for political purposes in the past, but this particular warning is so blatant it is hard to take seriously.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">3. The warning takes place at the same time as events in Pakistan. There is a warning of a reconstituted al Qaeda, the leak of the 2005 incursion, the Red Mosque, and three carrier battle groups are about to be in the region. The warning can be taken as a prelude for military action in Pakistan. Certainly, we have established just cause with the warning.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">4. There is a semantic issue. The administration has historically mulched together al Qaeda as a strategic terrorist organization, with al Qaeda as a paramilitary force in Afghanistan and Pakistan. They have also confused Taliban and Al Qaeda. The reconstitution of the Taliban is a known fact. They undoubtedly have extensive paramilitary training facilities. Given past administration usage, these camps (the 10,000 terrorists al Qaeda was training in 2001) could be what they are seeing and the finding is being deliberately used in the way it was in 2001 -- conflating poorly trained Taliban fights with al Qaeda prime.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Finally, please note that if al Qaeda has reconstituted itself in Pakistan, this is an admission of a massive failure in the intelligence community. Given the resources spent to prevent such a reconstitution, the community is saying it has again been out-thought and outmaneuvered by al Qaeda. It has managed to rebuild in spite of the intense operations conducted to stop it from doing so. Not only have we not captured Osama bin Laden, but we have not even been able to interfere with al Qaeda's activities. Interestingly, the government seems to be saying that we have penetrated the organization well enough to know its status, but were impotent to have prevented its moves. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Given the government's track record and its warning, it is difficult to take this seriously. If the government indeed had deeply penetrated al Qaeda, announcing it publicly would make no sense, when no meaningful defensive measures could be taken and it would undermine the penetration. In addition, the claim of knowledge coupled with the admission of impotence makes no sense.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It could be that this warning should be taken more seriously than prior warnings that never amounted to anything. But we have been at this for six years, with prior warnings about actions in the continental United States that never came to fruition. Six years is a long time to generate false positives. But they have done this much. For the moment, the conversation has shifted from Iraq to al Qaeda. And if something does happen -- and who knows? It may -- the government has protected itself. If nothing happens, it will be forgotten. We know there have been no attacks in the United States since Sept. 11. We know there have been numerous alerts. It would be interesting for pure academic reasons to count the number.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292134"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-55455920618886418542007-07-11T13:25:00.000+05:302007-07-11T13:33:32.279+05:30Stratfor: Red Mosque Fallout Could Derail Election Schedule<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor on Red Mosque fallout.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The much-anticipated Red Mosque operation in Islamabad, Pakistan, on Monday was in its final stages. Security forces were cleaning up and trying to fully secure the mosque/madrassa complex. Intense fighting between security forces and the militants lasted about four hours. At least 40 militants and roughly six security personnel reportedly were killed. Dozens were wounded on both sides, and some 50 militants were arrested. As of the writing of this piece, however, there is not much information on the fate of the women and children the militants were holding hostage.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">After the dust settles and more information becomes available regarding casualties and damage to the mosque, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf's government likely will face the wrath of radical and Islamist militant forces in the country. This likely will involve a significant wave of attacks against government, military and Western targets throughout the country. There also could be assassination attempts against Musharraf and other key government and military officials.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Meanwhile, there already are indications that the government is going to engage in anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency operations elsewhere, especially in the North-West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. A militant reaction to the Red Mosque operation or a sweeping government action against jihadist forces -- or both -- is likely to lead to significant violence and unrest. The United States likely will be watching the situation closely and will be ready to act should the situation arise. In such a situation the government could move to impose some form of emergency rule. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The imposition of emergency rule could allow the government to get a handle on the militancy in the country and even lead to the capture or elimination of al Qaeda-related high-value targets -- albeit after a long and bloody campaign. But it would further complicate the political situation because the parliamentary and presidential elections slated for the fall would have to be postponed. This could create political unrest in addition to a militant insurgency. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Even if Musharraf decides against imposing emergency rule, the fallout from the Red Mosque operation could still cause a delay in the elections. At the very least, parliament could be dismissed, which would allow Musharraf to continue as a president leading a caretaker government for some time before new elections could be held. But this will only allow him a limited amount of time to conclude ongoing back-channel talks with his political opponents to secure his own political future. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In the wake of the Red Mosque operation, Musharraf will need not just the support of the Pakistan People's Party, whose secular ideology he shares, he also will need the support of some of the more pragmatic Islamist elements to help counter extremists and militants. Here is where Maulana Fazlur Rehman’s Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam -- the largest component party of the Islamist coalition Mutahiddah Majlis-i-Amal -- could play a role. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">But this depends on whether the president will be able to press ahead with the elections and deal with the militancy at the same time. Musharraf no longer has the luxury of dealing with them separately.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291930&selected=Analyses"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-19804651923786149432007-07-11T12:45:00.000+05:302007-07-11T13:07:29.620+05:30The Many Faces of Al Qaeda<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Here is another excellent article from Stratfor’s Peter Zeihan on Al Qaeda. It also looks at the core Al Qaeda’s possible Armageddon battle.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">With all the talk about al Qaeda "leaders," al Qaeda "factions" and militants with "links" to al Qaeda, it is useful to take a step back and clarify precisely what al Qaeda actually is. Al Qaeda is a small core group of people who share strategic and operational characteristics that set them apart from all other militants -- Islamist or otherwise -- the world over. All signs indicate this group is no longer functional and cannot be replicated. Whether or not Osama bin Laden is still alive, al Qaeda as it once was is dead.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Strategically, these men envisioned a world in which the caliphate would rise anew as a consequence of events they would set into motion. The chief obstacle to this goal was not the United States but the panoply of secular, corrupt governments of the Middle East. Al Qaeda knew its limited numbers precluded it from defeating these governments, so it sought to provoke the Muslim masses into overthrowing them. Al Qaeda also knew it lacked the strength to do this provoking by itself so it sought to trick someone more powerful into doing it. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">By al Qaeda's logic, an attack of sufficient force against the Americans would lure the United States to slam sideways into the Middle East on a mission of revenge, leading to direct and deep U.S. collaboration with those same secular, corrupt local governments. Al Qaeda's hope was that such collaboration with the Americans would lead to outrage -- and outrage would lead to revolution. Note that the 9/11 attacks were not al Qaeda's first attempt to light this flame. The 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings and the 2000 USS Cole bombing were also the work of this same al Qaeda cell, but the attacks lacked the strength to trigger what al Qaeda thought of as a sufficient U.S. response. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>The Real Difference</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">But al Qaeda is hardly the first militant group to think big. What really set al Qaeda apart was its second characteristic -- its ability to evade detection. That ability was part and parcel of the way in which al Qaeda formed. Al Qaeda's roots are not merely within the various militant groups of the Arab Middle East but deep within the geopolitical struggles of the Cold War. Many of the mujahideen who relocated to Afghanistan to resist the Soviet invasion found themselves recruited and funded by Saudi intelligence, equipped and tasked by U.S. intelligence and managed and organized by Pakistani intelligence. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This exposure not only leveraged the Afghan resistance's paramilitary capabilities but also gave the mujahideen a deep appreciation for, and understanding of, the strengths and weaknesses of the U.S. and Soviet intelligence systems. When the Cold War ended, some of those mujahideen reconstituted their efforts into what came to be known as al Qaeda, and those deep understandings became part of the organization's bedrock.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Such knowledge enables al Qaeda to operate beneath the radar of nearly all intelligence agencies. It knows how those agencies collect and analyze intelligence, where the blind spots are and, most important, how long it takes for an agency to turn raw information into actionable intelligence. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This characteristic is al Qaeda's greatest asset. Al Qaeda's standards of operation assume that intelligence agencies are always waiting and watching, and only al Qaeda's understanding of those operations keeps the "base" from being busted. Operational security -- not operational success -- is al Qaeda's paramount concern; its attacks are meticulously planned, fantastic in scope and sacrificed in a heartbeat if the leadership suspects a breach in security. This makes al Qaeda nearly impossible to track.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It also means that al Qaeda, by necessity, is a very small, close-knit group. The organization's core -- or the apex leadership, as we often call it -- consists of little more than Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and a double handful of trusted, heavily vetted relationships stretching back more than a decade. Disposable operatives with minimal training can be picked up for specific missions, but these people cannot do anything very complex (such as infiltrate a foreign country and hijack a civilian airliner).</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Replacement of lost assets within this small group is negligible due to security concerns. Ultimately, the same security protocols that empowered al Qaeda to be a player of strategic scope are what removed al Qaeda from the chessboard. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Once the CIA and its affiliated allies named al Qaeda public enemy No. 1, al Qaeda's security instincts became its greatest liability. The rapid U.S. invasion of Afghanistan caught al Qaeda off guard -- the group had assumed it would have months of U.S. pre-mission staging before the invasion, a lesson it learned from watching the first Gulf War. The quick U.S. response meant al Qaeda was forced to go into hiding before it had fully secured redundant communication, funding and travel routes. Intelligence agency efforts to penetrate al Qaeda forced the group to constrict information flow, limit financial transfers, reduce recruiting and abandon operations. Once the United States succeeded in co-opting Saudi assistance against al Qaeda in 2003 -- something brought about both by a U.S. presence in Iraq and al Qaeda's own efforts to destabilize its ideological homeland -- al Qaeda's star stopped falling and started plummeting. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Al Qaeda has not only failed in its attempts to trigger region-wide uprisings against the Middle East's secular governments, it has also lost the ability to launch strategically meaningful attacks -- that is, attacks resulting in policy shifts by its targets. Al Qaeda can operate to a certain degree in regions where it has allies, many of whom flowed through its training camps in the 1990s, but the ability of the group that planned the 9/11 attacks to operate beyond the Middle East and South Asia seems to have disappeared. Attrition after years of confrontation with the Americans, coupled with self-imposed isolation, has rendered al Qaeda useless as a strategic actor. Not only is its ability to provide command and control nonexistent, but its self-enforced invisibility and inactivity have undermined its credibility. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Furthermore, al Qaeda has left no one truly capable of taking up its mantle. The training camps in the 1990s processed hundreds of would-be jihadists, but the quality of that training for the rank and file has been exaggerated. Most of it was a combination of poor conventional combat training and ideological indoctrination. Hence, most "veterans" of those camps have neither access to the core al Qaeda leadership nor the operational security or tactical training that would allow them to reconstitute a new elite core. They are no more members of the real "al Qaeda" than today's skinheads are members of the real Nazi party. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">By the only criterion that matters -- successful attacks -- al Qaeda has slipped from readjusting global priorities (9/11) to contributing to the change in government of a middling U.S. ally (the March 2003 Spain attacks) to affecting nothing (the 2005 London bombings). No attacks since can be meaningfully linked to al Qaeda's control, or even its specific foreknown blessing. Al Qaeda had hoped for a conflagration of outrage that would sweep away the Middle East's political order; it only managed to raise a few sparks here and there, and now it is a prisoner of its own security. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Yet, public discussion of all things "al Qaeda," far from fading, has reached a fever pitch. But this talk -- all of it -- is about a fundamentally different beast. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>Enter Al Qaeda the Franchise</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It all started with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who put himself forward as the leader of the Iraqi node of al Qaeda in 2004. While one can argue that al-Zarqawi might have been through an al Qaeda training camp or shared many of bin Laden's ideological goals, no one seriously asserts he had the training, vetting or face time with bin Laden to qualify as an inner member of the al Qaeda leadership. He was a local leader of a local militant group who claimed an association with al Qaeda as a matter of establishing local gravitas and international credibility. Other groups, such as Southeast Asia's Jemaah Islamiyah, had associations with al Qaeda long before al-Zarqawi, but al-Zarqawi was the first to claim the name "al Qaeda" as his own. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">For al Qaeda, prevented by its security concerns from engaging in its own attacks, repudiating al-Zarqawi would make the "base" come across as both impotent and out of touch. Accepting "association" with al-Zarqawi was the obvious choice, and bin Laden went so far as to issue an audio communique anointing al-Zarqawi as al Qaeda's point man in Iraq. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Others have also embraced the al-Zarqawi/al Qaeda association, as dubious as it was. Al Qaeda's operational security protocols -- and its ongoing presence just beyond the United States' reach in northwestern Pakistan -- meant that destroying al Qaeda (the real al Qaeda) was at best a difficult prospect. But al-Zarqawi was local and active and clearly valued launching attacks over maintaining hermetically sealed security. Al-Zarqawi could be brought down. And just as al-Zarqawi's "association" with al Qaeda increased his street cred with the Arab world, that "association" also increased his value to the U.S. military as a target. Taking down an "al Qaeda-linked terrorist" was much better for purposes of public relations and funding than taking down any random militant. The media, of course, stand ready to help; reporting on a militant with direct connections to bin Laden is sexy -- even if that connection was only catching a glimpse of Big "O" walking by during breakfast.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The result has been the formation of an odd iron triangle among an al Qaeda desperate for relevance, local jihadists seeking a fast track to importance and Western intelligence and law enforcement seeking credibility and funding. In the common lexicon, al Qaeda is no longer that core of highly trained and motivated individuals who tried to change the world by bringing down the World Trade Center, but a do-it-yourself jihadist franchise that almost anyone can join. Some nodes are copycats who look to the real al Qaeda for inspiration; others are existing militant groups -- such as Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, now called the al Qaeda Organization for the Countries of the Arab Maghreb -- that can identify with their ideological brethren. But few to none have any real connections to al Qaeda.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Violence is certain to continue, but the lack of meaningful attacks in the West in general and the United States in particular suggests al Qaeda's degraded capacity and the West's improved security have minimized the chances of a geopolitically significant attack for the next several years. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This does not mean would-be "al Qaeda" groups are not dangerous, or that the "war on terror" is anywhere near over. While some of the would-be al Qaeda groups almost seem comical, others are competent militants in their own right -- with al-Zarqawi perhaps being the most lethal example. Their numbers are also growing. The ongoing war in Iraq has provided potential militants across the Islamic world with the motive to do something and the opportunity to gain some serious on-the-job training. Just as Soviet operations in Afghanistan created a training ground for a generation of Middle Eastern militants in the 1980s and 1990s, the Iraq war is in part a crucible for the next generation of Arab militants. Add in al Qaeda's offer of open association and we will be hearing from dozens of "al Qaedas" in the years to come. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Luckily, links between these new groups and their erstwhile sponsor are limited mostly to rhetoric. There might be a few thousand people out there claiming to be al Qaeda members, but the real al Qaeda does not exercise any control over them. They are not coordinated in their operations or even working toward a common goal. And while many of these new al Qaedas might be competent militant groups, they lack the combination of strategic vision and obsession with security that ultimately allowed the original al Qaeda to move mountains. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Top it off with terminology buy-in from Western intelligence, law enforcement and the media and the result is a war literally without end; the definition of al Qaeda is stretched by nearly any player to fit nearly any political need. The United States is now waging a war against jihadism as a phenomenon, rather than against any specific transnational jihadist movement. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><b>Back to Square One?</b></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The political situation in Pakistan has long imposed an unstable stasis on what many feel should have been the real focus of the war on terror all along. Since escaping from Afghanistan in 2001, the true al Qaeda has spent most of its time taking refuge in northwestern Pakistan, where a mix of political complications and ethnic and tribal allegiances have allowed it to stay out of harm's way.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The United States has been aware of al Qaeda's presence there, but ultimately has not attacked for three reasons. First, al Qaeda's internal security protocols forced the organization to isolate itself. During a time when the United States had a great many fish to fry, al Qaeda seemed to have put itself into lockdown; it was issuing videos, not starting wars like Hezbollah or reconstituting like the Taliban. Second, while U.S. intelligence knows the region in which al Qaeda resides, it has never gotten enough detail to allow for airstrikes to take care of business. Such not-quite-there intelligence has always been just diffuse enough to necessitate boots on the ground -- and raise the specter of a disastrously botched and politically problematic military operation. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Which brings us to the third and, in many ways, most important reason for leaving al Qaeda alone. The United States felt it could not risk an assault for fear of political fallout. Ultimately, the United States needs Pakistani cooperation to wage war in Afghanistan -- after all, Pakistan has the only easily traversable land border with the landlocked country -- and support for radical Islam runs deep in both Pakistani society and government. So, yes, U.S. attacks against militant sites located on Pakistani soil happen all the time, but they are small pinprick operations. Any large attack could not be disavowed and, therefore, could result in the fall of the very Pakistani government that makes the hotter parts of the war on terror possible. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Back in 2005, the United States believed it had credible intelligence about a planned meeting of the core al Qaeda leadership in northwestern Pakistan. A strike force of several hundred to several thousand was assembled in order to punch through the Pakistani tribes hiding and shielding bin Laden and his allies, but the strike was ultimately abandoned because then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld felt the operation could not be kept quiet. It is one thing when Pakistanis think there are a few Americans running over the border to do something tactical. It is quite another when Pakistanis know that several thousand Americans with heavy air support are surging across to do something strategic. The U.S. might have been able to take out its target, but probably not without losing a critical ally. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Details of this attack plan were leaked July 8 to The New York Times. For us at Stratfor, news of the plans was nothing new. It made perfect sense that this plan, and likely dozens of others like it, were at various times in the works stretching back as far as 2003 (and we have noted such on numerous occasions). What caught our attention was the timing of The New York Times article. The United States has been eyeing northwestern Pakistan for years. Why draw attention to that fact now? </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The United States' core fear in 2005 was that the Pakistani government would destabilize. Well, in 2007, the Pakistani government is horrendously unstable. On July 10, Islamabad launched a multi-hour raid replete with Branch Davidian overtones against the Red Mosque complex and a gathering of radical (some would say mentally unhinged) Islamists challenging the government's writ. Be worried when the government of an Islamic republic feels it must take such action. Be doubly worried when the government taking the action already seems to be in its death throes. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Previous efforts by Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf to strengthen his political grip on the country by firing the chief justice rebounded on him so severely that he cannot even depend upon his oldest allies. Various political, military and cultural power centers are sniping at the president, making their own independent and often contradictory demands. There are also hints that Musharraf's faculties are beginning to crack. The government -- as well as the president -- is now teetering on the edge of oblivion, facing an unsavory menu of crushing compromise with one force or another to stay in power in name, and risking the turbulent waters of emergency rule over an increasingly hostile population.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">If the threat of a government fall was the only thing holding Washington back in 2005, and now that the fall is imminent through no action of the United States, what does Washington have to gain from restraining itself any further? </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This is more than a rhetorical question. The relative inactivity of al Qaeda these past six years, as well as the political situation in Pakistan, has imposed a shaky equilibrium on the issue. Al Qaeda's security protocols curtail al Qaeda's threat level, and that has allowed the United States to shelve the issue for another day. Meanwhile, the instability of Musharraf's government limits the United States' ability to pressure Islamabad over the issue of al Qaeda. Consequently, al Qaeda has been more or less hiding in plain sight.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Alter any aspect of this scenario -- in this case, drastically increase the tottering of the Musharraf government -- and the "stability" of the other pieces immediately breaks and the United States is forced to surge assets into Pakistan.