Stratfor's Forecast for US Military

Here is Stratfor's 2005-15 decade forecast for US Military.

The peaks and troughs and localized strains the U.S. military has felt during the war on terrorism in general and the Iraq war in particular will prove to be immaterial in the coming decade. Regardless of the outcome of the war -- though Stratfor suspects it will end in Washington's favor -- U.S. military dominance will remain absolute during the next decade. The U.S. military is the unquestioned and sole global military power; this is based primarily on the ability of the U.S. Navy to dominate the world's oceans. This condition of hegemony is only partially based on the superior numbers and technology of U.S. naval vessels and augmented significantly by U.S. dominance in space-based reconnaissance technology. On a broad scale, this situation will not change in the next 10 years -- especially regarding U.S. naval dominance -- but the next decade probably will see the emergence of cautious challengers to U.S. dominance over space. Fundamental technological breakthroughs have often driven fundamental changes in warfare, and Stratfor expects the next decade to be no different. The next step in revolutionary warfare likely to become operational by 2015 is hypersonic scramjet technology. Having been developed by the United States for going on two decades now, this technology -- capable of traveling at 15 times the speed of sound, meaning an aircraft with a weapons payload could fly from Seattle to Beijing in less than half an hour -- will have a coming-out party of sorts over the next 10 years. The availability of such a unique standoff weapon will allow for rapid response and battlefield dominance in every corner of the world. This already is provided in part by the U.S. Navy, but now weapons can be delivered to a target far from any substantive naval presence and rapidly enough to negate any conventional countermeasures an enemy might have on hand. Technology like this solves many logistics-associated force projection problems simply because assets do not have to be in theater in order to launch a strike. Naturally, this will be another warfare tool for the United States and will not supplant traditional tactics and techniques. As situations require, ground forces will still have to be sent in to hold ground and force a political outcome favorable to the United States. This weapon would, however, give the United States rapid first strike or retaliatory capability in corners of the world where U.S. forces cannot instantaneously interdict or where the overriding geopolitical concerns do not require the physical presence of traditional U.S. military assets. This will force those seeking to counter the United States to look to asymmetric methods and toward the one area the U.S. military is still subject to competition -- space. After all, the quickest, stealthiest, most expensive aircraft in the world is still rendered useless if it cannot navigate or if intelligence on the target cannot be gathered quickly. Given the virtual inevitability of U.S. naval dominance, state and non-state actors' only viable recourse will be the pursuit of asymmetric naval forces to limit Western mercantile and U.S. military access. Guerrilla navies are limited to regionally focused militant organizations (Tamil Tigers) and oceangoing pirates; in 10 years, however, the use of these navies might rise. Considering the ability of a single small craft to disable a U.S. naval vessel -- as evidenced by the attack against the USS Cole -- it is a logical step for anyone seeking to disrupt U.S. naval operations but without the conventional military strength to do so. Southeast Asia is the most likely area for this development, since the region already plays host to a number of maritime pirates and criminal organizations that can find safe sanctuary in areas of limited security and governance -- the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, for example. Elsewhere, increased naval activity in and around the Gulf of Guinea might inspire guerrilla navies to use the existing pirate havens of Nigeria and the surrounding area to launch attacks against mercantile and U.S. naval vessels and ships of allied navies. Though a strategic competitor is not likely to emerge by 2015, missile technology will continue to develop. States such as Iran and North Korea could be able to deliver first-strike nuclear weapons to targets within their regions, including U.S. military bases and staging points. This is part and parcel of the unconventional threat that could trump the U.S. military's ability to project power wherever and whenever Washington sees fit. Of course, hypersonic payload delivery technology partially mitigates this threat, since it is best used against fixed infrastructure targets. The broadening of the U.S. missile defense umbrella is another line of defense for countries within range of regional nuclear powers, but missile defense technology is still spotty, will likely lag behind offensive technology and will never be 100 percent reliable. The possibility of non-state actors acquiring nuclear weapons either through collusion with or because of the incompetence of a state government cannot be ruled out. A non-state actor in possession of nuclear weaponry allows for the weapons' use without political encumbrances and throws a volatile variable into military planning and operations in the next decade. There will be at least six potential rivals emerging to challenge the United States' sole ownership of global, real-time, space-based reconnaissance and navigation: Russia, China, Japan, India, Iran and Europe. All six have their own internal limits on what they can and will do as far as space-based technology goes, but each will attempt to deploy such assets one way or another. Russia is the only competitor with an outside shot of actually reforming its existing space program to the point of creating a near-global, near-real-time reconnaissance system. Add this to existing ballistic missile technology, and a space-capable Moscow would pose a genuine threat to U.S. hegemony. The variable here is the economic and political status of Russia throughout the decade; the country is in a cycle of decline, but Stratfor expects that to reverse sometime in the next decade. Once that reversal kicks in, Moscow will pay far more attention to improving its space-based capabilities as the only viable hedge to U.S. global naval dominance. India and China are hamstrung by their indigenous space programs' limitations and the limitations created by economic difficulties, such as those forecast for China. Nevertheless, both countries maintain fairly substantial missile programs they will seek to augment with space-based assets to multiply their missiles' capabilities and deny the perception of free passage through their territorial waters. A rise in Chinese nationalism/militarism could serve as an impetus for this despite economic and social limitations. India's economy will continue to grow, and a severe economic crunch will not negatively impact its fledgling space program. It is possible -- and probable, in India's case -- that a limited space program, coupled with indigenous and exogenous missile development, could provide checks to U.S. naval dominance on a regional scale. Japan's national security interests currently are in line with U.S. global and regional interests. In the long term, however, Japan likely anticipates its interests diverging from Washington's and could seek to use good relations now to incrementally launch a space-based reconnaissance and navigation program further down the road. This will be done slowly and innocently -- dual-use satellites, for example -- so as not to raise the United States' hackles and likely will not be completed by 2015, given Japan's economic and political limitations. Iran and Europe are even further behind the power curve than other potential rivals. Europe has demonstrable space-based and satellite capabilities but does not, and likely will not, have the internal structure or political willingness to pursue a militaristic space program -- though Europe might be interested in a purely defensive domestic intelligence/surveillance space program. Iran has the motivation and the initiative, demonstrated by its planned March 2005 launch of its very first satellite. Additionally, Iran has a relatively capable missile program that will continue to improve, unless indigenous and exogenous factors interfere with Iranian military development. Their space program is still in its embryonic stages and not likely to be robust enough to challenge U.S. naval power even regionally. The limiting factor for all these programs is not so much time as it is indigenous political willpower and economic capability. With the exception of Russia -- should its reversal come sooner rather than later -- none of the potential rivals has the necessary political willpower and economic leeway to complete a space-based defense program by 2015 that would be robust enough to challenge U.S. space hegemony. Of course, geopolitical and military alliances between any of these rivals could accelerate indigenous programs and capabilities. It is worth noting that Russia has made a virtual cottage industry out of exporting its own space expertise and technology to countries such as India, China and Iran. Whenever Russia reverses course and begins to rebuild its military and space programs, this cooperation is likely to be somewhat curtailed, mitigating the benefits of these relationships. Since U.S. naval dominance will not be challenged and power projection capabilities will remain near absolute, the United States will naturally respond in kind to a growing threat to its space hegemony. Stratfor expects a substantial increase in research and development into yet-to-be-realized anti-satellite technology to counter the potential rise of competing space powers. Whatever system is decided upon -- kinetic energy, high energy lasers, satellite parasites, jamming or chemical lasers -- it is not likely to be operational by 2015. Working prototypes, however, could be seen in limited operation by 2015. These will become even more indispensable when satellite-dependent hypersonic scramjet aircraft are put to use.

