The Secrets of Counter-Surveillance

Stratfor in another of its innumerable insightful articles takes a look at the secrets of counter-surveillance (CS), which is the process of detecting and mitigating hostile surveillance. Counter-surveillance (CS) is also an important, though often overlooked, element of counter-terrorism and security operations.

According to Stratfor, counter-surveillance is especially important because it is one of the few security measures that allows for threats to be dealt with before they can develop into active attacks.

The First Secret Various potential assailants use different attack cycles, which vary depending on the nature and objectives of the plotter. For example, the typical six-step terrorist attack cycle does not always apply to a suicide bomber (who is not concerned about escape) or a mentally disturbed stalker (who is not concerned about escape or media exploitation). It is during the early phases of the attack cycle -- the target selection and the planning phases -- that the plotters conduct their surveillance, though they even can use a surveillance team during the actual attack to signal that the target is approaching the attack zone. The purpose of pre-operational surveillance is to determine the target's vulnerabilities. Surveillance helps to quantify the target, note possible weaknesses and even to begin to identify potential attack methods. When the target is a person, perhaps targeted for assassination or kidnapping, surveillants will look for patterns of behavior such as the time the target leaves for work, the transportation method and the route taken. They also will take note of the type of security, if any, the target uses. For fixed targets such as buildings, the surveillance will be used to determine physical security measures as well as patterns of behavior within the guard force, if guards are employed. For example, the plotters will look for fences, gates, locks and alarms, but also will look for times when fewer guards are present or when the guards are about to come on or off their shifts. All of this information will then be used to select the best time and location for the attack, the type of attack and the resources needed to execute it. Since an important objective of pre-operational surveillance is establishing patterns, the operatives will conduct their surveillance several times, often at different times of the day. Additionally, they will follow a mobile target to different environments and in diverse locations. This is when it is important to know the first "secret" of CS: surveillants are vulnerable to detection. In fact, the more surveillance they conduct, the greater the chances are of them being observed. Once that happens, security personnel can be alerted and the entire plan compromised. Additionally, surveillants who themselves are being watched can unwittingly lead intelligence and law enforcement agencies to other members of their organization. Surveillance A large and professional surveillance team can use a variety of fixed and mobile assets, including electronic listening devices and operatives on foot, in vehicles and even in aircraft. Such a large team can be extremely difficult for anyone to spot. A massive surveillance operation, however, requires an organization with vast assets and a large number of well-trained operatives. This level of surveillance, therefore, is usually only found at the governmental level, as most militant organizations lack the assets and the number of trained personnel required to mount such an operation. Indeed, most criminal and militant surveillance is conducted by one person, or by a small group of operatives. This means they must place themselves in a position to see the target -- and thus be seen -- with far more frequency than would be required in a huge surveillance operation. And the more they show their faces, the more vulnerable they are to detection. This vulnerability is amplified if the operatives are not highly trained. The al Qaeda manual "Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants" and its online training magazines not only instruct operatives planning an attack to conduct surveillance, they also point out the type of information that should be gathered. These documents, however, do not teach jihadist operatives how to go about gathering the required information. In the United States, the Ruckus Society's Scouting Manual provides detailed instructions for conducting surveillance, or "scouting," as the society calls it, on "direct action" targets. Following written instructions, however, does not automatically translate into having skilled surveillance operatives on the street. This is because, while some basic skills and concepts can be learned by reading, applying that information to a real-world situation, particularly in a hostile environment, can be exceedingly difficult. This is especially true when the application requires subtle and complex skills that are difficult to master. The behaviors necessary to master surveillance tradecraft are not intuitive, and in fact frequently run counter to human nature. Because of this, intelligence and security professionals who work surveillance operations receive in-depth training that includes many hours of heavily critiqued practical exercises, often followed by field training with experienced surveillance operatives. Most militant groups do not provide this level of training, and as a result, poor tradecraft has long proven to be an Achilles' heel for militants, who typically use a small number of poorly trained operatives to conduct their surveillance operations. What does "bad" surveillance look like? The U.S. government uses the acronym TEDD to illustrate the principles one can use to identify surveillance. So, a person who sees someone repeatedly over Time, in different Environments and over Distance, or one who displays poor Demeanor can assume he or she is under surveillance. Surveillants who exhibit poor demeanor, meaning they act unnaturally, can look blatantly suspicious, though they also can be lurkers -- those who have no reason for being where they are or for doing what they are doing. Sometimes they exhibit almost imperceptible behaviors that the target senses more than observes. Other giveaways include moving when the target moves, communicating when the target moves, avoiding eye contact with the target, making sudden turns or stops, or even using hand signals to communicate with other members of a surveillance team. The mistakes made while conducting surveillance can be quite easy to catch -- as long as someone is looking for them. If no one is looking, however, hostile surveillance is remarkably easy. This is why militant groups have been able to get away with conducting surveillance for so long using bumbling operatives who practice poor tradecraft. The Second Secret At the most basic level, CS can be performed by a person who is aware of his or her surroundings and who is watching for people who violate the principles of TEDD. At a more advanced level, the single person can use surveillance detection routes (SDRs) to draw out surveillance. This leads to the second "secret": due to the nature of surveillance, those conducting it can be manipulated and forced to tip their hand. It is far more difficult to surveil a mobile target than a stationary one, and an SDR is a tool that takes advantage of this difficulty and uses a carefully designed route to flush out surveillance. The SDR is intended to look innocuous from the outside, but is cleverly calculated to evoke certain behaviors from the surveillant. When members of a highly trained surveillance team recognize that the person they are following is executing an SDR -- and therefore is trying to manipulate them -- they will frequently take countermeasures suitable to the situation and their mission. This can include dropping off the target and picking up surveillance another day, bypassing the channel, stair-step or other trap the target is using and picking him or her up at another location along their projected route. It can even include "bumper locking" the target or switching to a very overt mode of surveillance to let the target know that his SDR was detected -- and not appreciated. Untrained surveillants who have never encountered an SDR, however, frequently can be sucked blindly into such traps. Though intelligence officers performing an SDR need to look normal from the outside -- in effect appear as if they are not running an SDR -- people who are acting protectively on their own behalf have no need to be concerned about being perceived as being "provocative" in their surveillance detection efforts. They can use very aggressive elements of the SDR to rapidly determine whether the surveillance they suspect does in fact exist -- and if it does, move rapidly to a pre-selected safe-haven. At a more advanced level is the dedicated CS team, which can be deployed to determine whether a person or facility is under surveillance. This team can use mobile assets, fixed assets or a combination of both. The CS team is essentially tasked to watch for watchers. To do this, team members identify places -- "perches" in surveillance jargon -- that an operative would need to occupy in order to surveil a potential target. They then watch those perches for signs of hostile surveillance. CS teams can manipulate surveillance by "heating up" particular perches with static guards or roving patrols, thus forcing the surveillants away from those areas and toward another perch or perches where the CS team can then focus its detection efforts. They also can use overt, uniformed police or guards to stop, question and identify any suspicious person they observe. This can be a particularly effective tactic, as it can cause militants to conclude that the facility they are monitoring is too difficult to attack. Even if the security forces never realized the person was actually conducting surveillance, such an encounter normally will lead the surveillant to assume that he or she has been identified and that the people who stopped him knew exactly what he was doing. Confrontational techniques can stop a hostile operation dead in its tracks and cause the operatives to focus their hostile efforts elsewhere. These techniques include overt field interviews, overt photography of suspected hostiles, and the highly under-utilized Terry stop, in which a law enforcement officer in the United States can legally stop, interview and frisk a person for weapons if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, even if the officer's suspicions do not rise to the level of making an arrest. Also, by denying surveillants perches that are close to the target's point of origin or destination (home or work, for example) a CS team can effectively push hostile surveillance farther and farther away. This injects a great deal ambiguity into the situation and complicates the hostile information-collection effort. For instance, if surveillants do not know what car the target drives, they can easily obtain that information by sitting outside of the person's home and watching what comes out of the garage or driveway. By contrast, surveillants forced to use a perch a mile down the road might have dozens of cars to choose from. CS teams also can conduct more sophisticated SDRs than the lone individual. In addition, the CS team will keep detailed logs of the people and vehicles it encounters and will database this information along with photos of possible hostiles. This database allows the team to determine whether it has encountered the same person or vehicle repeatedly on different shifts or at different sites. This analytical component of the CS team is essential to the success of the team's efforts, especially when there are multiple shifts working the CS operation or multiple sites are being covered. People also have perishable memories, and databasing ensures that critical information is retained and readily retrievable. CS teams also can conduct more sophisticated SDRs than the lone individual. Although professional CS teams normally operate in a low-key fashion in order to collect information without changing the behaviors of suspected hostiles, there are exceptions to this rule. When the team believes an attack is imminent or when the risk of allowing a hostile operation to continue undisturbed is unacceptable, for example, team members are likely to break cover and confront hostile surveillants. In cases like these, CS teams have the advantage of surprise. Indeed, materializing out of nowhere to confront the suspected surveillant can be more effective than the arrival of overt security assets. Well-trained CS teams have an entire arsenal of tricks at their disposal to manipulate and expose hostile surveillance. In this way, they can proactively identify threats early on in the attack cycle -- and possibly prevent attacks.[Stratfor]