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Washington has to assume that an al Qaeda anywhere but Pakistan is an al Qaeda that will act with less conservatism. By the American logic, al Qaeda assets in Saudi Arabia, long drilled that security is paramount, would naturally doubt that a telegram from bin Laden ordering a new attack is genuine -- but they would certainly believe bin Laden himself should he show up at their door. By al Qaeda's logic, Musharraf's fall would force al Qaeda to relocate from Pakistan because the group would have to assume that the Americans would be coming.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Which means the odd stasis in the war on terror these past six years could be about to loosen up, and a front that has proven oddly cold might be about to catch fire.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=292004&selected=Analyses"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">This Stratfor article on Al Qaeda is from an American perspective. From this we in India can get an insight into the way Pakistan’s ISI manages its terror jihad against India. Pakistan has clearly taken portions from Al Qaeda’s terror handbook (or is it other way round that ISI’s terror manual is Al Qaeda’s guidebook?) and has put it to work in India and the results are horrendously spectacular. So much so that today, after every terror attack, the investigations usually arrive at dead ends.<br /><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">One thing that is clear from this article is that we Indians have more to fear from ISI instigated terrorism than from the main Al Qaeda. But actually, there is no difference between the two - what with ISI’s terror wings in India like LeT, JM, HM all being members of Al Qaeda’s Int’nl terror org.</span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-11419167658249050472007-07-10T11:01:00.000+05:302008-12-12T01:24:14.059+05:30Cartoon Speak: Eighth Wonder of the World<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgUj496FQsHHehCv0GFsm-XcxwmoJvO7oACFound11472YAzJ7giKsuVAvwtf7zTtxz0WJflI4t9xgWOHwOMknpSrN3YOsySJGb_jupefxDjfsks0LCkUTZOyJAC3OL9bQt8Pqw9w/s1600-h/8th+wonder.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5085437268877186386" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgUj496FQsHHehCv0GFsm-XcxwmoJvO7oACFound11472YAzJ7giKsuVAvwtf7zTtxz0WJflI4t9xgWOHwOMknpSrN3YOsySJGb_jupefxDjfsks0LCkUTZOyJAC3OL9bQt8Pqw9w/s400/8th+wonder.jpg" border="0" /></a> <br /><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center>Courtesy: The Hindu</center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-35465691611153836472007-07-10T10:55:00.000+05:302007-07-11T01:01:34.010+05:30Stratfor: Plotters' Al Qaeda Links Not Likely<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor on why the London and Glasgow terror perpetrators wouldn't have met anyone from the core Al Qaeda leadership and why it is important to link the botched attacks to Al Qaeda.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea" border="0"><tbody><tr><td></span><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">British media reported July 9 that Kafeel Ahmed, one of the two men in the sport utility vehicle that rammed into a passenger terminal at </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291421"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Glasgow International Airport</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> on June 30, had ties to a "senior al Qaeda" leader. Ahmed, who was severely burned in the attempted attack and remains hospitalized, is believed to have once associated with Abbas Boutrab, an Algeria-born man arrested in Belfast, Northern Ireland, in 2003 and sentenced to six years in prison for plotting to blow up an airliner. The men reportedly met in Belfast while Ahmed was studying engineering. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">British media also reported that at least one individual connected to the London and Glasgow plots traveled to Pakistan and met with al Qaeda leaders. U.S. officials have repeated the claims reported in British media that SO15, Scotland Yard's counterterrorism command, uncovered evidence that at least one of the suspects communicated with militant leaders in Iraq.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Though Ahmed could have crossed paths with another amateur jihadist, it is very unlikely that he -- or any other participants in the botched attacks in Glasgow and </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291389"><span style="font-family:verdana;">London</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> in June -- would have been able to meet with anyone who is actually part of al Qaeda's core leadership. However, linking the </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291408"><span style="font-family:verdana;">sloppy attempts</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> at militant attacks in the United Kingdom to al Qaeda helps authorities remind the public of the threat of similar attacks and show that al Qaeda's operational capacity actually has declined.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Several things indicate that the London and Glasgow plotters were not tied to any significant element of al Qaeda's leadership. First, for its own security, al Qaeda's core leadership remains </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291201"><span style="font-family:verdana;">extremely isolated</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">, taking refuge in the remote areas of the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Al Qaeda's leaders limit their contact with the outside world to the extreme minimum. If any of the plotters did meet with al Qaeda members, these members likely were lower-level field operatives who are not in direct contact with the apex leadership. Western intelligence officials believe that after the Taliban regime's ouster in Afghanistan in 2001, al Qaeda's leadership regrouped in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Though jihadists certainly operate in the area, some intelligence officials and the media use the term "al Qaeda leader" very liberally, since locals and visitors alike in the border region tend to think every armed Pashtun is with the Taliban and every armed non-Pashtun is with al Qaeda.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Another indication is the amateurish nature of the attempted attacks. Any operation sanctioned by the core -- or even the second or tertiary tiers -- of al Qaeda's leadership would probably display more thoughtfulness and skill than the London and Glasgow incidents showed. The attacks' complete failures, combined with the speed with which British authorities detained individuals connected to the attacks, indicate poor planning. Even the July 7, 2005, London Underground bombers -- some of whom trained in jihadist camps and pulled off a very successful attack -- did not meet with anyone close to al Qaeda's core leadership.