The Bumbling Indian Police

Here is another example of bumbling by Indian Police which allows a terror suspect to escape.

Taking forward the probe into the August 25 twin blasts in Hyderabad, the police have arrested one more Bangladeshi woman in Bangalore. But another suspect Rizvan Ghazi once again managed to give a slip to the cops. Afsana, 28, was arrested late on Monday from a house in Bannerghatta in Bangalore but her accomplice Rizvan once again escaped the police dragnet. She is the second Bangladeshi woman to be arrested in the case. Police sources in Hyderabad said Afsana is a relative of Shafeera Rustomjah, a Bangladeshi arrested in Hyderabad four days ago for overstaying. Shafeera's brother Rizvan, who resembled the sketch of the bomb planter at Lumbini Park, escaped on Sunday when a police team from Hyderabad was reportedly arguing with an autorickshaw driver over the fare after reaching a house in Bangalore. Shafeera, Rizvan and their parents were allegedly staying in Bangalore even six years after their visas expired.[HT]

India's Own String of Pearls Around China

China’s official statements on Arunachal Pradesh and the larger border dispute since late last year clearly indicate a conscious change in China’s policy towards India. China, which used to have border disputes with almost all its neighbours, has settled it amicably with the sole exception of India.

China’s strategy towards India on the border and territorial dispute was clear for some time now – delay the settlement till China can negotiate it from a position of considerable military and economic strength. China pinned its hopes on the economic reforms, which it started in the 1970s to make it economically, militarily and politically strong vis-à-vis India. All of a sudden in the early 1990s circumstances forced India too to embark on the economic reforms route. This, China was never able to foresee and today an India growing at 9% has upset China’s calculations.

China, realising what economic reforms can do to a nation, embarked on its contain India strategy. China got down to its business of encircling India with its strategic string of pearls, which are pressure points to make India uneasy and vulnerable. The results have been fantastic as far as China is concerned; what with India’s supposed allies like Maldives, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, etc joining the party.

As India found herself at the world’s high table as a consequence of her unprecedented economic growth and post cold war geopolitical realties, China’s strategy of playing for time failed miserably. Today India is an Asian ally of USA and rapidly getting economically and militarily closer to it. This has clearly rattled the Chinese and IMHO exactly because of this we are hearing those noises from China on the border and territorial dispute.

B. Raman, however, is of the view that China wants to settle the Tibet issue after the death of the present Dalai Lama by incorporating Tawang or possibly the whole of Arunachal Pradesh in to China Occupied Tibet by any means including another war if necessary.

Now the question is what should be India’s response to an increasingly belligerent China?

On the one hand China wants the trade relation, because it is heavily tilted in its favour to continue and grow further but also wants to have a multi-faceted relation covering all spheres with India. And on the other hand it wants to settle the border and territorial dispute in its favour, on its terms and at a time of it’s choosing. By its string of pearls strategy China wants to confine India to the subcontinent by making it feel strangled and thus vulnerable.

India too has an interest in continuing and boosting the trade relation with China particularly if India’s export share of value added products increases. But that definitely shouldn’t undermine India’s interests or its territorial integrity. If anything that is clear from China’s policies or official statements is that it doesn’t want to do anything that will disrupt its “peaceful” growth. This means China surely can get belligerent but will not be stupid enough to get into a full-scale war to settle the border dispute when it knows unlike in 1962, today, India can hit back hard.

If one studies the geopolitical situation in the subcontinent and the belligerent noises emanating from China, then it is time for India to stop being pusillanimous in its relation with China. In other words, it is time to reciprocate China’s policy of encirclement. Some joint Naval exercises and some security meetings between India, USA and allies have rattled the Chinese like anything. So how much more will China be rattled if India replicates its version of string of pearls around China?

China’s Achilles Heels

To fuel it’s voracious growth, China is signing up oil, gas, and minerals deals of all kinds around the world. From South America to Australia, from Central Asia to Africa, the Chinese are rummaging for stuff to keep their country running. Signing up deals is the easy part but getting it to their country is the difficult part.

China and Pakistan have lined up ambitious plans for their growth. Pakistan hopes to benefit financially and economically from being a trade and energy corridor to the Central Asian Republics and China. China, which is building the Gwadar port in Pakistan, hopes to lay oil and gas pipelines to route crude and gas from the Persian Gulf and Africa to China through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Not only this, for China the shortest route to transport raw materials it plunders from the African continent to the mainland will be via the soon to be laid all-weather Karakoram Highway. A rail link is also planned.

The Karakoram Highway that connects Pakistan with China passes through the Khunjerab Pass in POK. If what Pakistan and China have planned for themselves - by exploiting India’s legitimate territory - comes to fruition, then the Karakoram Highway, the pipelines, the rail link all well could become China’s Achilles heel. In other words, destruction of these economic links will make China highly vulnerable. This is an important pressure point India can exploit to make China feel the pressure. The strategy of targeting this vital economic corridor of China should be on two fronts. One, from Jammu and Kashmir and the other from the Wakhan Corridor in Afghanistan, which is nearer to the Karakoram Highway. To get access to Wakhan Corridor and establish a military outpost there, it would take India’s best diplomatic efforts in cajoling Afghanistan to grant it. One way of getting access is on the pretext of building roads that benefit Afghanistan in the Wakhan Corridor.

One of the reasons China is keen on routing oil and gas from Gulf and Africa through PoK is to avoid the shipping lanes of Malacca Strait, which are patrolled by USA and allies. As India increasingly engages with USA and allies on security matters, sooner or later if India can play its cards shrewdly, it can hope to be given the exclusive or major responsibility of safeguarding the shipping lanes of SE Asia and the Malacca Strait. Once this fructifies China will surely know the pressure.

China’s economically important areas are in Eastern China – the coastal areas to be precise. That is were China’s SEZs are. India’s IRBM Agni III, which is still in the developmental stage, can very well target these areas. But the distance just will not make China feel the pressure because China’s BMD system will have ample time to knock them out.

India’s relation with Vietnam has been strong from the Cold War days. Apart from political and economic relations, India also has military relations with Vietnam. Vietnam’s northern borders are very close to China’s economically important coastal regions. India needs to have a full-fledged military base in this area with a battery of appropriate missile targeting China’s SEZs. Once again it would take India’s best diplomatic efforts in cajoling Vietnam to grant it. USA is also increasing its political and economic relation with Vietnam in order to pressure China on trade issues such as intellectual property rights and currency reform.

Another country with which India’s relation has been strong from the cold war days is Mongolia. An Indian military base here would be a good bet to put additional pressure on China.