Wonder whether India has any CS programme. How long will Indians be sitting-ducks to terrorists of all kinds operating with impunity allover India?

Stratfor on Al Qaeda's Declaration of War on India

Here is Stratfor report on Al Qaeda's declaration of war on India. They are of the opinion that jihadist movement in India is likely to be unsustainable as the country lacks a strong radical Muslim current from which these groups can draw.

Media organizations in Srinigar, the summer capital of India's Jammu and Kashmir state, received a DVD and statement June 8 in which al Qaeda purportedly declares war on India. The DVD features a man wearing a black mask and calling himself Abu Abdul Rehman Ansari (likely a pseudonym), who claims he is a top al Qaeda cadre. The statement is in Arabic and Urdu. Stratfor has long observed the growing nexus between al Qaeda affiliates and Kashmiri Islamist militants operating in India. CDs with footage from al Qaeda and Taliban training camps and interspersed with recordings of Osama bin Laden calling for Muslims to join the "jihad" have appeared in the Patna and Bhojpur districts of Bihar in northeastern India. A number of attacks during the past year also reveal how these Kashmiri groups have become increasingly influenced by al Qaeda tactics, such as the 2006 railway bombings and a move toward Muslim-on-Muslim attacks against religious targets that aim to inflame communal tensions and create the conditions necessary for militant cells to take root throughout the country. Despite these indications, a jihadist movement in India likely is unsustainable, as the country lacks a strong radical Muslim current from which these groups can draw. This has been illustrated by the failure of Indian Hindus and Muslims to provide the wide-scale violent response the Islamist groups have been hoping for by targeting both Hindu and Muslim sites in recent attacks.[Stratfor]

There is no guarantee that this can be the case always. Now that Muslim-specific parties have started popping up allover India at an alarming rate and some even winning elections, anti-national Muslim elements can easily find an outlet to execute their nefarious designs. The last state elections in Kerala has shown us how radical Islamists there are hand-in-glove with the Communists of Kerala and helped them win election in Muslim strongholds.

The Future of Pakistani Military Leadership

Pakistani dictator Gen. Musharraf's position has weakened so much that according to Stratfor an energetic intern could knock him out of office anytime soon. Stratfor looks at what moves can Musharraf make, and who will ultimately replace the General.