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Some of the plotters could have gained access to militant facilities and individuals in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Some British citizens of Pakistani origin -- former members of the now-defunct London-based al-Muhajiroun organization -- relocated to Pakistan around the time of the 9/11 attacks and set up a conduit to funnel British Muslim youth to training camps operated by Taliban and al Qaeda elements. These former al-Muhajiroun members went offline after the arrests of several </span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=267746"><span style="font-family:verdana;">operatives</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> who used this conduit and the London Underground bombings spawned a worldwide counterterrorism dragnet. However, the conduit could still be operational (though limited). Even if the London and Glasgow plotters used this channel to gain access to militants and their facilities, those militants would not necessarily be al Qaeda or Taliban members, as there are plenty of local Pakistani militants in the Afghan-Pakistani border region.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The al Qaeda link story will be allowed to proliferate among the media. Governments have an interest in linking even amateurish militant operations to al Qaeda because the name itself is instantly recognizable and associated with major jihadist attacks. This keeps anti-terrorism issues high on the public agenda, which can increase overall vigilance and helps various government intelligence and law enforcement agencies when budgets are being drawn up. Additionally, by allowing the botched attacks in the United Kingdom to be associated with al Qaeda, Western governments can emphasize to the Islamic world just how far al Qaeda has declined from the days when it was able to plan and execute spectacular attacks.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291881"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div></td></tr></tbody></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-13782674218601895102007-07-09T13:13:00.003+05:302007-07-09T13:24:41.066+05:30The War Between Pakistan and its Ex-Proxies<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor asks some questions on the type of people holed up at Lal Masjid and looks what this means for Pakistan on the security front.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /> </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">After days of avoiding an all-out assault on the mosque/madrassa complex, Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf reportedly has issued orders to storm the Pakistani capital of Islamabad's Red Mosque. The government also has claimed that the Islamist militants holed up in the mosque include both wanted hard-core Pakistani jihadists as well as foreign fighters -- mostly Arabs -- affiliated with al Qaeda. The six-day security operation to dislodge Islamist militants from the Red Mosque thus appears to have entered a decisive stage.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The government's new claims may have some merit to them, thus warranting an examination of the facts associated with the operation. The Pakistanis, fearing possible public backlash in an already-charged political atmosphere, have up till now avoided taking the facility by force. Nonetheless, the government has brought in some of its best security units to flush the militants from the mosque. These include the army's 111th Brigade, its Special Services Group (SSG) commando force, the 9th Wing of the Rangers paramilitary force, and the elite anti-terrorism squad of Punjab Police. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Despite being up against some 12,000 well-trained, professional and heavily armed security personnel, the militants inside the Red Mosque have managed to hold their ground. They have managed to survive several days of intense bombardment in the form of shelling and gunfire. Moreover, they have managed to kill a commander of the SSG (a lieutenant colonel) during one operation Friday night. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">All of this does not appear to be the work of mere seminary students who are followers of the rogue mullahs running the Red Mosque, perhaps boasting only a little experience handling an AK-47. Radical seminary students do not possess the skills to strategize -- let alone hold off -- a superior force. Holding out in the face of insurmountable odds demands a certain level of nerves as well.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The leaders of the resistance in the mosque probably are battle-hardened jihadists, not a mere ragtag band of seminarian zealots, which raises a number of questions. How did these elements establish themselves in a major mosque in the South Asian country's capital, just a few miles from the city's diplomatic enclave, key government institutions, --- and above all, the headquarters of the country's premier spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence directorate? How were the fighters able to procure the weapons and other supplies needed to sustain such a standoff without setting off alarms? Why are the militants able to make back-channel contacts with some key top officials even after the government has made it clear the fighters must surrender unconditionally? </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The answers to such questions are not readily available, but the questions themselves bolster claims that the Pakistani state, especially its military and intelligence agencies, are significantly infiltrated by jihadist elements. This has directly resulted from the army's past practice of employing Islamist militant actors to pursue its domestic and foreign policy objectives. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Pakistani media reported July 7 that a close relative of the mullahs controlling the Red Mosque is the driver for Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao, as he was for the minister's two predecessors in office. Meanwhile, the bodyguard of the deputy leader is an employee of the National Crisis Management Cell, led by retired Director-General Brig. Javed Iqbal Cheema -- who is also the Interior Ministry's spokesman.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Consequently, these militants are not just challenging the writ of the state, they enjoy a significant number of sympathizers both within the government and the wider society. The military leadership led by Musharraf may have embarked upon a strategic shift as far as the role of Islam in state and society is concerned, but clearly a large number of people both inside and outside the government do not subscribe to his philosophy of "enlightened moderation." </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Though radical Islamist forces constitute a minority, they constitute a significant one. And while the vast majority of Pakistanis do not support jihadists, they do not necessarily support Musharraf's agenda either. Overall, Pakistan lacks a national consensus regarding Islam's role in public affairs, something extremist and radical forces are exploiting to their advantage. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Therefore, the Red Mosque operation does not amount to a one-off event. Rather, it is likely the beginning of a long confrontation between the state and radical/militant Islamist forces. Such a clash will involve military operations in areas like the North-West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, as well as nationwide social unrest.[</span><a href="http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=291825"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Stratfor</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-41384071713886975322007-07-05T15:15:00.000+05:302008-12-12T01:24:14.359+05:30Emoticons and You<div align="justify"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZD1gyRqPTRBgMBfkAO85NfGpgqZoleWVzFOciJ_2ULX9VglFJ25o9gn6LCaQhWgmqaxWPxIHzF0a2LfTzN0NdeZ5poxZPJbuLMBj1ub1LZik2GF997MZQiIUkfcRX15PeU2QMPw/s1600-h/yahoo+simley.jpg"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5083647092148475186" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZD1gyRqPTRBgMBfkAO85NfGpgqZoleWVzFOciJ_2ULX9VglFJ25o9gn6LCaQhWgmqaxWPxIHzF0a2LfTzN0NdeZ5poxZPJbuLMBj1ub1LZik2GF997MZQiIUkfcRX15PeU2QMPw/s320/yahoo+simley.jpg" border="0" /></span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> <br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It is 25 years since emoticons or smilies made their debut and Yahoo! came out with this survey.</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">People in the age group 19-25 are the most smitten by emoticons, with about 68 per cent using smileys daily, a survey by online portal Yahoo! revealed.<br /><br />.... Emoticons changed the way emails were perceived in the early years.<br /><br />......<br /><br />However, its not just the younger generation embracing emoticons. Nearly 48 per cent of users over 50 use emoticons in their everyday communication.<br /><br />The Yahoo! survey further indicates that 82 per cent of Yahoo Messenger subscribers use emoticons while chatting. The perception though is that emoticons are used more by women. Men, said the survey, are more prone to use instant messengers and emoticons to fire someone (14 per cent) versus women (11 per cent).<br /><br />The majority of survey respondents said they best express themselves in IM using emoticons. Nearly two-thirds (61 per cent) rely on emoticons to best express their feelings, while 17 per cent on internet slang (i.e. LOL, GR8) and 13 per cent on photo-sharing.[<a href="http://www.businessstandard.com/common/storypage_c.php?leftnm=10&autono=290081">B-S</a>]<br /><br /></td></table></center><br /></div></span><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-1300371629344013612007-07-05T11:45:00.000+05:302008-12-12T01:24:14.629+05:30Cartoon Speak: Playing With Letters<div align="justify"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjC-jcEwjQ5wwZs_EhRQYXuD96oezfu3p9XEnlFInOUibtZ3QTPW2NzQ8ydz-Vih4gHkL3HJ1em6qzu3A0RHeaS_4Iql5dtgSU_MkWyGExpC6FuRNmBuseT4-XclgxjKiTw9j1NZg/s1600-h/playing+with+letters.bmp"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5083594289820538146" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjC-jcEwjQ5wwZs_EhRQYXuD96oezfu3p9XEnlFInOUibtZ3QTPW2NzQ8ydz-Vih4gHkL3HJ1em6qzu3A0RHeaS_4Iql5dtgSU_MkWyGExpC6FuRNmBuseT4-XclgxjKiTw9j1NZg/s400/playing+with+letters.bmp" border="0" /></span></a></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center>Courtesy: Indian Express</center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></div></span><div align="justify"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEikLW4xxGZtJblKmfRPn6RlxIZOZ-iAhxsZsaUagIFiAF6CPAtIVtUe5eEvs1gP5vXCceuyxC8G04eXM9yVuW0hPZLir0a7EkZz2Iy4lrsTan8zURhorblsr_mhyAXFSJuTo_5GZw/s1600-h/letter+game.jpg"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5083593460891850002" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEikLW4xxGZtJblKmfRPn6RlxIZOZ-iAhxsZsaUagIFiAF6CPAtIVtUe5eEvs1gP5vXCceuyxC8G04eXM9yVuW0hPZLir0a7EkZz2Iy4lrsTan8zURhorblsr_mhyAXFSJuTo_5GZw/s400/letter+game.jpg" border="0" /></span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;"> <center>Courtesy: The Hindu</center><br /><br /></span><br /></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-54335780490588803702007-07-02T20:51:00.000+05:302008-12-12T01:24:14.821+05:30Cartoon Speak: "Commie-cal" Ethics<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjMgguLgdk6kePK5VaQHNP9VGWib6TYdhtK-TYYu9yJlWXyzeiB8s0YqP9RXZYCp_hYvTop_YOf20sL-AfYa6xtAJKIuPcRmZYkmXJS2qhTrudDhcQUdqPv4pCSTp7wVoLXqtYtJw/s1600-h/comical+ethics.bmp"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5082659103641507074" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: hand; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjMgguLgdk6kePK5VaQHNP9VGWib6TYdhtK-TYYu9yJlWXyzeiB8s0YqP9RXZYCp_hYvTop_YOf20sL-AfYa6xtAJKIuPcRmZYkmXJS2qhTrudDhcQUdqPv4pCSTp7wVoLXqtYtJw/s400/comical+ethics.bmp" border="0" /></a><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center>Courtesy: Indian Express</center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-76091634616755125062007-06-30T15:29:00.000+05:302007-06-30T16:01:56.068+05:30Reality Hits MSM<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Has the MSM realised that their exclusive dominance of the news dissemination field is over? </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table border="0" width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea"><td></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">When senior ministers of the government said that the “President is not elected through SMS campaign, “ they were dismissing SMS and blogs as tools of a participatory democracy...</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Mr Dasmunsi’s comments were made in the light of the campaign carried in the electronic media about the desirability of a second term for President Kalam. And while he was technically correct in dismissing the role that people and hence their SMS and blogs had to play in electing the President, the fact is that in being dismissive the ministers revealed a certain lack of understanding of the power of this new medium. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It could be argued that internet penetration in India is low, at the end of May, there were 2.46 million broadband connections in the country. Even if all landline connections — at the end of May there were 40.26 million connections — were to be treated as potential dial up internet connections, penetration of the internet is rather low. When it comes to wireless phones, to determine the catchment area for SMS campaigns, there are 177.79 million subscribers. At the end of May, India had a teledensity of 19.26, that is for every hundred persons only 19.26 had a physical phone, which could be a cellular or a landline phone. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">It could be this low penetration of telephones as well as a negative growth pattern for broadband subscribers that could have made the ministers dismiss the importance of the SMS and blog campaign for President Kalam. But the power of this medium lies not in its numerical strength but in the momentum it creates. </span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">........</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">.....the SMS campaign for Kalam, or the blogs on Pratibha Patil’s suitability as president help form a certain kind of opinion. The SMS campaign for President Kalam showed overwhelming support for the idea of a second term for him. The message that seemed to go out was that the government was willing to turn a deaf ear to the voice of the people. It didn’t matter that the voice of the people represented through the SMS campaign was not representative of the electorate. <u>So when ministers dismiss the SMS polls, they reinforces the feeling of a lack of understanding of the power shift to the new media. </u></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Blogs and SMS, limited as they may be in there spread, seem to have democratised opinion making. Blogs about Pratibha Patil’s credentials or alleged lack thereof, gives rise to discussions all of which centre on the credentials of those who supported her candidature. [</span><a href="http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/Ignoring_power_of_blogs_SMSes_emails/rssarticleshow/2158955.cms"><span style="font-family:verdana;">ET</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]</span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span> </div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></td></table></center></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">So, the Main Stream Media (MSM) have at last realised the power of Web 2.0 and that the days of its domination is over or soon to be over. Now we hope confrontational articles deriding Bloggers from MSM journalists will wane and a new beginning of cooperation between the MSM and Web 2.0 will start.<br /><br />If the MSM and Web 2.0 can join hands, then the power of the new and old mediums can be put to better use of making our country a better place for all of us. </span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-23642114.post-31662370112411648332007-06-29T09:51:00.000+05:302007-06-29T09:50:06.040+05:30The Paradise Called "Azad Kashmir"<div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">There are many in Jammu Kashmir who still today believe the other side of the LoC i.e. in “Azad Kashmir” controlled by an Islamic Pakistan offers Muslims better life than J&K “controlled” by an ‘Infidel’ India. However, after the establishment of bus links between the two parts of J&K, this notion is fast falling apart. </span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><center><table width="90%" bgcolor="#eaeaea" border="0"><tbody><tr><td></span><br /><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">In J&K, Gurjjars make up the third-largest ethnic group — after Kashmiri-speaking Muslims and Dogra Hindus. Over the years, they have emerged as a significant political entity in J&K, wielding considerable electoral influence in a quarter of the constituencies. Since the early 1990s, the group’s inclusion in the list of Scheduled Tribes has led to a significant improvement in its socio-economic profile, and now it is demanding political reservations as well. </span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">The Partition of 1947 saw the division of the Pir Panchal region — the traditional Gurjjar heartland. This led, in turn, to the separation of lakhs of [Muslim] Gurjjar families... </span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">Given the close ties that exist between the Gurjjars on both sides of the border, the troubles and fortunes of families and friends across the border have long been a subject of keen interest to the community. With the re-establishment of contact between J&K and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) by way of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot bus links, there was suddenly an opportunity to find out about how relatives across the border were faring. </span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><u>As it turned out, many Gurjjar families in POK were found to be living in difficult conditions, and the community itself was on the verge of losing its identity. As those who came across to J&K from POK put it, the symbols of Gurjjar culture — its folk songs and music, traditions and age-old rituals — which are still visible in J&K, are missing on the other side. The majority of Gurjjars in POK seem to have forgotten the life of dhoks and mergs — the high-alpine meadows to which Gurjjar communities traditionally moved during the summer, and which are such an essential part of the Gurjjar heritage.</u> </span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">One of the reasons why Gurjjar traditions were better preserved in J&K was the fact that the community enjoyed special privileges guaranteed under the tribal quota. No such legislation exists in Pakistan. In POK, it is said, nobody dares to speak Gojri in the bazaars and at public functions. In contrast, the J&K Cultural Academy regularly publishes books in Gojri, while NGOs such as Gurjjar Desh Charitable Trust and Gojri Anjumans are also working to preserve the language. There are even local radio programmes in Gojri. In fact, those who do write in Gojri in POK — like Rana Fazal Rajourivi — have to get their books published through the J&K Cultural Academy.</span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">... Abdul Latief, an elderly Gurjjar from Bandi Abasspur in POK, who had come to visit his relatives in the village of Kalai in Poonch, attributed <u>the dilution of his community’s ethnic, cultural and linguistic identity in Pakistan to state-sponsored marginalisation. “Our economic condition is vulnerable,” Latief says. “We are mostly illiterate and work as land-tillers on other people’s farms, or as shepherds.”</u>...</span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"><br /></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;">If this does not happen, the Gurjjars of POK may soon face extinction in a region that was part of their traditional homeland.[</span><a href="http://www.indianexpress.com/story/34028.html"><span style="font-family:verdana;">IE</span></a><span style="font-family:verdana;">]<br /></span></div><br /><div align="justify"><span style="font-family:verdana;"></span></div></td></tr></tbody></table></center></span></div>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0