Finally there is the Taiwan card. Nothing rattles China more than Taiwan getting any type of political importance particularly from countries that matter. India suffering from Sino-phobia after the 1962 war refused to have anything to do with Taiwan lest it annoyed China some more and China rubbed its nose in the mud again. Today, India has at last allowed a harmless (for China) Taiwanese politician to set foot in India only after taking due permission from Communist China. India needs to change its policy on Taiwan This card is to be kept aside till the appropriate time and let China know it.

What I wrote on the strategy to contain China is no fairytale but something that is achievable. To achieve this, as I mentioned earlier, it would take strong political resolve and India’s best diplomatic efforts. A military base each in Northern Vietnam immediately and the Wakhan Corridor later is of paramount importance if India wants to keep the boisterous and belligerent dragon away from mischief directed at it. Once China realizes that India can take out its vital economic assets and it can’t respond before it is too late, it will have no option but to behave.

At the end of the day India also wants the border and territorial dispute with China settled amicably. This cannot be achieved as long as India decides not to confront the dragon with the ground realties.


If India remains complacent it will surely pay the price in not too distant future. If it is too incompetent to come up with a “contain China” strategy of its own, then the next best way to keep the dragon away and secure its borders is to get into full military alliance with the United States of America.

The U.S. Nuclear Deal and Indian ICBMs

CNN-IBN reported on June 18 that India had halted the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles as a good-faith gesture aimed at facilitating the troubled civilian nuclear deal with the United States. According to Stratfor, though the gesture may have appeared magnanimous, intercontinental reach is far down New Delhi's list of priorities.

New Delhi appears to have halted -- at least temporarily -- development of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), CNN-IBN reported June 18. The halt appears to be an effort to address Washington's discomfort with the proposed U.S.-Indian bilateral civilian nuclear deal. Though the report has not been confirmed, it also has not been denied. U.S. concerns, however, have nothing at all to do with Indian ICBMs. India has only moderate interest in such a capability, since its most pressing international concerns are hardly at intercontinental distances. As such, India's need for ICBMs -- especially in the near term -- is quite limited. Pakistan Ultimately, India is fairly geographically secure. Oceans and mountains constitute the bulk of New Delhi's border. The Himalayas provide a nearly impenetrable barrier to meaningful military confrontation with China. Pakistan, which along with Afghanistan occupies the Hindu Kush to the northwest, is the only real power within India's immediate geographic zone. The Indo-Pakistani rivalry has been well entrenched since 1948 -- but Indian strategic missiles are well-suited to deal with that threat. Moreover, the nuclear balance between the two has matured to the point that it now injects an element of stability and restraint into the rivalry. An ICBM has almost no relevance to a direct confrontation with Pakistan. The 3,000-kilometer (about 1,800 miles) distance from Bangalore in southern India to the Pakistani capital, Islamabad, in northern Pakistan is probably approaching the minimum range of a true ICBM. Thus, unlike the intercontinental ranges of the U.S.-Russian Cold War rivalry, the Indo-Pakistani rivalry is not a long-distance rivalry. The medium-range Agni II, the longest-range ballistic missile yet deployed by the Indian military, already allows India to cover the entirety of Pakistan from nearly anywhere in India. In terms of this particular rivalry, the Agni II will suffice for New Delhi's ballistic missile needs. Other avenues, like the BrahMos cruise missile and the Prithvi-derived Dhanush ship-launched ballistic missile now under development, can be pursued to complement this ability. Any additional range actually would be counterproductive. China The Sino-Indian balance, however, is another story. With the Himalayas as a geographic buffer, neither country represents an imminent strategic threat to the other. And neither has much interest in any sort of arms race, since both have far better things to worry about. This is where the Agni III intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) comes in. A successful test in April followed a serious stumble in 2006, when a failure with the first-stage exhaust nozzle destroyed the test mission in the first minute of flight. It took nearly a year to retool and test a second missile. The Agni III gives New Delhi the ability to target Beijing, though this is not something New Delhi is in any particular hurry to do given the two countries' distracted bilateral relationship. Beijing, by contrast, already can target all of India with most of its strategic arsenal. With another major power so close by, New Delhi could only consider it prudent to establish a basic counterbalance. Given the state of the two countries' current relations, such a counterbalance could be more than sufficiently accomplished with a small force of Agni III missiles. Other Motivators for India This is not to say India does not want an ICBM capability; who would not? But just like anyone else, India has priorities -- with establishing the military capability to obliterate Pakistan ranking near the top. Achieving a basic parity with China also is important. But for the immediate future, the importance of the nuclear deal with Washington ranks far above its desire for intercontinental reach. While an ICBM is indeed within India's grasp, the nation's missile programs reflect that this is not a top priority. Development of the Surya ICBM has been rumored for more than a decade without tangible results. This is despite continued progress with the indigenous geostationary and polar orbit satellite launch vehicles on which the Surya theoretically is based. (Ultimately, the distinction between a satellite launch vehicle and an ICBM comes down to payload.) What is more, India is poised to become only the sixth country in the world to field a cryogenic upper stage, a particularly complex technology. So if it were a real priority, the Surya would surely be further along. On the other hand, few things are more important to India right now than maintaining control over its own nuclear fuel cycle (and thus retaining the ability to extract its own weapons-grade plutonium for military purposes). This has been a contentious issue in the nuclear negotiations with the United States. India's defense establishment is extremely wary of the conditions the United States wants to place on India before the civilian nuclear deal can pass, and New Delhi is offering very little leeway on any concessions that would set India back militarily. Before the announcement of the Indian ICBM halt, the Indian Cabinet ratified an amendment June 15 to the International Atomic Energy Agency convention providing for protection of nuclear material from acts of terror and sabotage. This was another key U.S. demand for India (a nonsignatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) to facilitate the ongoing negotiations. In essence, the apparent sacrifice of the ICBM program is nothing more than a low-cost way for India to promote itself as a responsible nuclear player deserving of the civilian nuclear agreement with the United States. India can certainly stand to take a missile program essentially already on the back burner off the stove for a little while. But with the continued development of the Agni III IRBM and launches of its geostationary and polar satellite launch vehicles, India will continue to progress in this direction regardless.[Stratfor]

Stratfor is right on the importance and priority of ICBMs for India at this moment. Recent Chinese statements on Arunanchal Pradesh and the larger border dispute are of any indication, then development and deployment of Agni III IRBM should now be the main priority of the Indian government.

Surveillance in the Internet Age

Here is Stratfor's article on the importance of the Internet in Surveillance.