In a speech to lawmakers from Pakistan's ruling coalition, embattled Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf said he is worried and warned that a change in the current political order would be disastrous for the country, Pakistani media reported June 7. Musharraf accused his parliamentary allies of abandoning him in the ongoing political crisis and said he constantly receives reports about what they are saying privately. The president went on to criticize his allies for not supporting him publicly and questioned their usefulness if they are not willing to step up and defend him in the media and other public forums against criticism from the opposition. These comments -- Musharraf's first admission of concern since the political crisis began March 9 -- show that the Musharraf regime is buckling under the weight of the crisis, which has created serious fissures within the civilian side of the hybrid Musharrafian political system. Infighting among his allies -- upon whom he depends to secure a second presidential term -- and the rapidly intensifying unrest in the country raise serious doubts about Musharraf's ability to win the next presidential election, scheduled for the second half of September. If the president cannot win re-election, he could try to impose an emergency rule of sorts, but that would only exacerbate matters. When Musharraf cannot seek re-election, his generals likely will force him to throw in the towel, and a caretaker government, whose main task will be holding fresh parliamentary polls, will be created. It is too early to predict which political force will form the next government, since a number of elements are in play. Whatever happens to Musharraf politically, the composition of Pakistan's military -- with or without Musharraf -- is relatively easier to discern. If Musharraf Wins Re-election Musharraf not only wants to get re-elected as president, but he also wants to do so while holding onto the position of military chief. This is because he wants to oversee the forthcoming round of promotions and retirements in order to build the right team to ensure his hold on power -- a step that would be an absolute necessity if Musharraf later caves to domestic pressure and steps down as military chief. The military deck is scheduled to undergo a routine reshuffle in the first week of October. The most prominent change to come is the retirement of Musharraf's two senior-most subordinates: Vice Chief of the Army Staff (VCOAS) Gen. Ahsan Saleem Hayat and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq. Currently, these two are the only four-star generals besides Musharraf himself. If he wins re-election in September, Musharraf's priority will be to fill the vacant positions. This process will bring to the fore younger generals, among whom there are a number of possible candidates based on merit and seniority, as well as on personal ties to Musharraf: Lt. Gen. Tariq Majeed: commander of the 10th Corps, who is considered to be the most capable among all the corps commanders, and who is the front-runner for the No. 2 position of VCOAS Lt. Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani: director-general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and another senior general who could be appointed to the No. 3 post, the CJCSC Lt. Gen. Salahuddin Satti: current chief of the General Staff who, though a bit junior to other generals, could be moved to a key position Lt. Gen. Muhammad Yousaf: current vice chief of the General Staff, who also could be appointed to a critical position While effecting promotions and appointments, he would want to make sure that his own position is not threatened, especially given the growing movement to oust him from power. Moreover, should he need to step down as military chief and become a civilian president, he would want the next military chief to be beholden to him. This involves not just loyalty but also the creation of dependency. Therefore, he could go beyond the top tier of generals and elevate others, such as 4th Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Shafaatullah Shah, Quarter Master General Lt. Gen. Afzal Muzaffar or 30th Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Waseem Ahmed Ashraf. Director-General of Military Intelligence Maj-Gen. Nadeem Ejaz could also become a three-star general and be made director-general of the ISI. There is a downside to filling the top slots with second-tier commanders. These generals are inexperienced in political matters, especially in situations like the current crisis. Therefore, they are more likely to press Musharraf to step down if the existing situation escalates, especially with political forces mobilizing for the parliamentary polls slated for November. Considering the pace and magnitude of the anti-Musharraf movement's growth, it is becoming increasingly unlikely that Musharraf can win re-election. Once Musharraf realizes that an election victory is beyond his reach, he could attempt to impose emergency rule as a means of prolonging his hold on power. This will only accelerate the unrest and lead to the point at which his generals will likely have to force him to quit. If Musharraf is Forced to Step Down Though he is the army chief, Musharraf has not had time to oversee the day-to-day running of the military because of his duties as a president -- especially as a president who has had to deal with an extraordinary number of domestic and foreign policy issues. As a result, Hayat has been running the military on Musharraf's behalf and could easily step into the role of military chief. But the task of removing the increasingly unpopular Musharraf -- especially since Hayat is due to retire -- would make the process very complicated, to say the least. Furthermore, Hayat is known to be mild-mannered, which makes him unlikely to initiate Musharraf's removal. Instead, a consensus among corps commanders and certain key agency heads would be required. This is where the other four-star general, Ehsan-ul-Haq, who has served as head of the military's two intelligence directorates, could play an important role. However, Ehsan-ul-Haq's position is ceremonial, so he does not have the authority to get the ball rolling or even secure a position in a post-Musharraf military leadership. This makes the role of the corps commanders -- who already are key because they are in command of the troops -- all the more important. From the seniority standpoint, Majeed and Kiyani would be the key deciding players, while Satti and commander of the Mangla-based 1st Corps Lt. Gen. Sajjad Akram would be the prominent players from a logistical standpoint. At the end of the day, a consensus would be needed among the three-star generals, who likely would back Hayat to succeed Musharraf as army chief and get a three-year extension, thereby avoiding his scheduled retirement. Hayat's first order of business as military chief would be to work with the political forces and the civilian establishment to install an acting president and caretaker government headed by an interim prime minister, which would hold parliamentary elections within 90 days. Though Hayat would not inherit Musharraf's political powers, he would be the one to oversee the reshuffle of the military deck, at which point every position aside from his own would be up for grabs. That said, those who would have played leading roles in the removal of Musharraf will be the ones most likely to assume key posts in the post-Musharraf military hierarchy. After Musharraf's departure from the helm, regardless of how and when that happens, the military is unlikely to continue to directly run the country. Moreover, because of the assertiveness of the judiciary and the media, and an increasingly vibrant civil society, the military will have to give the civilian setup more freedom than it did in 1988, when military rule came to an end after military-chief-cum-president Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq died in a mysterious plane crash. But, for the foreseeable future, the military will continue to maintain a strong hold over the state -- partly because it is the most disciplined and professional institution in the country.[Stratfor]

Cartoon Speak: The Politician's Evil Magic

Courtesy: The Hindu

Cartoon Speak: Big B's Superduper Flop

Courtesy: The Hindu

The Clock is Ticking

Stratfor's latest report on Musharraf.

Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf on Monday amended laws governing the country's electronic media, GEO television reported. Musharraf empowered the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to block transmissions, suspend licenses, confiscate equipment and seal the buildings of electronic media organizations deemed in violation of PEMRA regulations. This, combined with the ongoing political crisis, has increased the number of protests in Pakistan. The same day Musharraf also chaired a special meeting of the National Security Council, during which he discussed ways and means of dealing with the increasingly deteriorating crisis of governance. Thus far all the steps taken by the Musharraf government to fix the growing political instability have backfired, and even have made matters worse. For the most part, this outcome is the result of serious miscalculations. This is not altogether surprising because Musharraf is now relying on a small circle of bureaucratic advisers, and is no longer listening to his political allies in the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML). However, not heeding the PML's advice might not have major consequences, since it is the party that is dependent on Musharraf for its position of power. But Musharraf is critically dependent on the military's support to ensure his regime's continuity. This is why Musharraf on June 1 called an emergency meeting of the corps commanders and army's agency heads, during which the top generals reportedly expressed complete support for the president. During this meeting Musharraf made use of the increasingly loud criticisms of the military's domination of the state. He was able to convince the generals that the government's opponents are not just out to force the country's military chief from power, but also want the military establishment to lose control of the political system. In this regard, Musharraf also exploited the recent release of the new book "Military, Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy," authored by Ayesha Siddiqa, a top Pakistani political and military analyst. Siddiqa's book, which provides a detailed account of the military's hold over Pakistan's economic system, has further fueled the public ire against the military's domination of the country. As a result the government scrambled to torpedo the launching ceremony of the book and has accused the author of spreading lies and of being an enemy of the state. There are reports that Siddiqa is being intimidated by intelligence officials. Taking all of this into account, the generals are currently rallying around Musharraf and are saying they will support his efforts to do all what is necessary to remedy the faltering situation. But they, more than anyone else, know that the need to hold such a special meeting indicates a weakness in Musharraf's position. Therefore, the generals will be watching the situation more closely than ever and will be considering contingency plans as the political temperature rises in the coming weeks. Then, if needed, they can intervene and force Musharraf to step down in order to avoid risking an ugly confrontation on the streets. For now, the generals figure the anti-Musharraf movement, though growing in size, lacks direction, organization and critical mass because the main opposition parties remain divided. Put differently, they believe their interests can still be secured through a compromise involving the reinstatement of the chief justice, and perhaps even with Musharraf assuming the role of a civilian president. But Musharraf does not believe he can both compromise and sustain power, which is why he has decided to tough it out in an effort to get past the re-election in September. The generals would prefer a situation in which they are not forced to move against Musharraf because they know such a situation does not necessarily help them salvage the position of the institution. Having Musharraf step down could land them in a situation in which the new military leadership would be forced to negotiate a new civil-military power-sharing mechanism with the political forces, and from a position of relative weakness. Part of this has to do with the fact that Musharraf has been reshuffling the military deck so much that most of the top generals have not had much experience in dealing with national politics. But when the generals know things have reached a point of no return, they will act; this could happen before the end of summer depending on how fast events progress. The prevention of news broadcasts and political talk shows deemed critical of the government on private television channels could prove to be one key step in that direction. Because of the immense popularity of these private channels, the anti-Musharraf movement is likely to gain greater momentum -- and rapidly. The growing public unrest will only get worse because the government is determined to deal with the situation by cracking down. Unless Musharraf reverses course and opts for the path of accommodation with his opponents -- both among the political parties and with civil society -- it is quite feasible that the unrest, which is expected to peak around the time of the presidential vote in September, could surge earlier. Even his key civilian partner, the PML, is starting to show signs of hemorrhaging, indicating that it might not be possible for Musharraf to secure a second term.[Stratfor]

The BMW Case, NDTV Sting Op and Some Questions

NDTV usually doesn’t do sting on big fishes. So when NDTV does a big sting, some questions always pop up.

