The Unpardonable Sin of Indian Commies

It is a well-know fact that Indian Commies under instruction from their masters in the former Soviet Union stayed away from the Quit India Movement of 1942, as they didn’t want to go jail. But the Indian Commies greatest crime of trying to destabilise the newly independent Indian nation is hardy talked about. This is because the majority of intellectuals and historians in India are notoriously Commies at heart.

Historian and Nehru worshipper Ramachandra Guha has exposed the unpardonable crime of Indian Commies - who never ever thought of India's good - in a recent article.

....When India became independent in August 1947, the general secretary of the CPI was P.C. Joshi, a cultured, sensitive man who understood that freedom had come through the struggle and sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Indians. A statement issued by the CPI thus acknowledged that the Congress was “the main national democratic organization”, and said the party would “fully co-operate with the national leadership in the proud task of building the Indian Republic on democratic foundations….” However, by the end of 1947, P.C. Joshi found his line challenged by the radical faction of the CPI. This claimed that the freedom that India had obtained was false — “Ye Azaadi Jhoota Hai”, the slogan went — and asked that the party declare an all-out war against the government of India. The radicals were led by B.T. Ranadive, who saw in the imminent victory of the Chinese communists a model for himself and his comrades. A peasant struggle was already on in Hyderabad, against the feudal regime of the Nizam — why not use that as a springboard for the Indian revolution? On February 28, 1948 — four weeks after Gandhi’s murder — the CPI leadership met in Calcutta, and confirmed that the revolutionary line would prevail. Joshi was replaced as general secretary by Ranadive, who declared that the Indian government was a lackey of imperialism, and would be overthrown by armed struggle. Party members were ordered to foment strikes and protests to further the cause of the revolution-in-the-making. Bulletins and posters were issued urging the people to rise up and “set fire to the whole of Bengal”, to “destroy the Congress Government”, and move “forward to unprecedented mass struggles. Forward to storm the Congress Bastilles”. The government, naturally, came down hard. Some fifty thousand party members and sympathizers were arrested. These arrests forestalled Ranadive’s plans to crystallize strikes in the major industrial cities of Bombay and Calcutta. It took some more time to restore order in Hyderabad, where a recalcitrant Nizam was refusing to join the Indian Union, egged on by militant Islamists (known as ‘Razakars’), who were making common cause with their local communists. But in September 1948, the Indian army moved into Hyderabad; slowly, over a period of two years, the areas where the communists had been active were brought back under the control of the state. ...when speaking of the failed communist insurrection, they [Indian intellectuals and historians]choose to focus instead on the “massive state repression”. But what was the Indian state supposed to do when faced with this armed challenge to its authority? Sit back and allow Ranadive and his men to move into power in New Delhi? The state reacted the only way it could. And its actions were legitimate; behind them was the support of the broad masses of the people. As it happened, the legitimacy of the state was tested and confirmed in the general elections of 1952, won resoundingly by Nehru’s Congress, and in which the now-reconciled Communist Party of India was also a contestant. [The Telegraph]