Those who conduct surveillance -- either for nefarious or protective security reasons -- frequently have used available technology to aid them in their efforts. In earlier times, employing such technology might have meant simply using a telescope, but in more recent years, surveillants have used photographic and video gear, night vision aids and electronic equipment such as covert listening devices, beacons and programmable scanners. These efforts have been greatly enhanced by the advent of personal computers, which can be used to database and analyze information, and the Internet, which has revolutionized information gathering. Doubtlessly, modern technology has radically altered the surveillance process. What it has not done, however, is render physical pre-operational surveillance obsolete. Despite innovative Internet tools, a person sitting in an Internet café in Quetta, Pakistan, cannot get everything he or she needs to plan and execute a terrorist attack in New York. There are still many things that can only be seen in person, making eyes-on surveillance vital to pre-operational planning. And, as long as actual physical surveillance is required, countersurveillance will remain a key tool for proactively preventing terrorist attacks. The Internet as a Tool The Internet has proven to be an important asset for those preparing a surveillance operation. If the target is a person, open-source Internet searches can provide vital biographical information, such as the target's full name, address, occupation, hobbies, membership in organizations, upcoming speaking engagements and participation in charity events. It also can provide the same information on the target's spouse and children, while image searches can be used to find photos of the target and related people. In most instances, public records checks performed on the Internet also can provide a vast amount of personal information about a potential target, including property, vehicle and watercraft ownership, voter registration data, driver's license information, criminal history, professional license information and property tax data. The property tax data can be especially revealing because it not only tells the surveillant which property the target owns, but in some jurisdictions can even include photographs of the front of the home and even copies of the floor plan. In addition, many commercial services will, for a fee, provide an extremely detailed public records dossier on a desired subject -- often with little regard for how the information will be used. There also are a number of Internet sites that offer maps and aerial photographs of specific locations. In videos released by the al Qaeda Organization for the Countries of the Arab Maghreb, the group has shown how it has used Google Earth to obtain aerial photographs to help it plan its attacks in Algeria. An additional aspect of the Internet is that posters -- wittingly or unwittingly -- often meet hostile surveillants halfway, so to speak. For example, several environmental, animal rights, anti-globalization and anti-abortion groups have even gone so far as to publish lists of potential targets on their Web sites, frequently including personal data and sometimes also photographs. Real estate agencies also use the Internet to post detailed photographs, and even video tours, of homes on the market, which can provide additional information to surveillants. Buildings that lease office space also frequently post a great deal of online information. And, of course, many people are quite obliging to would-be surveillants and post a great deal of information about themselves -- including numerous photographs -- on blogs, personal home pages or networking Web sites like MySpace and Facebook. Importantly, not only can surveillants use the Internet to collect an abundance of information on a person or location, they can do so quickly -- and anonymously. Before the Internet era, hostile surveillants were forced to expose themselves at a far earlier stage in the attack cycle, if only to request information from a public agency or collect photographs to initially identify a person or location. Now, much of this information can be obtained without the need for surreptitious behavior or for providing false information -- and from the comfort and safety of one's own home. Of course, the Internet also can be used for protective reasons. Security managers, for instance, can conduct "cyberstalker" operations to determine how much information is available on the Internet regarding a person or building they are responsible for protecting. Though it is hard to get some information removed from the Internet once it is out there, it is important to realize that such information is available, and to identify where information vulnerabilities exist. The Limits of Technology One of the major problems associated with relying solely on information found on the Internet is the possibility of error. Because there is a great deal of erroneous information on the Internet, one cannot take every post at face value. Additionally, public data sources tend to have a considerable lag time (sometimes of several months) between an event and its posting on the Internet. For example, it is possible to pay a company to run a detailed public records profile on someone and then find that the person actually sold the property listed as the "confirmed" address on that profile two months earlier. When information gathered from a source such as the Internet is not confirmed, it can lead to the failure of an entire operation. A militant group is unlikely to win much sympathy among its intended audience if it shoots the wrong person or leaves a timed incendiary device at the wrong residence (as the Animal Liberation Front did in June 2006.) Furthermore, terrorist attacks require a large amount of time and effort, and in some cases utilize a large proportion of the resources available to a militant group. Such attacks also carry with them the possibility of death or long imprisonment for the person conducting them. They are, therefore, too costly to be conducted without adequate planning -- and sophisticated planning requires information that can only be collected by conducting physical surveillance. Biography data and photos, maps to help find the target's house, aerial photos of the target's property and even street-level views of a target's apartment building or home are very useful to operational planners. In fact, an operational commander can use these tools to help plan the surveillance and to quickly orient the surveillance and attack teams to the target and the area around it. However, even at their best, these sources of information provide a potential attacker with a static (and usually quite limited) view of a person or building. It simply cannot provide the richness of perception that comes from actually watching the building or person over time. Additionally, the targeted person or building does not exist in a vacuum, and potential attackers must also have an understanding of the environment around the target if they are going to determine the best time, location and method for the attack, how best to take advantage of the element of surprise and how to escape afterward, if escape is called for in the plan. It is hard to place a target into context based solely on the information available on the Internet. Internet information also cannot provide what is perhaps the most important element of operational planning: an understanding of human behavior. If the target is a person, the surveillance team is looking not just for static facts, but for patterns of behavior that will predictably place the target in an ideal attack site at a specific time. Internet research can reveal that the target owns two cars and works for a particular company, but it will not reveal which vehicle he drives to work or whether he has a driver, the time he leaves the house, the Starbucks he visits every morning on his way to work, or the odd little shortcut he takes every morning to avoid traffic. If the target is a building, the surveillance team will be looking to define the security in place at the site and for gaps in the security both in terms of physical security equipment and in guard coverage that can be exploited. They will make diagrams of the building, including any bollards, cameras and access control measures. They also will monitor the guards to see how they operate, and note their level of training and alertness. Militant groups have been known to test the adequacy and response time of building security by attempting to park a vehicle illegally in front of a building or by entering the building without the proper identification. In the past, al Qaeda has even entered potential target buildings and collected detailed engineering data such as the measurements and locations of building support pillars, elevator equipment and air handling systems. This is simply not the type of information that can be obtained by looking at overhead photos or even at 3D street-level views of the targeted building on the Internet. Though the Internet can provide surveillance teams with information that allows them to become quickly oriented to their target, and to condense some of the initial surveillance they would otherwise need to conduct, it has not been able to replace physical surveillance altogether. In fact, the same video in which al Qaeda's Maghreb node uses Google Earth to demonstrate how to plan attacks also shows operatives conducting physical surveillance of the attack sites. It also shows videos of attacks, meaning a surveillance team was on hand to record the event. Although the Internet has become a valuable tool in the surveillance process, it has not come close to eliminating the need for eyes-on monitoring of a target. As such, countersurveillance remains a powerful and proactive tool in the counterterrorism toolbox.[Stratfor]

What if Nehru Never Took the Kashmir Issue to the UN?

Vikram Sood, former head of RAW in an article writes on the major implications of Nehru's first blunder.