The BMW hit and run case dragging for eight years took a new turn after NDTV aired a previously unseen tape of the BMW car in a badly damaged condition just after the accident. The question here is how did NDTV get hold of this tape? Was this tape, which was in the custody of the police, made available to NDTV by someone in the govt or obtained by NDTV after bribing the police with moolah or other obvious means?

At that time NDTV also aired a report on a private party given by Sanjeev Nanda. In it, NDTV reporter interviewed Nanda where he talked about his business, etc. How did NDTV get access and permission – which no other channel got - to record and telecast Nanda’s private party? Doesn’t this show that NDTV and the Nandas were on good terms not so long ago? So what turned NDTV against the Nandas and what made NDTV telecast a tape that is potentially damaging to Sanjeev Nanda? Is NDTV settling old scores with the Nandas?

NDTV’s telecast of the sting tapes was only after Kulkarni testified in the court that a fat man was in the driver’s seat, which effectively could let Sanjeev Nanda off the hook. So if we take this into consideration, then NDTV timed the telecast to tarnish only IU Khan and RK Anand. After the telecast the Nandas have distanced themselves from their lawyer, RK Anand.

From Barkha Dutt’s article in the HT it is clear that Kulkarni’s motives were suspect from day one. He was doing it for money and he had approached other channels too- looking for the highest bidder obviously - about the sting. This and Kulkarni’s previous ambiguous statements clearly make him an unreliable witness. Still NDTV knowing very well about the fallout went ahead telecasting the tapes “in public interest” after consulting its legal team. Who are the members of NDTV’s legal team?

IU Khan and RK Anand according to Barkha Dutt "are ingenious, influential, notoriously aggressive and famously successful". So if NDTV is taking them on, then it must be only because people more powerful than these two are backing NDTV. Only the UPA govt. is more powerful than these two in India. Is anyone in the govt. backing them?

Why is NDTV hiding the fact that its correspondent the baby faced Poonam Aggarwal transcending the limits of journalistic ethics - so ‘dear’ to Barkha Dutt and Prannoy Roy – was indulging in blackmailing IU Khan and demanding he give her the case diary and confidential police documents pertaining to the case?

Why is NDTV hiding the fact that after Khan didn’t part with the prosecution documents, Poonam Aggarwal had threatened him that he should be prepared to face the consequence?

Why is NDTV hiding the fact that this warning by their reporter had prompted Khan to send a legal notice to NDTV on April 19, to which NDTV replied on April 26 expressing regret over the happening?

Why is NDTV hiding the fact that its reporter Poonam Aggarwal had also been hauled up repeatedly by the court of another additional sessions judge, Ravinder Kaur, for misreporting the court proceedings?

For me, this collusion between the prosecution and the defence is nothing new. Such things happen daily allover India. But in this particular case there is more to it. It is like killing two or more birds with one stone. Don’t ask me to explain.

Stratfor on Musharraf's Crack Down

Stratfor on Musharraf's latest crack down on the media in Pakistan.

Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf on Thursday called an emergency meeting of the country's top military brass, including corps commanders and agency heads, for June 1 to discuss the domestic political situation. The same day, Information and Broadcasting Minister Sen. Muhammad Ali Durrani announced that all private electronic media outlets must now obtain permission from the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority before each live broadcast. Pakistan's Supreme Court also said it plans to investigate reports of state authorities and political groups harassing and threatening journalists. The country's increasingly assertive judiciary and media have played a key role in the growing crisis of governance. The most recent blow to Musharraf came May 26 during a Supreme Court Bar Association seminar entitled "Separation of Powers and Independence of the Judiciary," when several prominent lawyers harshly criticized the government and the military's control of the state. Several TV channels carried the event live. The seminar enraged the Musharraf regime, which responded by saying abusive and derogatory remarks about national institutions, especially the armed forces, will not be tolerated. In a May 30 speech to officers at the Jehlum garrison, Musharraf warned the media to stop politicizing the judicial crisis, though media criticism of the Pakistani government is hardly unprecedented. In fact, the country has seen a major proliferation of private television channels under Musharraf's rule. The government allowed this in order to counter public criticism that it is a military-dominated autocratic regime. It also could afford to allow the increasingly vibrant media its freedom since Musharraf faced no real challenge to his rule. But in the wake of the suspension of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry, this vibrancy has damaged the public perception of the government. Yet, because the country's opposition parties continue to be divided over how to move against Musharraf, media coverage of political events and the broadcasting of damning criticism have not resulted in the protests attaining critical mass. Nonetheless, the government is moving toward a major crackdown that will drastically curtail free speech. The nature of the criticism -- which has been aimed not only at the president, but also at the military's domination of the state -- and its reception within Musharraf's own constituency could present major problems for Musharraf's ability to rule. Musharraf's most important source of power is the support he receives from the military, particularly the army. Criticism of Musharraf due to his dual role as military chief and president is one thing, but the questioning of the military's control over the state changes things dramatically. This forces the top generals to question Musharraf's ability to look after the military's interests. Hence, Musharraf is rushing to clamp down on the media. He must now show the generals he is very much in control and is capable of ensuring that the military maintains its hold on the state. Losing the confidence of the army's senior leadership would prove fatal to his own hold on power. It is unlikely a crackdown on political dissent will help Musharraf shore up his position; in fact, it likely will make the situation worse for him. The verdict in Chaudhry's appeal case and the controversial presidential vote set to take place in September will only accelerate the momentum of the country's growing unrest.[Stratfor]

Not the end of the World

Starfor reports that Washington appears to be preparing New Delhi for disappointment by giving quiet assurances that the United States is still firmly committed to pursuing a strategic partnership with India even if the nuclear deal falls through.

When asked how close Indian and U.S. negotiators are in sealing a pending civilian nuclear deal, U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said May 31, "we're almost there." Burns is now in India, where he will spend the next two days trying to iron out a bilateral deal termed the "123 agreement" needed to bring India out of 30 years of nuclear isolation so the energy-starved South Asian giant can start receiving nuclear fuel and technology from the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group. The deal has stagnated for close to two years now because of some critical sticking points that the Indians and Americans simply cannot afford to back down on. The main sticking points involve clauses added to the original agreement by the U.S. Congress that stipulate India will not be allowed to reprocess nuclear fuel (which would allow for the extraction of weapons-grade plutonium) and the nuclear deal will be nullified should India conduct a nuclear test. For economic, political and national security reasons, India is not willing to concede on these U.S. demands and is looking for some leeway from Washington. That leeway will not be easy to come by, especially since U.S. President George W. Bush knows the 123 agreement is going to have to come back to Congress for final approval. With the U.S. election season already in full swing and a vociferous nonproliferation lobby in Washington breathing heavily over the nuclear deal, it looks like these negotiations are not going to be wrapped up as quickly as both sides are hoping. Bush has set the June 6-8 G-8 summit in Germany as an unofficial deadline to get this nuclear deal wrapped up and use the international conference as a platform to commemorate the cementing of a strategic partnership between India and the United States. This nuclear deal is the main stepping-stone the United States needs to formulate a geopolitical balance in the Indian Ocean basin. Such a balance would allow Washington to use India as a hedge against China, safeguard U.S. energy interests in the Persian Gulf, dilute Russia's ties with New Delhi and sustain pressure on Pakistan to cooperate on containing the transnational jihadist movement. The ruling Congress party in India is keen on expanding ties with the United States, but also realizes the need to allay domestic political concerns that India is straying from its generally nonaligned foreign policy stance in the post-Cold War world. For New Delhi to move forward with this strategic alliance, it needs to show that it is getting a good deal with this nuclear agreement to alleviate India's energy concerns substantially. Though Burns and his team are hard at work in New Delhi, the Bush administration appears to be making moves of its own to keep India interested in case the nuclear deal ends up taking even longer than expected. Indian officials said May 30 that Bush recently called up Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and invited him to his ranch in Crawford, Texas. The dates are still being sorted out, but Singh could be donning cowboy boots as early as September. Singh's trip would be a personalized visit, not another stuffy meeting at the White House with 30-member delegations. Bush does not invite just anybody to the ranch for one-on-one face time over barbeque. So far, less than two dozen world leaders have been hosted by Bush at the ranch since he came into office in January 2001. To get an invitation to Crawford, one must be a close friend or ally of Bush (like British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi or Australian Prime Minister John Howard), or someone Bush feels he must deal with for strategic reasons (like Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah). Singh likely falls into the latter category. Singh's addition to the Crawford guest list has also been coupled with an announcement by the U.S. Defense Department of a $1.1 billion deal to sell India six C-130J Hercules transport aircraft and related equipment. These fully modernized C-130s are a significant update to the Indian air force's airlift capacity. Its 30 or so Soviet-era Ilyushin Il-76 transports are getting old, and the C-130 is a fairly unique airframe with more than 50 years of ongoing active service with the U.S. military. But this is not to say that Washington is pulling out all the stops in terms of military aid to India -- Pakistan (along with Cameroon and some 60 other countries around the world) operates older variants of the venerable transport. The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, however, is making a point to glamorize the proposed deal as a way for the United States to enhance its foreign policy and national security by strengthening the U.S.-Indian strategic relationship. While Pakistan and China may be pleased to see the nuclear deal faltering over recent months, Washington is sending a clear message that it is still dead serious about its strategic alliance with India. But though the United States has its eyes set on India for long-term purposes, India's perspective is more short-term. India is not willing to go back on 50 years of its nuclear doctrine to satisfy U.S. demands for the deal to pass, and New Delhi's stance is becoming increasingly hardened. For India, the nuclear deal will have to materialize for this developing strategic alliance to bear fruit. Burns might be able to work some magic in New Delhi to get the agreement inked, but it is going to be a long shot.[Stratfor]

We dont need the civilian nuclear deal if it is not on our terms. It is better the deal falls through. The UPA as well as Bush want to ink the deal asap for political reasons. For that India cannot sacrifice its strategic interests.

India and the Modern Islamist Terrorist

Even five years after the 9/11 terror attacks, India’s security forces haven’t learned anything about modern Islamist terrorists. In their zeal to safeguard one of Delhi’s showpieces the Delhi Metro, the CISF, which has the responsibility of its security, has rightly decided to introduce a series of tough security measures including profiling of suspicious passengers. They have already decided the target for profiling – “bearded youths wearing caps” (read: Muslim youth wearing skull caps).

After that what are we supposed to do? Cry or laugh?

The modern Islamist terrorist is completely different from the stereotypical image engrained in the minds of India’s security forces. They are highly educated and ambitious. They come from simple middle-class families who are not overtly religious or are secular. They are well acquainted with Western lifestyle. They are clean-shaven, suave looking and don’t sport anything that will give their identity away. They are intelligent, courteous and friendly. To their families and the outside world, they would be the last anyone would suspect of being Islamists.

It is once they come under the influence of jihadi recruiters looking out for the modern would-be jihadi, their life takes a 180° turn. They are imparted lessons in radical Islam and brainwashed into believing that Islam is in danger from the infidels. In India, the meticulously planned and executed Gujarat riots of 2002 - in the wake of the heinous Islamist terror activity of burning and killing innocent but boisterous Kar-Sevaks at Godhra - where the state BJP govt and the larger Sangh Parivar actively participated and perpetuated the pogrom for more than two months is today used by Pakistan's ISI controlled Indian Islamists to brainwash the young and impressionable Indian Muslims to indulge in anti-India terrorism. Apart from this, as Mullahs teach the faithful to be more concerned about their fellow Muslim in another country than the welfare of their country, the Islamists have many excuses like Palestine, Iraq, Bosnia, Kashmir, etc to motivate innocent Muslims into jihad. Killing them - even if that means fellow Muslims get killed in the process - is the only way to save Islam and establish it as the dominant religion in the world. They are further brainwashed into believing that if they die for Islam, they will be in paradise and rewarded with 72 virgins for non-stop pleasure. Their background helps them from giving away their new identity. Ultimately their passion for radical Islam and jihad turn them into Islamic zombies.

But that doesn’t stop them from enjoying the vices defined by Islam before their final act. This is what some of the 9/11 terrorists who were supposed to be pious Muslims did before they boarded the flights that changed the world: Some of them called prostitutes to their rooms and indulged in earthly pleasures before their encounters with the virgins waiting for them in Paradise, others watch pornographic movies, some others gulped down liquor, some visited strip clubs. After that surely Allah wouldn’t have been that pleased and cancelled their tickets to paradise.

So the question is: are the Indian security agencies going to update their notes on the Islamist terrorists or are they going to harass innocent Muslims while letting the modern Islamist terrorist through the green and yellow channels.

Related Link: Tavleen Singh on the movement to de-Indianise Indian Muslims by imposing an Arabic idea of Islam.

India Boosting Pakistan's Economy

For sometime now after the removal of quotas, Pakistan has been losing out in the world textile market due to superior products and offers from its main competitors like India, China, Bangladesh, etc. On one hand India is partly stealing Pakistan’s textile pie in the international market and thus reducing its foreign exchange earnings but on the other hand India is boosting Pakistan’s internal economy.