From the 1970s, Pakistan began trying to detach Gilgit and Baltistan from the rest of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK). By 1982, General Zia was suggesting that while the question of Kashmir could be examined afresh, Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu were an integral part of Pakistan and were separate from POK. Pakistan gradually tightened its hold on the region. Dissent and nationalism have been suppressed with singleminded ruthlessness. There has been systematic discrimination against the locals and Sunni Pathans imported to offset the Shias of Gilgit and Baltistan to change demographic patterns. In the early 1980s, Pakistan made serious attempts to move from Skardu towards the Karakoram Pass near Aksai Chin. This intended linking with Shahidullah on the Kashgar-Shigatse road that goes through Aksai Chin and runs parallel to the Tibet-India border would have enabled an outflanking of India in Ladakh. Alarmed at this, India asserted that the Karachi Agreement of 1949, which stipulated that the Line of Control (LoC) would run north towards the glaciers from Pt NJ 9842, be fully implemented. North meant the true north and also meant the Siachen Glacier, not the Karakoram Pass, which is north-east from NJ 9842. Troops had to be sent to the Saltoro Ridge to ensure this. Later, in 1994, the Lahore High Court ruled that administrative separation of these areas from the rest of POK was illegal; the Pakistani authorities had the Supreme Court overturn this in 1996. There are good strategic reasons why Pakistan has followed this policy. The mighty Indus that irrigates Pakistani Punjab passes much of its distance in India through Ladakh and then Baltistan and Gilgit. Imagine for a moment if today the entire J&K were with India. We would have a border with Afghanistan and the Wakhan Corridor would have provided access to Central Asia. India would have had a border with Chitral, Swat and Hazara districts of the NWFP. The Karakoram Highway, which enters China at the Khunjerab Pass and through which Pakistan has acquired strategic material, would not have been built. Pakistan would not have had direct access to China. Pakistan may have its own reasons to keep the Kashmir issue alive. But it wants the world to assume that Gilgit and Baltistan is a settled issue - settled in favour of Pakistan. China, too, would be interested that Pakistan has total control over Gilgit and Baltistan. Otherwise the $ 298 million investment in the development of Gwadar is a financial or strategic waste. Xinjiang is only 2,500 km away from the Arabian seaport of Gwadar. On the other hand, it is 4,500 km away from the Chinese east coast. A fully developed port at Gwadar would help in the economic development of Xinjiang. Gas and oil pipelines from Gwadar to Xinjiang and Tibet would enable China to overcome the uncertainty of sealanes from the Persian Gulf through the Malacca Straits patrolled by the US. Therewill be a special SEZ for China in Gwadar. China has set aside $ 150 million to upgrade the Karakoram Highway and widen it from 10 metres to 30 metres for heavy vehicles in all-weather conditions. A rail link is also planned in the region with technical advice from an Austrian firm to connect Pakistan and China. This link will be connected further south into the main Pakistani rail grid. Fibre optic cables are being laid. An Islamabad Kashgar bus service will start from August 1. Both China and Pakistan are getting ready for an economic boom that will include transit trade to Central Asia. The Pakistani Army's National Logistics Cell, which has a near monopoly, will handle this freight traffic all the way up to Kazakhstan and Xinjiang. There is money to be made. Thus development of both Gwadar and control of Gilgit and Baltistan are interlinked and the Pakistani Army will gain financially from both. In fact, it is going to be a financial bonanza for the already huge corporate interests of the Pakistani Army. All this is being done by using territory that we say is an inalienable part of India. In retrospect, it can be said that it was a mistake to have halted our troops at Uri and Gurez in 1948. It was a blunder to have then gone to the UN for succour. But it would be a strategic catastrophe to withdraw from Siachen without the entire issue of J&K satisfactorily and unequivocally resolved. Since distortion of facts is possible, a mere signing of documents about the Agreed Ground Position Lines would not be an adequate guarantee enabling troop withdrawals.[Vikram Sood]

With China's strategy of encircling India with its strategic string of pearls, India too should have some strategic pressure points that can make China vulnerable. India should not waste anytime in making the Karakoram Highway this very pressure point. And RAW should be very active in the Northern Areas.

The Secrets of Counter-Surveillance

Stratfor in another of its innumerable insightful articles takes a look at the secrets of counter-surveillance (CS), which is the process of detecting and mitigating hostile surveillance. Counter-surveillance (CS) is also an important, though often overlooked, element of counter-terrorism and security operations.

According to Stratfor, counter-surveillance is especially important because it is one of the few security measures that allows for threats to be dealt with before they can develop into active attacks.

The First Secret Various potential assailants use different attack cycles, which vary depending on the nature and objectives of the plotter. For example, the typical six-step terrorist attack cycle does not always apply to a suicide bomber (who is not concerned about escape) or a mentally disturbed stalker (who is not concerned about escape or media exploitation). It is during the early phases of the attack cycle -- the target selection and the planning phases -- that the plotters conduct their surveillance, though they even can use a surveillance team during the actual attack to signal that the target is approaching the attack zone. The purpose of pre-operational surveillance is to determine the target's vulnerabilities. Surveillance helps to quantify the target, note possible weaknesses and even to begin to identify potential attack methods. When the target is a person, perhaps targeted for assassination or kidnapping, surveillants will look for patterns of behavior such as the time the target leaves for work, the transportation method and the route taken. They also will take note of the type of security, if any, the target uses. For fixed targets such as buildings, the surveillance will be used to determine physical security measures as well as patterns of behavior within the guard force, if guards are employed. For example, the plotters will look for fences, gates, locks and alarms, but also will look for times when fewer guards are present or when the guards are about to come on or off their shifts. All of this information will then be used to select the best time and location for the attack, the type of attack and the resources needed to execute it. Since an important objective of pre-operational surveillance is establishing patterns, the operatives will conduct their surveillance several times, often at different times of the day. Additionally, they will follow a mobile target to different environments and in diverse locations. This is when it is important to know the first "secret" of CS: surveillants are vulnerable to detection. In fact, the more surveillance they conduct, the greater the chances are of them being observed. Once that happens, security personnel can be alerted and the entire plan compromised. Additionally, surveillants who themselves are being watched can unwittingly lead intelligence and law enforcement agencies to other members of their organization. Surveillance A large and professional surveillance team can use a variety of fixed and mobile assets, including electronic listening devices and operatives on foot, in vehicles and even in aircraft. Such a large team can be extremely difficult for anyone to spot. A massive surveillance operation, however, requires an organization with vast assets and a large number of well-trained operatives. This level of surveillance, therefore, is usually only found at the governmental level, as most militant organizations lack the assets and the number of trained personnel required to mount such an operation. Indeed, most criminal and militant surveillance is conducted by one person, or by a small group of operatives. This means they must place themselves in a position to see the target -- and thus be seen -- with far more frequency than would be required in a huge surveillance operation. And the more they show their faces, the more vulnerable they are to detection. This vulnerability is amplified if the operatives are not highly trained. The al Qaeda manual "Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants" and its online training magazines not only instruct operatives planning an attack to conduct surveillance, they also point out the type of information that should be gathered. These documents, however, do not teach jihadist operatives how to go about gathering the required information. In the United States, the Ruckus Society's Scouting Manual provides detailed instructions for conducting surveillance, or "scouting," as the society calls it, on "direct action" targets. Following written instructions, however, does not automatically translate into having skilled surveillance operatives on the street. This is because, while some basic skills and concepts can be learned by reading, applying that information to a real-world situation, particularly in a hostile environment, can be exceedingly difficult. This is especially true when the application requires subtle and complex skills that are difficult to master. The behaviors necessary to master surveillance tradecraft are not intuitive, and in fact frequently run counter to human nature. Because of this, intelligence and security professionals who work surveillance operations receive in-depth training that includes many hours of heavily critiqued practical exercises, often followed by field training with experienced surveillance operatives. Most militant groups do not provide this level of training, and as a result, poor tradecraft has long proven to be an Achilles' heel for militants, who typically use a small number of poorly trained operatives to conduct their surveillance operations. What does "bad" surveillance look like? The U.S. government uses the acronym TEDD to illustrate the principles one can use to identify surveillance. So, a person who sees someone repeatedly over Time, in different Environments and over Distance, or one who displays poor Demeanor can assume he or she is under surveillance. Surveillants who exhibit poor demeanor, meaning they act unnaturally, can look blatantly suspicious, though they also can be lurkers -- those who have no reason for being where they are or for doing what they are doing. Sometimes they exhibit almost imperceptible behaviors that the target senses more than observes. Other giveaways include moving when the target moves, communicating when the target moves, avoiding eye contact with the target, making sudden turns or stops, or even using hand signals to communicate with other members of a surveillance team. The mistakes made while conducting surveillance can be quite easy to catch -- as long as someone is looking for them. If no one is looking, however, hostile surveillance is remarkably easy. This is why militant groups have been able to get away with conducting surveillance for so long using bumbling operatives who practice poor tradecraft. The Second Secret At the most basic level, CS can be performed by a person who is aware of his or her surroundings and who is watching for people who violate the principles of TEDD. At a more advanced level, the single person can use surveillance detection routes (SDRs) to draw out surveillance. This leads to the second "secret": due to the nature of surveillance, those conducting it can be manipulated and forced to tip their hand. It is far more difficult to surveil a mobile target than a stationary one, and an SDR is a tool that takes advantage of this difficulty and uses a carefully designed route to flush out surveillance. The SDR is intended to look innocuous from the outside, but is cleverly calculated to evoke certain behaviors from the surveillant. When members of a highly trained surveillance team recognize that the person they are following is executing an SDR -- and therefore is trying to manipulate them -- they will frequently take countermeasures suitable to the situation and their mission. This can include dropping off the target and picking up surveillance another day, bypassing the channel, stair-step or other trap the target is using and picking him or her up at another location along their projected route. It can even include "bumper locking" the target or switching to a very overt mode of surveillance to let the target know that his SDR was detected -- and not appreciated. Untrained surveillants who have never encountered an SDR, however, frequently can be sucked blindly into such traps. Though intelligence officers performing an SDR need to look normal from the outside -- in effect appear as if they are not running an SDR -- people who are acting protectively on their own behalf have no need to be concerned about being perceived as being "provocative" in their surveillance detection efforts. They can use very aggressive elements of the SDR to rapidly determine whether the surveillance they suspect does in fact exist -- and if it does, move rapidly to a pre-selected safe-haven. At a more advanced level is the dedicated CS team, which can be deployed to determine whether a person or facility is under surveillance. This team can use mobile assets, fixed assets or a combination of both. The CS team is essentially tasked to watch for watchers. To do this, team members identify places -- "perches" in surveillance jargon -- that an operative would need to occupy in order to surveil a potential target. They then watch those perches for signs of hostile surveillance. CS teams can manipulate surveillance by "heating up" particular perches with static guards or roving patrols, thus forcing the surveillants away from those areas and toward another perch or perches where the CS team can then focus its detection efforts. They also can use overt, uniformed police or guards to stop, question and identify any suspicious person they observe. This can be a particularly effective tactic, as it can cause militants to conclude that the facility they are monitoring is too difficult to attack. Even if the security forces never realized the person was actually conducting surveillance, such an encounter normally will lead the surveillant to assume that he or she has been identified and that the people who stopped him knew exactly what he was doing. Confrontational techniques can stop a hostile operation dead in its tracks and cause the operatives to focus their hostile efforts elsewhere. These techniques include overt field interviews, overt photography of suspected hostiles, and the highly under-utilized Terry stop, in which a law enforcement officer in the United States can legally stop, interview and frisk a person for weapons if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, even if the officer's suspicions do not rise to the level of making an arrest. Also, by denying surveillants perches that are close to the target's point of origin or destination (home or work, for example) a CS team can effectively push hostile surveillance farther and farther away. This injects a great deal ambiguity into the situation and complicates the hostile information-collection effort. For instance, if surveillants do not know what car the target drives, they can easily obtain that information by sitting outside of the person's home and watching what comes out of the garage or driveway. By contrast, surveillants forced to use a perch a mile down the road might have dozens of cars to choose from. CS teams also can conduct more sophisticated SDRs than the lone individual. In addition, the CS team will keep detailed logs of the people and vehicles it encounters and will database this information along with photos of possible hostiles. This database allows the team to determine whether it has encountered the same person or vehicle repeatedly on different shifts or at different sites. This analytical component of the CS team is essential to the success of the team's efforts, especially when there are multiple shifts working the CS operation or multiple sites are being covered. People also have perishable memories, and databasing ensures that critical information is retained and readily retrievable. CS teams also can conduct more sophisticated SDRs than the lone individual. Although professional CS teams normally operate in a low-key fashion in order to collect information without changing the behaviors of suspected hostiles, there are exceptions to this rule. When the team believes an attack is imminent or when the risk of allowing a hostile operation to continue undisturbed is unacceptable, for example, team members are likely to break cover and confront hostile surveillants. In cases like these, CS teams have the advantage of surprise. Indeed, materializing out of nowhere to confront the suspected surveillant can be more effective than the arrival of overt security assets. Well-trained CS teams have an entire arsenal of tricks at their disposal to manipulate and expose hostile surveillance. In this way, they can proactively identify threats early on in the attack cycle -- and possibly prevent attacks.[Stratfor]

Wonder whether India has any CS programme. How long will Indians be sitting-ducks to terrorists of all kinds operating with impunity allover India?

India and the Modern Islamist Terrorist

Even five years after the 9/11 terror attacks, India’s security forces haven’t learned anything about modern Islamist terrorists. In their zeal to safeguard one of Delhi’s showpieces the Delhi Metro, the CISF, which has the responsibility of its security, has rightly decided to introduce a series of tough security measures including profiling of suspicious passengers. They have already decided the target for profiling – “bearded youths wearing caps” (read: Muslim youth wearing skull caps).

After that what are we supposed to do? Cry or laugh?

The modern Islamist terrorist is completely different from the stereotypical image engrained in the minds of India’s security forces. They are highly educated and ambitious. They come from simple middle-class families who are not overtly religious or are secular. They are well acquainted with Western lifestyle. They are clean-shaven, suave looking and don’t sport anything that will give their identity away. They are intelligent, courteous and friendly. To their families and the outside world, they would be the last anyone would suspect of being Islamists.