The popularity of Indian TV dramas among Pakistani women has lead to an increasing trend of attiring sarees, which has boosted the business of local saree manufacturers. Popular Indian TV dramas such as “Kiunkay Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi”, “Kahin Tu Hoga”, “Kumkum” and “Kahani Ghar Ghar Ki” have played a major role in setting a new fashion trend in the country. This emerging fashion has had a positive impact on clothing and jewellery businesses in domestic markets and creating employment among the lower class people. On the other hand, imports and smuggling of Indian sarees has also surged notably in the country, owing to a soaring demand among female customers for this product. Traditionally, married women belonging to Bihari and Hyderabadi families in the country prefer wearing Banarsi sarees in ceremonies and wear silk and shafoon sarees at home. But the rising fashion trend has breached all ethnic differences and age-limits among women for adopting saree in their culture. A survey conducted by Daily Times at various big shopping centres and manufacturing areas of the metropolis revealed that the production and sales of sarees have increased following a rising demand among the women from elite and middle classes. Scores of entrepreneurs, who have newly established their business with large stocks of this popular dress, have been generating profitable revenues while cashing in on the saree fever. One of the saree retailers at Tariq Road in Karachi, Muhammad Sohail told Daily Times that the sale of sarees has increased tremendously since last three years. He estimated that the business of every big saree emporium at Tariq Road has surged by four times in just two years and scores of saree shops have been opened in various shopping centres. “If one (shopkeeper) used to sell 20 sarees in a week, now he is selling around 100 sarees in the same period. “The Saas-Bahu dramas have played a magnificent role as advertisement campaign for sarees, and provided a remarkable boost to our sales,” he said. According to shopkeepers, the majority of the customers purchase sarees ranging between Rs 2,500 and Rs 5,000, whereas some also demand costly and exclusive sarees ranging between Rs 8,000 to Rs 15,000 per item, especially for dowry purposes. Banarsi, silk and shafoon sarees are highly demanded by the customers. The local manufacturers design sarees with valuables embroidery and handiwork to imitate the Indian style. Interestingly, the most demanded and costly sarees in the market are those, which look similar to the saree worn by Indian actresses in Indian TV dramas. Keeping this in view, the local manufacturers have adopted a simple technique to name their sarees after the popular characters in the dramas. “Kumkum and Kashish sarees are very popular among young and unmarried customers,” Sohail said. For instance, a saree similar to one worn by a popular TV character Kashish is available in the market for Rs 20, 000 under the name of “Kashish saree”. A saree worn by Kumkum –another famous TV character - branded as “Kumkum saree” is being sold at Rs 25, 000. Besides, huge quantities of sarees are being imported from Dubai via India. It is also smuggled directly from India by some cloth merchants. The surging fashion craze created by Indian TV dramas has not only boosted the business of cloth merchants, but has also increased profits of the jewellery industry. Mangalsuther (necklace), bangles and earrings, similar to those worn in Indian TV dramas, have rose in demand.[Daily Times]

So once again India's Softpower rocks. One more reason for Pakistan to lift the ban of Indian News Channels - who knows what that can do to Pakistan's economy. One more reason to liberalise trade between the two countries - to put an end to smuggling and cut the middle-men of Dubai out. I am looking forward to know the reactions of the Pakistani political parties to this revelation. I am sure the Mullahs will be aghast at this news.

Cartoon Speak: Tick, tick, tick

Courtesy: The Hindu

The Chinese Espionage Style

In the wake of the arrest and subsequent trial of Chi Mak, a naturalized Chinese-American accused of acting as an agent of the Chinese government and exporting military information, among other charges, Stratfor, examining the the testimony and evidence presented in this case, reports how the case provides an inside look at the methods the Chinese use in the United States to acquire cutting-edge technology and the U.S. government's efforts to counter them. Chi's wife, brother, sister-in-law and nephew are awaiting trial in connection with the case.

An Age-Old Problem Espionage, often called "the world's second-oldest profession," has been practiced since the beginning of recorded history. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the launch of the global war on terrorism, however, the FBI redirected nearly all of its assets for foreign counterintelligence (FCI) programs into the counterterrorism effort. This meant that for the first time in the bureau's history, practically no counterintelligence efforts were taking place. Although the scope of the damage caused by this virtual FCI hiatus might never be fully appreciated, the October 2005 arrest of the Chi family was one sign that the pendulum was beginning to swing the other way -- that resources were being allocated to address the enormous problem of foreign spies. While the FBI's limited FCI programs run up against the espionage efforts of dozens of foreign countries, no country poses a more aggressive or widespread intelligence threat to the United States than China. The Chinese in many ways use the espionage version of the "human wave" attacks they employed against U.S. military forces during the Korean War. Due to China's size and the communist government's control of society, the Chinese can devote immense manpower to gathering intelligence. For example, the U.S. State Department issued 382,000 nonimmigrant visas and 37,000 immigrant visas to Chinese citizens in 2006. Additionally, more than 62,000 Chinese students were studying at U.S. universities last year. Granted, very few of these people were spies, though the number still represents an enormous pool of potential suspects to vet and watch, especially when one considers that there are only 12,575 FBI agents in the United States -- most of whom are assigned to tasks other than FCI, such as terrorism and white-collar crime. The bottom line, therefore, is that it is very difficult to determine which of these visitors are in the United States to steal secrets and technology. Indeed, many serve in both capacities: They are legitimate students and part of the intelligence effort. Furthermore, not everyone who collects information for the Chinese government realizes they are doing so. By engaging in normal conversations with Chinese friends or relatives about all manner of things, including work, the average person can be providing these friends -- the real intelligence agents -- with critical information. Additionally, in many cases, the activities of Chinese agents do not fit the legal definition of espionage. Scouring open-source material for new and emerging technologies, attending technology conferences and trade shows and hiring firms to look at new technologies are all legal activities -- and U.S. companies do this all the time. Some Chinese agents, then, are engaging much more in business intelligence than in true espionage. Given the blurred lines between civilian and government/military technology in China, however, the information gleaned can easily find its way into military applications. The Chinese Style The Chinese are renowned for their patient and persistent espionage methods, and for their technological reverse-engineering capabilities. They also are noted for taking an extremely long view of their political and military needs and of the intelligence required to meet them. Because of this, the Chinese pose the greatest intelligence threat to U.S. technology. Aggressive efforts by the Chinese government to obtain critical technologies are no secret. The Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, for instance, lists science and technology acquisition programs such as its National High-tech R&D Program (known as the 863 Program) on its official Web site. This program provides guidance and funding for acquiring or developing technology that will have a "significant impact on enhancing China's overall national strengths." Targeted technologies include those for civilian use in areas such as information technology (IT), biotechnology, agriculture, manufacturing, energy and the environment. Many of these technologies, however, also have military applications. While the 863 Program calls for the Chinese to acquire or develop these technologies, it is far cheaper and quicker to acquire them -- and China has a long history of doing so. A great many of China's weapons systems have been developed either by stealing designs and technologies or by outright copying the entire system. In addition to copying small arms such as the AK-47, the RPG-7 and the Makarov pistol, Chinese military industries have even reverse-engineered fighter aircraft. The Chengdu F-7 fighter, for example, is a copy of the Soviet MiG-21. This crash technological advancement program is intended not only to close China's technological gap with the West, but also to leapfrog ahead of it. To acquire critical technologies, then, the Chinese rely not only on traditional espionage, but also on collecting the needed information via open sources. Such open-source collection is both faster and easier than engaging in espionage -- and it is legal. In effect, the Chinese are exploiting the openness of the U.S. research and development (R&D) system. Such openness allows faster development of technologies in the United States because scientists and engineers from various institutions and companies can share ideas, and thus contribute to different aspects of the concept. The openness, however, also makes it easy for others to "eavesdrop" on the ongoing technological conversation. Other countries, including Israel, France, India and South Korea, do the same thing -- though none has matched China in the amount of effort and resources devoted to this process. To obtain the desired technology, China is sending students, scholars and researchers to work and study in the United States and other industrialized countries. Some of these visitors then return to China to work in high-tech "incubator parks," where R&D takes place. Among this group, however, are real intelligence officers who are sent to steal critical technologies. The Chi case provides insight into this process at work in the United States. According to the U.S. government, Chi was employed as a principal support engineer for Power Paragon, a subsidiary of L-3 Communications/SPD Technologies/Power Systems Group in Anaheim, Calif. Chi, who was born in China and became a U.S. citizen in 1985, was granted a "secret-level" security clearance in 1996 and worked on more than 200 U.S. defense and military contracts as an electrical engineer. During the investigation into Chi's activities, the FBI performed a "trash cover" on him -- literally combing through his trash for evidence -- and found two documents containing instructions for Chi to attend more seminars and lists of the technologies he was to obtain. The lists had been torn up into small pieces, but the FBI was able to reconstruct and translate them. The FBI then performed surreptitious searches of Chi's residence and reportedly found documents pertaining to a number of the technologies listed on both documents. Redefining the 'Company' Efforts to collect sensitive technology are conducted not only by individual intelligence agents, but also by the many corporations established and controlled by the Chinese government. One such corporation is the Xinshidai Group, which was established by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and is one of China's two largest military hardware conglomerates. One of the armaments companies Xinshidai controls is Norinco, which is widely known in the United States for sales of light arms and ammunition. While conglomerates such as Xinshidai are not officially part of the Chinese government, they were established solely to serve the needs of the PLA and the Chinese military-industrial complex. And one important need of the Chinese government is to acquire advanced defense technology. Many Xinshidai subunits, including Norinco, own subsidiary companies in the United States, and employees of these companies attend trade shows and technology conferences, and also meet with representatives from other companies. Of course, with so much information available online, much of this open-source collection can be accomplished from a desk in China Many times, early technologies related to the defense industry are not yet classified and therefore not protected. These technologies often become classified only after the U.S. government has purchased them. Information on these emerging technologies, then, can be obtained during the early stage, when their developers are applying for patents or looking for venture capital, partners and/or customers. The technology acquisition process more often crosses the line into traditional espionage inside China, where Chinese intelligence officers -- operating without fear of prosecution -- frequently steal sensitive documents or copy a target's hard drive. This situation is further complicated when one considers that many of the major U.S.-based corporations doing business in China or seeking to expand market share there also have lucrative contracts with the U.S. Defense Department or other federal agencies. Some of these companies are going beyond Chinese manufacturing and are establishing design and software development centers in the country, meaning even more technology and proprietary information must be made available there. The expansion of foreign companies into China brings a host of potential targets right to the Chinese intelligence apparatus, allowing China to apply even more pressure to even more points in its quest for technology. Moreover, the techniques used against companies and travelers in China can be far more aggressive than those employed against similar targets in the United States. In addition to the threat posed to U.S. national security, allowing China to close the technology gap through the acquisition of proprietary information -- legally or not -- ultimately will hurt U.S. multinationals as Chinese companies use the information to become competitors. This means U.S. companies wishing to remain competitive by operating in China or partnering with Chinese firms and their subsidiaries in the United States must maintain a high level of vigilance.[Stratfor]