It is once they come under the influence of jihadi recruiters looking out for the modern would-be jihadi, their life takes a 180° turn. They are imparted lessons in radical Islam and brainwashed into believing that Islam is in danger from the infidels. In India, the meticulously planned and executed Gujarat riots of 2002 - in the wake of the heinous Islamist terror activity of burning and killing innocent but boisterous Kar-Sevaks at Godhra - where the state BJP govt and the larger Sangh Parivar actively participated and perpetuated the pogrom for more than two months is today used by Pakistan's ISI controlled Indian Islamists to brainwash the young and impressionable Indian Muslims to indulge in anti-India terrorism. Apart from this, as Mullahs teach the faithful to be more concerned about their fellow Muslim in another country than the welfare of their country, the Islamists have many excuses like Palestine, Iraq, Bosnia, Kashmir, etc to motivate innocent Muslims into jihad. Killing them - even if that means fellow Muslims get killed in the process - is the only way to save Islam and establish it as the dominant religion in the world. They are further brainwashed into believing that if they die for Islam, they will be in paradise and rewarded with 72 virgins for non-stop pleasure. Their background helps them from giving away their new identity. Ultimately their passion for radical Islam and jihad turn them into Islamic zombies.

But that doesn’t stop them from enjoying the vices defined by Islam before their final act. This is what some of the 9/11 terrorists who were supposed to be pious Muslims did before they boarded the flights that changed the world: Some of them called prostitutes to their rooms and indulged in earthly pleasures before their encounters with the virgins waiting for them in Paradise, others watch pornographic movies, some others gulped down liquor, some visited strip clubs. After that surely Allah wouldn’t have been that pleased and cancelled their tickets to paradise.

So the question is: are the Indian security agencies going to update their notes on the Islamist terrorists or are they going to harass innocent Muslims while letting the modern Islamist terrorist through the green and yellow channels.

Related Link: Tavleen Singh on the movement to de-Indianise Indian Muslims by imposing an Arabic idea of Islam.

The Chinese Espionage Style

In the wake of the arrest and subsequent trial of Chi Mak, a naturalized Chinese-American accused of acting as an agent of the Chinese government and exporting military information, among other charges, Stratfor, examining the the testimony and evidence presented in this case, reports how the case provides an inside look at the methods the Chinese use in the United States to acquire cutting-edge technology and the U.S. government's efforts to counter them. Chi's wife, brother, sister-in-law and nephew are awaiting trial in connection with the case.

An Age-Old Problem Espionage, often called "the world's second-oldest profession," has been practiced since the beginning of recorded history. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the launch of the global war on terrorism, however, the FBI redirected nearly all of its assets for foreign counterintelligence (FCI) programs into the counterterrorism effort. This meant that for the first time in the bureau's history, practically no counterintelligence efforts were taking place. Although the scope of the damage caused by this virtual FCI hiatus might never be fully appreciated, the October 2005 arrest of the Chi family was one sign that the pendulum was beginning to swing the other way -- that resources were being allocated to address the enormous problem of foreign spies. While the FBI's limited FCI programs run up against the espionage efforts of dozens of foreign countries, no country poses a more aggressive or widespread intelligence threat to the United States than China. The Chinese in many ways use the espionage version of the "human wave" attacks they employed against U.S. military forces during the Korean War. Due to China's size and the communist government's control of society, the Chinese can devote immense manpower to gathering intelligence. For example, the U.S. State Department issued 382,000 nonimmigrant visas and 37,000 immigrant visas to Chinese citizens in 2006. Additionally, more than 62,000 Chinese students were studying at U.S. universities last year. Granted, very few of these people were spies, though the number still represents an enormous pool of potential suspects to vet and watch, especially when one considers that there are only 12,575 FBI agents in the United States -- most of whom are assigned to tasks other than FCI, such as terrorism and white-collar crime. The bottom line, therefore, is that it is very difficult to determine which of these visitors are in the United States to steal secrets and technology. Indeed, many serve in both capacities: They are legitimate students and part of the intelligence effort. Furthermore, not everyone who collects information for the Chinese government realizes they are doing so. By engaging in normal conversations with Chinese friends or relatives about all manner of things, including work, the average person can be providing these friends -- the real intelligence agents -- with critical information. Additionally, in many cases, the activities of Chinese agents do not fit the legal definition of espionage. Scouring open-source material for new and emerging technologies, attending technology conferences and trade shows and hiring firms to look at new technologies are all legal activities -- and U.S. companies do this all the time. Some Chinese agents, then, are engaging much more in business intelligence than in true espionage. Given the blurred lines between civilian and government/military technology in China, however, the information gleaned can easily find its way into military applications. The Chinese Style The Chinese are renowned for their patient and persistent espionage methods, and for their technological reverse-engineering capabilities. They also are noted for taking an extremely long view of their political and military needs and of the intelligence required to meet them. Because of this, the Chinese pose the greatest intelligence threat to U.S. technology. Aggressive efforts by the Chinese government to obtain critical technologies are no secret. The Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, for instance, lists science and technology acquisition programs such as its National High-tech R&D Program (known as the 863 Program) on its official Web site. This program provides guidance and funding for acquiring or developing technology that will have a "significant impact on enhancing China's overall national strengths." Targeted technologies include those for civilian use in areas such as information technology (IT), biotechnology, agriculture, manufacturing, energy and the environment. Many of these technologies, however, also have military applications. While the 863 Program calls for the Chinese to acquire or develop these technologies, it is far cheaper and quicker to acquire them -- and China has a long history of doing so. A great many of China's weapons systems have been developed either by stealing designs and technologies or by outright copying the entire system. In addition to copying small arms such as the AK-47, the RPG-7 and the Makarov pistol, Chinese military industries have even reverse-engineered fighter aircraft. The Chengdu F-7 fighter, for example, is a copy of the Soviet MiG-21. This crash technological advancement program is intended not only to close China's technological gap with the West, but also to leapfrog ahead of it. To acquire critical technologies, then, the Chinese rely not only on traditional espionage, but also on collecting the needed information via open sources. Such open-source collection is both faster and easier than engaging in espionage -- and it is legal. In effect, the Chinese are exploiting the openness of the U.S. research and development (R&D) system. Such openness allows faster development of technologies in the United States because scientists and engineers from various institutions and companies can share ideas, and thus contribute to different aspects of the concept. The openness, however, also makes it easy for others to "eavesdrop" on the ongoing technological conversation. Other countries, including Israel, France, India and South Korea, do the same thing -- though none has matched China in the amount of effort and resources devoted to this process. To obtain the desired technology, China is sending students, scholars and researchers to work and study in the United States and other industrialized countries. Some of these visitors then return to China to work in high-tech "incubator parks," where R&D takes place. Among this group, however, are real intelligence officers who are sent to steal critical technologies. The Chi case provides insight into this process at work in the United States. According to the U.S. government, Chi was employed as a principal support engineer for Power Paragon, a subsidiary of L-3 Communications/SPD Technologies/Power Systems Group in Anaheim, Calif. Chi, who was born in China and became a U.S. citizen in 1985, was granted a "secret-level" security clearance in 1996 and worked on more than 200 U.S. defense and military contracts as an electrical engineer. During the investigation into Chi's activities, the FBI performed a "trash cover" on him -- literally combing through his trash for evidence -- and found two documents containing instructions for Chi to attend more seminars and lists of the technologies he was to obtain. The lists had been torn up into small pieces, but the FBI was able to reconstruct and translate them. The FBI then performed surreptitious searches of Chi's residence and reportedly found documents pertaining to a number of the technologies listed on both documents. Redefining the 'Company' Efforts to collect sensitive technology are conducted not only by individual intelligence agents, but also by the many corporations established and controlled by the Chinese government. One such corporation is the Xinshidai Group, which was established by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and is one of China's two largest military hardware conglomerates. One of the armaments companies Xinshidai controls is Norinco, which is widely known in the United States for sales of light arms and ammunition. While conglomerates such as Xinshidai are not officially part of the Chinese government, they were established solely to serve the needs of the PLA and the Chinese military-industrial complex. And one important need of the Chinese government is to acquire advanced defense technology. Many Xinshidai subunits, including Norinco, own subsidiary companies in the United States, and employees of these companies attend trade shows and technology conferences, and also meet with representatives from other companies. Of course, with so much information available online, much of this open-source collection can be accomplished from a desk in China Many times, early technologies related to the defense industry are not yet classified and therefore not protected. These technologies often become classified only after the U.S. government has purchased them. Information on these emerging technologies, then, can be obtained during the early stage, when their developers are applying for patents or looking for venture capital, partners and/or customers. The technology acquisition process more often crosses the line into traditional espionage inside China, where Chinese intelligence officers -- operating without fear of prosecution -- frequently steal sensitive documents or copy a target's hard drive. This situation is further complicated when one considers that many of the major U.S.-based corporations doing business in China or seeking to expand market share there also have lucrative contracts with the U.S. Defense Department or other federal agencies. Some of these companies are going beyond Chinese manufacturing and are establishing design and software development centers in the country, meaning even more technology and proprietary information must be made available there. The expansion of foreign companies into China brings a host of potential targets right to the Chinese intelligence apparatus, allowing China to apply even more pressure to even more points in its quest for technology. Moreover, the techniques used against companies and travelers in China can be far more aggressive than those employed against similar targets in the United States. In addition to the threat posed to U.S. national security, allowing China to close the technology gap through the acquisition of proprietary information -- legally or not -- ultimately will hurt U.S. multinationals as Chinese companies use the information to become competitors. This means U.S. companies wishing to remain competitive by operating in China or partnering with Chinese firms and their subsidiaries in the United States must maintain a high level of vigilance.[Stratfor]