An Insightful Look at US-Chinese Relationship

In an insightful and enlightening article Stratfor analyst Rodger Baker takes a deeper look into Sino-USA relations. He looks at the past, the present and the future of this relationship between the world’s sole superpower and a fast emerging China. This was published on the eve of the second biannual Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) between the two countries, which just concluded.

By Rodger Baker Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi is in Washington to meet with U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson for the second of the planned biannual Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) sessions between the two countries. The dialogue brings together representatives of numerous ministries on both sides of the Pacific, covering finance, labor, trade, agriculture and the environment, among others. As the talks get under way, business and media attention is focused almost exclusively on two main issues: the Chinese-U.S. trade imbalance and China's undervaluing of the yuan. The dialogue, however, is designed to integrate a much broader array of issues between Beijing and Washington, moving beyond trade to the larger matter of how the world's only remaining superpower deals with the rapid emergence of China on the international economic and political scene. For Washington, the dialogue is a tool to manage China's international relations as much as China's economic development. And for Beijing, the dialogue represents an attempt to shape relations with the United States in terms of economic cooperation, rather than strategic competition. The economic framework for discussions seems to appeal to both Washington and Beijing, and the current dialogue, then, serves as a convenient tool for managing relations that sit on a much broader geopolitical framework. Still in its early stages, the SED reflects a changing dynamic in the management of U.S.-Chinese relations. From Beijing's perspective, the SED is a way to focus on the potential positive elements of U.S.-Chinese ties -- business and trade -- and reduce attention on questions of the "China threat" and the emergence of China as a military competitor to the United States. The SED serves, in Beijing's mind, as one way of using the U.S. administration as a balance to the U.S. Congress. If the administration is looking at the broader strategic issues posed by China's global emergence, then it will be less likely to accede to congressional politicking on the China issue -- or so Beijing hopes. China sees the U.S. Congress as "unsophisticated" on China issues, and Capitol Hill as a place where short-term political interests, based to a large degree on electioneering and campaign contributions, drive periodic spurts of anti-Chinese rhetoric. However, during the past two decades, Beijing itself has grown a little more sophisticated in its understanding of U.S. politics, and has moved past dealing primarily with image management at the presidential and ministerial level to trying to shape U.S. political views from the ground up. With the rapid rise of the Chinese economy in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis and Beijing's entry into the World Trade Organization, China looked to both protect its growing economic connections and expand its international influence in the post-Cold War environment. With the Soviet Union gone and Europe failing to rise as a counterbalance to the United States, China set its sights on Washington as the biggest challenge to Chinese power -- and yet the best economic path to Chinese growth. Washington was headed for a presidential change, Beijing was dealing with increasing U.S. warnings of the China threat and the Chinese government was looking at its own upcoming leadership transition and the internal battle over best economic policies and security posture. For each of these issues, managing relations with the United States became the critical common factor. In the late 1990s, Beijing ramped up a program of perception management in Washington, moving from trying to buy influence through campaign contributions to a more subtle approach of accelerating political and economic dialogue with U.S.-based think tanks, research institutes and academic institutions. Chinese scholars, both in the academic fields and in semi-government research institutes, embarked on numerous exchanges, dialogues and forums, sharing insights into policy debates and internal economic inconsistencies in China. At the same time, the state began releasing economic statistics that, through close examination, painted a picture not of a strong and unbreakable China, but of one that faced many of the same economic challenges and potential pitfalls as its Asian neighbors. Through a carefully managed spread of information, China began shaping the perception of the key U.S. researchers on Chinese issues. Beijing seemed more open, more willing to admit mistakes and more receptive to suggestions for economic, social and even limited political reform. Discussions of the China threat shifted from a military concern to one of economics to one of potential Chinese collapse -- and the attendant ripples that would affect the international (and U.S.) economic systems. This information began trickling up to congressional aides, members of Congress and into the U.S. government bureaucracy and administration. And Beijing is seeing a payoff, at least on the surface. When the current administration took power, relations with Washington were contentious to say the least. U.S. President George W. Bush came into office with a Cabinet that viewed China as the next strategic threat now that the Soviet Union was relegated to history. China's economic rise, and its military expansion that focused on new missiles and naval technology, was seen as a challenge to U.S. dominance of the seas, and thus to U.S. core national security. Now, the administration is pursuing strategic dialogue and cooperation with China, even if this is just a stopgap measure until Washington can free itself from Iraq. In 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, Washington and Beijing came to a working arrangement. The United States would essentially leave China alone, and China would not present any direct challenge to the United States as Washington dealt with what it saw as a new strategic threat: al Qaeda and international Islamist militancy. Beijing welcomed the reprieve from the more contentious relations with Washington, which had declined precipitously following the collision that left a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft on a military runway in southern China. At the time, Beijing was neither militarily nor politically prepared to square off against the United States. In fact, China was facing a major generational shift in leadership and needed the external buffer to allow Beijing to focus on internal issues. With the political transition completed, Beijing then shifted focus to economic and social stability -- and again used the minimal external pressure from Washington to give it breathing room while these issues took priority. Internationally, Beijing used the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and the North Korean nuclear crisis to try to raise the profile of international organizations such as the United Nations to counter the unipolar power of the United States. At the same time, it tried to raise China's profile and importance to Washington -- since, after all, the U.S. government could not face off against al Qaeda, Afghanistan, Iraq and North Korea all at the same time. By 2005, Washington was looking at longer-term involvement in Iraq than it had planned, and then-U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick made an indirect offer to Beijing for closer potential cooperation -- offering to treat China as a global player if Beijing proved a "responsible stakeholder." The offer appealed to Beijing, and China, cautiously at first but with increasing boldness, launched