Stratfor on BrahMos and the Export Market

Here is Stratfor's article on Indo-Russian joint venture BrahMos Supersonic Missile and its prospects in the export market.

The supersonic BrahMos anti-ship missile is being prepared for its first test-launch from a submarine, which could take place later this month. Already a well-tested design, the compact and versatile BrahMos also appears to have an export market waiting for it. Though the missile's true potential remains to be seen, it seems poised to achieve widespread proliferation. Taking its name from a juxtaposition of the names of the Indian Brahmaputra and Russian Moscow rivers, BrahMos Aerospace Private Ltd. began as an Indian-Russian venture in 1998. However, the design work on the BrahMos missile can be traced to the Soviet Union in 1985 -- the fledgling SS-N-26, on which the BrahMos is based, had already been through substantial testing by the time the company was formed. From the beginning of the joint venture, the export market has been part of the BrahMos' future. The world anti-ship missile market has been dominated since the 1970s by the French Exocet and the U.S. Harpoon. Compared to their predecessors, these missiles were compact and versatile. It was easy to find room on the deck of a ship for a few launcher canisters. They flew close to Mach 1 and, after a couple of design evolutions, were capable of being launched out of torpedo tubes or from aircraft. They quickly became the global standard, either through export sales or through widespread copying of the basic design. Exocets were used in combat in 1982 in the Falkland Islands war, sinking the HMS Sheffield and another ship (a third was damaged). Five years later, the USS Stark was struck by an Exocet fired from an Iraqi Mirage F-1 fighter (although the U.S. frigate survived). Eventually the Exocet (and other missiles based on the same design) grew from a first-class naval weapon, which it remains, into a tool of nonstate actors. In July 2006, an Iranian-supplied, Chinese-built C-802 -- which, while not necessarily a direct copy, is similar to the Exocet in most significant ways -- was used by Hezbollah to attack the INS Hanit off the coast of Beirut. But despite the Exocet's popularity, supersonic anti-ship missiles -- for a long time the sole purview of the Soviet Union -- are far more capable and devastating weapons. Missiles like the Soviet SS-N-19 Shipwreck and SS-N-22 Sunburn make naval planners nervous. At speeds up to Mach 3, when a supersonic sea-skimming missile appears on the horizon, response time is measured in seconds. Furthermore, at such speeds, the kinetic energy of the impact alone stands to do massive damage to a modern, thinly-armored surface combat vessel, even if the warhead fails to detonate. If the missile is destroyed at close range, debris traveling at high speed can still pepper the target, or even inflict more serious damage. However, these weapons have proven too big and unwieldy to become truly successful export products. The Shipwreck was never exported, and China received the Sunburn only as a result of importing the Russian platform designed to carry it, the Sovremenny-class destroyer. This is where the BrahMos comes in. Designed from the ground up as a supersonic missile, the BrahMos can approach speeds of Mach 3 -- three times as fast as either the Harpoon or the Exocet. The standard BrahMos missile can carry up to a 650-pound warhead, which is heavier than the Harpoon's payload and nearly double that of the Exocet. Touted as the "Universal Supersonic Cruise Missile" by the BrahMos joint venture, it -- like the Harpoon and the Exocet before it -- can be land-, surface-, sub- or air-launched and offers a substantial improvement in range from its predecessors. Of course, the BrahMos is not perfect. The first of two major drawbacks at this point is the diameter. Unlike the Harpoon and Exocet, the BrahMos is too thick to fit into a standard 21-inch torpedo tube (or even the rarer 26-inch tubes). This means submarines will have to be modified to carry it -- not a particularly cheap or attractive option. Also, the BrahMos does not come cheap -- reportedly in excess of $2 million each, more than twice the cost of a Harpoon or Exocet. However, the improved capability could prove more than sufficiently compelling. The BrahMos has already begun to be fielded on Indian naval vessels, and seems set to become a mainstay of the Indian military. Malaysia and Indonesia have also expressed interest -- Malaysia is expected to sign a formal deal later this week, and reportedly plans eventually to equip its new Su-30MKM Flanker jets with the missile. The export market, it would appear, is ready for an upgrade in capability and is willing to pay the price. It is quite telling that the first potential export customer for the BrahMos is Malaysia. In other words, the first country outside of Russia, India and China to field a supersonic anti-ship missile is not another great naval power, but a modest one. The fact that Malaysia could soon field an offensive naval capability that was once the sole purview of the Soviet Union marks a fundamental shift in the maritime threat environment -- a fact that could ultimately change the playing field not just for navies, but also for worldwide shipping. Click to Enlarge And Malaysia is only the first. Other nations from Algeria to Venezuela might find the new capability similarly enticing. Nations such as Taiwan could be just as intrigued by the availability of a supersonic cruise missile -- a role that the BrahMos also can play with modified targeting and guidance -- for land attacks. Ultimately, however impressive the BrahMos' success in the export market proves to be, the genie is out of the bottle; a new generation of versatile, compact supersonic anti-ship missiles is here to stay. If the BrahMos fails to capture that market, Russia has alternative export products up its sleeve. [Stratfor]