into a more open dialogue with Washington, making token trades on currency issues and offering its services in "rogue" nations such as North Korea and, more recently, Sudan in order to demonstrate its "responsibility" and keep real pressure from the United states to a minimum. While the U.S. administration, particularly the Pentagon, was not all that reassured by China's behavioral change (as seen in early 2006 with a series of reports labeling China a strategic threat and culminating in a several-minute-long tirade by a Falun Gong activist at the White House reception for Chinese President Hu Jintao), Washington, with the exception of Congress, has taken a relatively relaxed approach to China. Trade issues dominate the headlines, as does the yuan valuation, but the administration pushes for more cooperative dialogue with Beijing rather than punitive sanctions or tariffs. On Beijing's side, shortly after the first SED meeting in December 2006, China's Foreign Ministry launched the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at its research institute, the China Institute for International Studies. The center is designed to bring together top Chinese scholars on U.S. issues from across a broad spectrum of China (economic, international relations, security and others) and encourage increased exchanges with counterparts in the United States -- thus managing the perception campaign from a unified center. Earlier this year, China also appointed Yang Jiechi as foreign minister, calling on Yang's years of experience in the Chinese Embassy in Washington, his work with both sides of Congress and his long-standing ties with the Bush family. The SED, then, provides both Washington and Beijing with a more centralized (and less random) point of contact for managing bilateral relations. But management and fundamental alterations are very different things. China's trade and economic policies will not be set with Washington's concerns as the top priority. Beijing's first concern is the maintenance of Communist Party rule, followed closely by the maintenance of social stability (which allows the party to remain in power). Economics are a tool, one that must balance domestic social pressures with international concerns. Furthermore, while dialogue can provide a channel for managing relations with the United States, China is not abandoning other tools for preserving its increasing economic vulnerabilities as its trade and energy requirements are internationalized. China's anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) test in January was a clear reminder that China still sees the United States as the top challenge to Chinese economic security. China is a land power, not a maritime power. But China's economics have grown increasingly linked to longer and longer supply lines, particularly with energy imports. As such, Beijing sees a major vulnerability in its supply routes, as a large portion of its energy must pass through waters that, for all intents and purposes, are controlled by the United States. The ASAT test was intended to notify Washington that Beijing has ways to deal with the U.S. strategic dominance of the seas by threatening critical U.S. communications and guidance infrastructure. China's vulnerabilities as a land power increasingly dependent on sea routes makes Beijing always extremely nervous about the United States, regardless of whether Washington intends to interdict Chinese trade and energy supplies. At the same time, China's expanding trade and political links around the globe are starting to rub up against U.S. strategic interests, particularly where China taps into energy resources Washington wants, or where Beijing's relations in places like Africa and Latin America challenge U.S. access to raw materials. But economic competition notwithstanding, Washington is loath to directly confront China, as attacking a land power in Asia is never wise or easy. There is a standoff, then, between Washington and Beijing. Washington is heavily occupied with Iraq and Iran, and Beijing is taking advantage of this to expand its political and economic ties as broadly as possible. At the same time, China is obsessed with internal economic and social instability, and Washington can use these concerns to needle Beijing and keep China from taking too much advantage of Washington's limited bandwidth. Both see the SED as a useful place to manage this dance. Neither sees the SED as a real forum for a strategic partnership between China and the United States, or a place for drastic changes in the relationship. There is something beyond the SED, however, that could start bringing Washington and Beijing closer together: the re-emergence of Moscow. Relations between Washington and Beijing have been rather manic since the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. After Beijing's initial flirtations with Washington, China and the United States soon found themselves facing one another on the battlefields of Korea. China's ally at the time, the Soviet Union, largely sat out the conflict, leaving Beijing to ensure the communist revolution in Asia -- and letting China fight the United States while Moscow avoided the potential World War III feared by U.S. strategists at the time. Rather than using the opportunity presented by the Korean War to launch a simultaneous assault on Europe, Moscow let China fight, undermining the potential for any Sino-U.S. relations and tying China closer into the Soviet sphere of influence. But by the late 1960s, tensions between Beijing and Moscow had risen to a fevered level, and significant border clashes broke out in 1969. Three years later, the mutually perceived threat from the Soviet Union brought U.S. President Richard Nixon to China to meet with Mao Zedong. The United States and China embarked on a new strategic relationship based on balancing the Soviet threat. This lasted until shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when China began seeking to expand its influence in East Asia and looked as though it were getting much more serious about war with Taiwan. In the late 1990s, China even flirted with the idea of establishing a strategic partnership with Russia to block the unipolar power of the United States, but never quite trusted its northern neighbor (and, for a while, Moscow had little to offer anyway aside from arms sales, which were already taking place). When 2001 rolled around, Beijing found new opportunities to deal directly with Washington. But Russia has begun reasserting its influence around its periphery, and Cold War rhetoric is flowing from Moscow. On the surface, that would seem ideal for China, except that Beijing has been looking at Central Asia as a critical piece of its energy security puzzle, since Central Asian energy supplies never need to move by sea to China. As Moscow seeks to reclaim influence and control in its near abroad, China sees its potential role in Central Asia diminishing and its energy supplies challenged by the resurgent Russia. Add in Russian talk of reinvigorating the Russian presence in the Pacific, and China sees its energy and economic security once again challenged by its neighbor. This could provide the impetus for a Beijing move closer to Washington -- to keep the United States focused on Russian threats rather than Chinese concerns. Beijing already has experience working with the United States to counter Russian influence, and keeping the current and former superpowers eyeing each other leaves China a less visible threat, and thus capable of continuing to deal with its own internal issues while facing minimal pressure from outside. As Beijing sees it, if a true multipolar world cannot be established any time soon, the hints of a return to a bipolar world order -- with Russia facing off against the United States -- could keep China out of the crosshairs and constrain U.S. actions. With the SED already in place, China has another pathway through which to shape its own image as cooperative, and perhaps drop a few hints of its concerns about Russia.[Strator]